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Will Mohamed ElBaradei be the next president of Egypt ?
gar - 28.01.2011 10:50
- Will Mohamed ElBaradei the next president of Egypt ?
- Was the wikileaks leaks on Midle East programmed and with a purpose ?
- Does the new US administration, wants to get rid of the old dictators in Middle East , including Mahmoud Abbas? (showing to Israel who is the boss)
- Does the realease yesterday of the PA documents (that nail Abbas) from Al Jazirra was just a coincidence ?
 http://garizo.blogspot.com/2011/01/will-mohamed-elbaradei-be-next.html
It is almost a year ago that the Time magazine published an article " Will ElBaradei Run for President of Egypt?" .. an a year after .. there he comes to "lead the revolution" ! in the streets (and minimise the support to the Muslim brotherwood") .
[ ..Egyptian activists, most of them young, were out in force in the midday sun on Friday, Feb. 19, 2010 with their flags and posters raised high, their chants rippling across the pavement at the arrival terminal of Cairo International Airport. They had come out in a startling show of support for a candidate who has yet to declare his candidacy for the presidency of Egypt...
By Abigail Hauslohner / Cairo Saturday, Feb. 20, 2010 !!! ]
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First we have to consider that Mubarak card has been "burned" ... Also noteworthy is that his partner Mahmoud Abbas is now looking for a hole to hide after the revelations of Al Jazeera. The kingdom of Jordan is not doing any better and the "pro-Western" regime in Yemen is already facing protests. King Abdullah in S. Arabia has been exposed irreparably in the eyes of the Arabs when it was discovered that he begged the U.S. to attack Iran,... and all started as if by magic, soon after the revelations of Wikileaks. Coincidence? I think not.
It is a surprise the ease with which Obama governance emptied Mubarak, that faithful dog of the American policy in the M East. The same almost happened to Abbas. Phenomena to be explained. A logical explanation is that the Obama administration, seeing the corruption levels and inability of these M. East puppets and fearing that the radical Islam will find fertile ground, is trying to develop a controlled as possible, process to fuel popular resentment and send these dictators on permanent holidays hoping for a more efficient replacement .. On the other hand rips this ridiculous puppet theater that had been set up by Israel and the Bush administration in the past, those ridiculous dolls that were moving whenever and in whatever way Israel moved the strings. By doing this limits the possibility of autonomous mobility of Israel, so it should now listen more carefully to Washington. In particular, there was the fear of "unauthorized" raid against Iran or Lebanon which now seems that the U.S. does not want. So..there he comes ... ElBaradei at the Cairo Airport ready to lead the "revolution" and put a legacy for the presidency
 Website: http://garizo.blogspot.com/2011/01/will-mohamed-elbaradei-be-next.html
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| aanvullingen | | uit dit artikel zijn aanvullingen verplaatst naar de ruispagina | | | M.ElB: Myth Anti-American Muslim Brotherhood | J. Escobedo Shepherd - 04.02.2011 00:43
Egypt Preparing for Mega Protests,
ElBaradei Dispels Myth of An Anti-American Muslim Brotherhood
On the seventh day of protest in Egypt, organizers planned for a 'mega-march' in Cairo tomorrow, which would involve rolling general strikes and over a million people marching in the streets, reports Al-Jazeera. President Hosni Mubarak swore in his new cabinet today; it includes three senior officials from the last cabinet. Protesters all over Egypt have declared they will not stop until Mubarak steps down or is forced out.
The White House apparently believes regime change is imminent, and is taking steps to prepare for the next phase. Hillary Clinton has called for 'an orderly transition,' and an anonymous government source spoke to the LA Times about the delicate diplomatic nature of the situation:
"They don't want to push Mubarak over the cliff, but they understand that the Mubarak era is over and that the only way Mubarak could be saved now is by a ruthless suppression of the population, which would probably set the stage for a much more radical revolution down the road.''
Of the $2 billion America sends to Egypt annually, a majority goes to the military. Marwan Mossad, an architecture student with dual Egypt-American citizenship, told the New York Times, “I brought my American passport today in case I die today. I want the American people to know that they are supporting one of the most oppressive regimes in the world and Americans are also dying for it.”
Meanwhile, Mohamed ElBaradei, the opposition leader, dispelled the myth that a new regime in Egypt would consist of anti-American sentiment in an interview with Fareed Zakaria. He also clarified the intentions of the Muslim Brotherhood, about which American uber-conservatives like John Bolton have been spreading fear:
ELBARADEI: This is a myth that was sold by the Mubarak regime, that it’s either us — the ruthless dictators — or a Muslim al-Qaeda type. The Muslim Brotherhood has nothing to do with the Iranian movement, has nothing to do with extremism as we have seen it in Afghanistan and other places. The Muslim Brotherhood is a religiously conservative group. They are a minority in Egypt. They are not a majority of the Egyptian people, but they have a lot of credibility because of liberal parties have been a struggle for thirty years. They are in favor of a secular state. they are of –they are in favor of an institution that have bread lines, they are in favor that every Egyptian have the same rights, that the state is in no way a state based on religion. And I have been reaching out to them. We need to include them. They are as much a part of society as the markets that started here. I think this is a myth that has been perpetuated and sold by the regime and has no iota of reality. You know Fareed, I worked with Iranians, I’ve worked here. It’s 100 percent difference between the two societies.
http://www.alternet.org/newsandviews/article/454387/egypt_preparing_for_mega_protests%2C_elbaradei_dispels_myth_of_an_anti-american_muslim_brotherhood/
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Threat Of Muslim Brotherhood Running Egypt As An Anti-American Muslim State Is A Myth
POSTED IN LIBERALAND BY ALAN • JANUARY 30, 2011, 9:48 PMET
Mohamed ElBaradei, a leading voice of Egypt’s opposition, told Fareed Zakaria on CNN that the American conservative fear put forth by people like John Bolton and Thaddeus McCotter that the Muslim Brotherhood will step in and take over Egypt if Hosni Mubarak falls is a myth without “one iota of reality.”
ZAKARIA: One of the visions that haunts Americans is of the Iranian Revolution where a dictator was replaced by an even worse regime that was more anti-American and more threatening to the region. People worry about the Muslim Brotherhood. Are you confident that a post-Mubarak Egypt will not give rise to some kind of Islamic fundamentalist force that will undermine the democracy of Egypt?
ELBARADEI: I’m quite confident of that, Fareed. This is a myth that was sold by the Mabarak regime, that it’s either us — the ruthless dictators — or a Muslim al-Qaeda type. The Muslim Brotherhood has nothing to do with the Iranian movement, has nothing to do with extremism as we have seen it in Afghanistan and other places. The Muslim Brotherhood is a religiously conservative group. They are a minority in Egypt. They are not a majority of the Egyptian people, but they have a lot of credibility because of liberal parties have been a struggle for thirty years. They are in favor of a secular state. they are of –they are in favor of an institution that have bread lines, they are in favor that every Egyptian have the same rights, that the state is in no way a state based on religion. And I have been reaching out to them. We need to include them. They are as much a part of society as the markets that started here. I think this is a myth that has been perpetuated and sold by the regime and has no iota of reality. You know Fareed, I worked with Iranians, I’ve worked here. It’s 100 percent difference between the two societies.
http://www.alan.com/2011/01/30/threat-of-muslim-brotherhood-running-egypt-as-an-anti-american-muslim-state-is-a-myth/
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10CAIRO215 2010-02-18 16:04 2011-01-28 00:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
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SUBJECT: ACTIVISTS PREPARE FOR EL-BARADEI'S ARRIVAL; DETAINEES
RELEASED
REF: 09 CAIRO 2279
CLASSIFIED BY: Donald A. Blome, Minister-Counselor, State, ECPO;
REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. KEY POINTS
-- (SBU) Activists affiliated with the political opposition are planning to greet former IAEA Chairman Mohammed El-Baradei upon his scheduled February 19 arrival in Cairo from Vienna. In recent months, El-Baradei has spoken about a possible 2011 presidential run if the GOE enacts political reforms to ensure free and fair elections (reftel).
-- (U) El-Baradei's scheduled arrival has generated interest among political activists and the independent press.
-- (C) Early on February 17, the GOE detained two "April 6" activists and filed charges against them February 18 before releasing them later in the day.
¶2. (C) Comment: Discussion of El-Baradei's potential candidacy and his planned February 19 arrival seems to have energized opposition political activists and the independent press, but El-Baradei's broader public support remains unclear. Public reaction to El-Baradei's actions once he arrives could be an indication of his potential political staying power. El-Baradei has recently said he does not intend to run for president, but wants to advance democracy in Egypt. End comment.
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Activists Prepare to Greet El-Baradei
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¶3. (C) NGO activist Bassem Samir who is a member of the opposition El-Ghad party told us he and some of his colleagues are organizing activists to greet El-Baradei, and the "April 6" movement has said they are participating in this effort. El-Baradei's planned arrival has generated interest among activists and the independent press. A Facebook group supporting El-Baradei's candidacy has grown to almost 64,000 members. Egyptian novelist Alaa Al-Aswany published a February 16 op-ed article in independent "Shorouq" newspaper attributing youth enthusiasm for an El-Baradei candidacy to GOE "failed and corrupt policies." Independent newspaper Al-Dostour devoted considerable coverage February 17 to El-Baradei's expected arrival, and called for citizens "who dream of a nation free of corruption" to greet El-Baradei at the airport.
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"April 6" Activists Arrested and Released
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¶4. (C) In the early morning hours of February 17, police arrested three "April 6" activists as they were driving in Cairo. "April 6" leader Ahmed Salah told us police detained fellow leader Ahmed Maher and two members, and subsequently released one of the members. Salah noted that the group had been spray painting political graffiti around Cairo welcoming El-Baradei and criticizing the GOE. The "Egyptian Chronicles" blog posted a photo February 17 of wall graffiti attributed to the activists saying, "Mubarak's regime is over, support the change, support El-Baradei's candidacy." Lawyers for the two detained activists confirmed to us that the Public Prosecutor charged them on February 18 with "attempting to overthrow the government, forcibly changing the constitution and incitement." "April 6'" lawyers and Ahmed Salah confirmed to us that the GOE released the two activists on bail with charges pending on February 18 at approximately 5 PM local time. The lawyers did not expect the GOE to take further action on the case due to a lack of evidence to support the charges.
SCOBEY
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10CAIRO215.html
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10CAIRO237 2010-02-23 13:01 2011-01-28 00:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
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SUBJECT: El Baradei Returns to Cairo
REF: 10 CAIRO 215
CLASSIFIED BY: Margaret Scobey, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (C) Key Points:
-- Thousands of supporters greeted former IAEA Chairman Mohammed El Baradei upon his return to Cairo. Beleaguered leaders of the opposition seem relieved at their ability to muster a show of support for El Baradei and enthusiastic about his potential impact.
-- El Baradei is seen as an "independent" and viable alternative to a corrupt regime and an ineffectual opposition. However, the mainstream opposition appears reluctant to claim him as their own "consensus candidate."
-- In a television interview February 21, El Baradei criticized GOE corruption, election fraud, lack of political reform and failure to successfully address poverty and illiteracy.
-- El Baradei met with Arab League Secretary Amre Moussa on February 22 and will begin to meet with political activists on February 23."
-- NDP reaction and government media reaction focused on El Baradei's lack of political experience and doubts over his level of commitment. Opinion makers in the independent media also see El Baradei as an outsider and appear wary to offer unqualified support.
¶2. (C) Comment: Mohammed El Baradei's presence on the political scene remains more notable than his message, which echoes existing opposition demands. Yet El Baradei's sober and broad-ranging criticism of President Mubarak's regime, buttressed by his credentials as a Nobel Prize winner and former IAEA chairman, distinguished his message from that of largely ineffective opposition leaders. Despite his reluctance to declare himself a candidate, he appears, for now, to have captured the imagination of some section of the secular elite that wants democracy but is wary of the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood. The significant challenge ahead is mustering credibility on the Egyptian "street." The NDP has thus far stepped back from previous attempts to demonize El, which had backfired. The real political costs to the regime of embracing El Baradei are low, but President Mubarak is unlikely to receive the returning "national hero," his criticism a personal affront. End Comment.
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An Enthusiastic Welcome and Media Reaction
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¶3. (SBU) On February 19, former IAEA Chairman Mohammed El Baradei arrived at Cairo airport to mark his return to Egypt. According to several Embassy contacts and staff present at the airport "thousands" of supporters and activists greeted El Baradei warmly at the airport. El Baradei's return was also marked by a boost in the number of his Facebook fans -- now more than seventy thousand -- and a flurry of reporting on his return in the independent media. (Note: The El Baradei for president Facebook page is run by XXXXXXXXXXXX, son of well known Egyptian XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Note.) On the opinion pages, journalists suggested that while El Baradei's welcome represented a hunger for political life previously repressed, they questioned the value of vague promises of change and El Baradei's real commitment to the process. Government newspapers largely downplayed the importance of El Baradei's return, noting President Mubarak had extended to El Baradei the use of the airport's VIP lounge and confirmation that security services would be present to keep the peace. Opinion pieces in the government owned or affiliated newspapers noted his "European style" of "brief and to the point answers," suggesting that El Baradei remained out of touch with Egyptians and unprepared for politics in Egypt. Noting that he has rejected alignment with any of Egypt's political parties they also suggest El Baradei arrived without a real "political program."
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Activists Generally Optimistic
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¶4. (C) "April 6" leader Ahmed Salah, who was at the airport, told us he was "proud" his movement succeeded in helping to organize the group of supporters, which he estimated at around 3,000. Salah said that "April 6" leader Ahmed Maher and activist XXXXXXXXXXXX, who were detained by police February 17-18 (ref A), also participated in the greeting. Despite suggestions in the press that GOE security would maintain tight order and make arrests if necessary, Salah confirmed press reports of a limited security presence at the airport, saying the police "withdrew completely" from the airport. Salah acknowledged that the lack of police made the arrival somewhat chaotic, with supporters and journalists jostling each other to draw close to El Baradei. El Baradei himself later confirmed in a media interview that he had decided not to stop and speak to the crowd because of the limited security presence, fearing people would be hurt.
¶5. (C) Kifaya leader George Is'haq, himself over 60, told us he had been pleasantly surprised that those on hand to greet El Baradei belonged to the "younger generation," but said others of his generation were present. Taking credit for efforts to get people to come to the airport, he noted that El Baradei's welcome marked a return to the kind of activism Kifaya had not been able to muster since 2006. This he said was the first time they were able to mobilize people without the help or presence of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). (Note: Individual members of the MB had been cooperating with Kifaya, "April 6" and others in several campaigns focused on drawing support before the 2010 parliamentary and 2011 presidential elections, such as the Campaign for Free Elections and the Campaign Against Succession. The MB also participated in Kifaya's pro-judge rallies during the 2005 elections. End Note.) Is'haq suggested El Baradei's return fueled an optimism that had "revived" people's spirits. Political commentator, Cairo University professor and head of the Ayman Nour-founded Coalition Against Succession Hassan Nafaa told Al Jazeera English urged public pressure on the GOE to enact the constitutional reforms outlined by El Baradei and said that Egypt is now "witnessing a new wave of political mobilization."
¶6. (C) Civil society activist and Director of the Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and Legal Profession Nasser Amin said El Baradei represents a clean slate candidate, someone both untainted by possible collusion with the regime -- like other members of the opposition -- and untouched by accusations of wrong doing -- like 2005 presidential candidate Ayman Nour. Commenting in the independent press, novelist and now frequent political commentator Alaa Al Aswani called enthusiasm about El Baradei evidence of an Egyptian desire for change, but warned that he should not be seen as a "savior."
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El Baradei and the Opposition
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¶7. (C) Mainstream opposition parties which regularly meet as what is known in Egypt as the "opposition coalition" (Al Wafd, the Democratic Front Party (DFP), Taggamou and the Nasserist Party) have not been able to reach consensus on El Baradei as a democratic activist or candidate. Only DFP leader Osama Al Ghazali Harb has publically expressed enthusiasm about the impact of El Baradei's return to Cairo. Harb told us the turnout at the airport was a sign of a "new political momentum" that would take "competition with the government to a new level." Harb called El Baradei the right man at the right time, but underscored that his core message was the same as the long-standing demands from the opposition. He called El Baradei an "international heavyweight" untouchable by government smear campaigns. Press reports indicate that Harb is the only member of the four party coalition that supports El Baradei as a candidate. However, there appears to be some internal debate within the Wafd party. Wafd party members from Gharbiyya part of the group Wafdists Against Succession (not sanctioned by the party) were present at the airport to receive El Baradei. That group's leader told the Egyptian daily El Shorouk that he and Wafd leaders Honorary President Mostafa El Taweel and VP Fouad Badrawy intend to seek their own meeting with El Baradei.
¶8. (C) Al Ghad Party Vice President Wael Nawara told PolOff that he and others in the party welcomed El Baradei's political activism in Egypt. Nawara added he would have liked to greet El Baradei at the airport, but was busy working to resolve internal party conflict after Ayman Nour's announcement on February 15 that he had been selected by Al Ghad as its presidential candidate. Some in the party, including its president Ehab El Khouly, publically criticized this move as pre-empting Al Ghad's ability to support an opposition "consensus candidate" like El Baradei. Nour's own comments about El Baradei have vacillated between statements of support and suggestions that he is only a "virtual candidate." Fellow Ghad party VP Gameela Ismail, Nour's estranged wife, was on hand to greet El Baradei and told the media she saw no contradiction in her support for El Baradei. Ismail said she would stand behind coordinated opposition support for one presidential candidate whether EL Baradei or Nour.
¶9. (C) El Baradei will meet on February 23 with Harb, XXXXXXXXXXXX, and XXXXXXXXXXXX and other political activists. Press reports indicate that Dr. Yehia El Gamal, well-known constitutional scholar and co-founder of the Democratic Front Party (DFP), will also ask El Baradei to join a group of scholars who seek to draft an alternative constitution for Egypt. (Note: El Gamal left the DFP after a clash with current President and co-founder Osama Al Ghazali Harb. End Note.)
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In His Own Words
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¶10. (C) In his first public appearance since his return, Sunday, February 21, El Baradei took part in a three hour interview on Egyptian Satellite Channel Dream TV's program ten o'clock hosted by Mona El Shazli. Taking questions from callers El Baradei reiterated his previous statements that he never intended to run in the 2011 presidential elections but said he would run against President Mubarak if needed constitutional changes were made and it were in Egypt's interest to do so. El Baradei reiterated his call for constitutional reforms, particularly reform of Article 76 which governs the selection of presidential candidates and which many believe was tailor made for presidential son Gamal Mubarak, and Article 88 which does not proscribe term limits. (Note: El Baradei has said he will not join a party; one of the criteria for candidacy is senior membership in a party with at least one representative in parliament, but he has not ruled out running as an independent which would require the endorsement of 250 members of parliament and the local councils, likely impossible because both institutions are dominated by members of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). End Note) El Baradei also criticized widespread election fraud in 2005 and criticized as "conspiracy theory" that any other country (i.e., the U.S.) is capable of selecting the president of another. El Baradei criticized the current regime, specifically President Mubarak, for leadership that has led to a corrupt state characterized by a climate of fear that was imposed by the security services. He cited widespread corruption, the failure to enact reforms to address the country's high poverty and illiteracy rates, inability to address sectarian tensions, and limited space for practice of political rights as the current regime's legacy.
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NDP Reaction
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¶11. (C) NDP reaction has been muted. NDP MP and Political Science Professor Gehad Ouda called in a comment during the El Baradei television appearance and said El Baradei does not realize the difficulty of the situation in Egypt, suggesting his criticisms were off the mark as there are different types of democracy that might be applied. The evening following El Baradei's appearance on her show, TV host Mona El Shazli reportedly told her audience that she had received calls from the public accusing her of a pro-NDP bias and calls from NDP members angry that she had given El Baradei three hours of air time. Dean of the Cairo University Faculty of Economics and Political Science and member of the ruling NDP's Policies Committee Alia Al Mahdy, told PolOff she remains close to her predecessor Mona El Baradei (Mohammed El Baradei's sister) and believes El Baradei intends to press for change but is unlikely to actually run for president. She said that she in others in the NDP "respect" El Baradei but remain loyal to President Mubarak. She added that El Baradei's long absence from Egypt does not mean that he does not understand Egypt well enough to run but that Egyptians do not know him well enough to vote for him.
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Meeting Amre Moussa
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¶12. (SBU) In his first public meeting following his arrival, El Baradei met with Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa whom he called a "personal friend." The meeting was reported by the independent media as having focused on the "future of Egypt." El Baradei gave no formal comment to the media after the meeting but Amre Moussa reportedly said that all Egyptians were "aspiring for change," calling it their right to do so.
SCOBEY
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10CAIRO237.html
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Pappegaai M.R.
http://nos.nl/artikel/216128-rutte-wil-snelle-overdracht-egypte.html
http://nos.nl/video/216306-premier-rutte-over-hervormingen-in-egypte.html
http://nos.nl/uitzending/32165-20110203-200000-nos-journaal-2000-uur.html
http://nos.nl/artikel/216344-mubarak-wil-weg-weg-maar-niet-nu.html
http://www.joop.nl/wereld/detail/artikel/egyptische_oppostieleider_baradei_vastgehouden_in_moskee/
http://nos.nl/zoeken/?s=moslimbroederschap
| | CIVIL SOCIETY ON ELECTIONS, NAGA HAMADI | W.L.-02-04-2010 - 05.02.2011 02:33
10CAIRO163 2010-02-04 15:03 2011-01-28 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
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SUBJECT: DAS WITTES ENGAGES GOE, CIVIL SOCIETY ON ELECTIONS, NAGA
HAMADI, DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
REF: CAIRO 141; CAIRO 64; CAIRO 59; 09 CAIRO 2314; 09 STATE 130658
CLASSIFIED BY: Margaret Scobey, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. KEY POINTS
-- (C) In meetings January 24-25, NEA DAS Tamara Cofman Wittes assured activists of continuing U.S. commitment to promoting democracy and human rights. She urged the GOE to use the penal code, not the Emergency Law, to prosecute the January 6 sectarian killings in Naga Hamadi.
-- (C) The quasi-governmental National Council for Human Rights plans to begin training domestic election observers March 1, and is trying to convince the GOE to accept international observers. Activists expected 2010 and 2011 elections will not be free and fair, and urged the U.S. to plan a strong public response.
-- (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Bassim said the GOE will use the Emergency Law to prosecute the Naga Hamadi killers quickly, and to signal that the crime infringed on Egyptian "national security." MFA officials asserted a Unified Places of Worship Law could exacerbate, rather than calm, sectarian tensions.
-- (C) Responding to MFA opposition to USG funding for unregistered Egyptian NGOs, DAS Wittes stressed that the U.S. wants to support and engage with the full range of Egyptian civil society.
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Elections: Observers and Credibility
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¶2. (C) Secretary-General of the quasi-governmental National Council for Human Rights (NCHR) Mukhlis Kutb said his organization plans to begin on March 1 training domestic observers from certain Egyptian NGOs for the 2010 Shura Council and Peoples' Assembly elections, expected in June and November respectively. He noted the training would be based on international and UN standards. He was confident the GOE High Election Commission, which will administer the elections with the Interior Ministry, will accept NGOs trained by NCHR as domestic observers. He reiterated NCHR's position supporting international observers for the 2010 elections (ref D). Kutb asserted that the GOE is still considering whether to allow such observers. According to Kutb, NCHR is trying to convince the GOE to accept international observers by explaining that foreigners such as diplomats and journalists have observed previous elections, and will do so again. Kutb opined that the most important electoral reforms would be voter registration through national identification cards and transition to a party-list from a single-district system, but doubted the GOE would enact either before the 2010 elections.
¶3. (C) Human Rights lawyer XXXXXXXXXXXXXX said he expected the coming elections not to be free and fair, and urged the U.S. to begin planning a public response. He applauded A/S Posner's January 14 public comments on the Naga Hamadi killings, and encouraged the U.S. to consider using a similar public tone in response to expected election violations. XXXXXXXXXXXXXX urged the U.S. to warn the GOE privately of "specific consequences" if the 2010 elections are a repeat of the 2005 contests. Director of the XXXXXXXXXXXXXX exhorted the U.S. to press for international observers; he assessed such observers would lend credibility to the elections, and result in increased voter turnout. Chair of XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX doubted international observers would make a significant difference in the elections, noting she has been an international observer for Arab elections that appeared to be free and fair, but the governments had pre-determined the results by manipulating the rules. Egyptian XXXXXXXXXXXXX asserted that only a constitutional amendment restoring judicial supervision of the elections would result in higher voter turnout, but ruled out GOE support for such an amendment.
¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX said he plans to organize his movement to expose 2010 parliamentary and 2011 presidential election violations, using new media tools such as cell-phone cameras and mobile uploads. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX will support Mohammed El-Baradei for president, or any other candidate who runs on a "platform of change." XXXXXXXXXXXXXX said he has been urging former El-Ghad party president Ayman Nour to enlist El-Baradei to run as an El-Ghad candidate. He hoped that if international observers viewed violations, they could force the GOE to order a re-count.
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Sectarian Killings in Naga Hamadi
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¶5. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Wafaa Bassim said the GOE wants quick action, and needs to try the case under the Emergency Law to underscore the issue's "relevance to national security" and the GOE's clarity of purpose. Trying the case under the penal code "would take ages," she asserted. Bassim acknowledged this action is contrary to GOE assurances it uses the Emergency Law only for terrorism and drug cases (ref E). She said the Public Prosecutor's investigation has been thorough and transparent. MFA Deputy Assistant Minister for Human Rights Wael Aboulmagd conceded the GOE has favored "superficial reconciliation" efforts in the past, and did not respond "thoroughly" to sectarian violence. DAS Wittes expressed concern over broad GOE application of the Emergency Law, and urged the GOE to try the case under the penal code. She worried that a quick trial could preclude a full investigation, and that lingering questions could erode public confidence in the government's handling of the issue.
¶6. (C) Aboulmagd said the GOE does not view the draft NCHR Unified Places of Worship law, which would place approval for church and mosque construction and repairs under uniform GOE criteria, as a solution to sectarian tensions. He noted MOI views that such a law would exacerbate sectarian problems, and that Muslims "would call for Jihad" in response to increased church construction and repairs. Aboulmagd doubted the GOE would take action on the draft law.
¶7. (C) Mukhlis Kutb said NCHR sent a research team to Naga Hamadi, and will issue a detailed report on the killings. He attributed the killings to "an atmosphere of hate" spread on television and "on the streets." He assessed the GOE decided to try the assailants in an Emergency State Security court because a regular criminal trial "would take too much time." Kutb doubted a regular criminal court would convict Muslims for murdering Copts, due to "Sharia law considerations and the influence of mosques."
¶8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXX said "he feels humiliated every day as a Copt," hearing anti-Christian mosque sermons in his club and reading editorials in pro-government "Al-Ahram" newspaper that "the Bible is corrupt." He criticized the GOE for "allowing violence against Copts" by not prosecuting perpetrators. XXXXXXXXXXXXXblamed the GOE for not preventing the Naga Hamadi killings, and for not reforming the educational system to combat anti-Coptic sentiment.
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U.S. Democracy Promotion
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¶9. (C) MFA Deputy Assistant Minister for North American Affairs Amin Meleka said the GOE "has a problem" with U.S. funding for unregistered Egyptian NGOs through the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). Deputy Assistant Minister for Human Rights Wael Aboulmagd asserted that some NGOs choose not to register under the NGO law, but continue to operate. He claimed registered NGOs believe they are "at a disadvantage" by "playing by the rules." DAS Wittes pushed back, saying that the U.S. wants to support the full range of Egyptian civil society and the emergence of new actors, and that the GOE denies or does not act on some NGO applications. She hoped that the GOE would facilitate this process and increase civil society's role. Separately, human rights lawyer XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX called for public and private U.S. "moral support" for Egyptian civil society, and asserted that such support is more important than funding. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX urged the U.S. to fund only "competent" Egyptian NGOs, warning that many organizations are "weak." DAS Wittes assured civil society activists the U.S. is committed to promoting democracy and human rights, as evidenced by frequent public statements by the Secretary and other senior officials.
¶10. (U) DAS Wittes cleared this message.
SCOBEY
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10CAIRO163.html
| | Egyptian political reform has little traction | W.L. 06-01-2010 - 05.02.2011 05:28
10CAIRO47 2010-01-06 14:02 2011-02-03 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXRO1738
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #0047/01 0061417
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061417Z JAN 10 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4689
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 000047
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y
SIPDIS
FROM CDA TUELLER FOR A/S POSNER TEL AVIV PLEASE PASS TO A/S POSNER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2030
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KIRF ELAB EG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S POSNER'S JANUARY 12-15
VISIT TO CAIRO
REF: A. 09 CAIRO 2283
¶B. 09 CAIRO 2277
¶C. 09 CAIRO 2209
¶D. 09 CAIRO 2164
¶E. 09 CAIRO 1836
¶F. 09 CAIRO 928
CAIRO 00000047 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: CDA Matthew H. Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. KEY POINTS
-- (C) The impact of the political reform process that started at the beginning of this decade is mixed. Activists and opposition politicians are increasingly engaged in political life and the independent press has achieved a substantial degree of freedom to criticize the government.
-- (C) However, the government continues to suppress the political opposition, retaliate against journalists and bloggers, and restrict religious freedom.
-- (C) As the 2010 parliamentary and 2011 presidential elections approach, President Mubarak continues to resist taking steps that could weaken his hold on power, and significant political reform has had little traction.
-- (C) We continue to urge the GOE to take steps forward such as lifting the State of Emergency, allowing increased political pluralism and respecting religious freedom.
¶2. (C) A/S Posner, we warmly welcome you to Cairo, and are scheduling meetings with a wide range of interlocutors from the Egyptian government, civil society and political parties. We are scheduling a press conference for you to emphasize the themes in the Secretary's December 14 speech to the Egyptian public. Your visit will afford you the opportunity to engage with government officials who are skeptical of U.S. efforts to promote democracy and human rights, and press them on implementing a reform agenda. You will also have the opportunity to reassure activists and opposition politicians who are concerned that the Obama Administration has backed away from supporting political reform.
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Political Landscape
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¶3. (C) The 2011 presidential elections and the question of succession are the focus of most domestic political discussions. President Mubarak may well run for another five-year term, although nothing is certain. Opposition and civil society observers complain about biased election rules, including constitutional reforms in 2007 that effectively block independent candidates. They have called for additional reforms before the elections, including improvements to the voting lists and a return to judicial monitoring of each ballot box. While the GOE will allow domestic monitoring, international monitors remain a sensitive topic, with many, even members of the opposition, calling it foreign intervention. Statements from putative candidates such as retired IAEA Chairman Mohammed El Baradei, who suggested he was open to the idea of running for president should there be significant changes to the electoral system, have dominated headlines and drawn fire from NDP supporters. We regularly raise with the GOE the importance of allowing free and fair elections, and the value of international monitors.
¶4. (C) As the 2010 parliamentary and 2011 presidential electionsapproach, significant political reform has fallen off the agenda. In his November 19, 2009 speech to parliament, Mubarak emphasized a socio-economic program for the poor, claiming necessary political reforms had already been implemented (ref C). Few observers believe a risk-averse President Mubarak will support significant political reforms before 2011, as he is concerned that changes could weaken the power of entrenched interests within the NDP, the military and the intelligence services.
In private discussions, Mubarak and other senior leaders argue that without strong authorities to combat religious extremists, the stability of Egypt would be at risk. Ongoing internal GOE discussions regarding a draft counterterrorism law that would replace the Emergency Law, set to expire in April, are stalled, and the Emergency Law could once again be renewed. Frustrated political activists have suggested that a post-Mubarak landscape offers the best prospect for increased political openness, and some are advocating for a transitional caretaker government to install more democratic institutions, although such a scenario is unlikely.
¶5. (C) U.S. funding supports civil society efforts to train candidates and domestic monitors, educate voters and provide technical assistance to the GOE in administering the elections. However, the GOE remains skeptical of our role in democracy promotion, contending that any efforts to open up will result in empowering the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which currently holds 86 seats in Egypt's 454-seat parliament.
Widespread arrests and internal dissent have weakened the MB and its electoral chances, but many still see it as the only alternative to the current regime and a weak secular opposition. We have urged the GOE to expand the space provided to political actors, including allowing for the registration of new parties. GOE-sanctioned harassment of political activists continues. The most high-profile has been a decision by the GOE to deny Ayman Nour an exit visa to travel
to Washington.
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Human Rights and Political Reform Stalled
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¶6. (C) The impact of the political reform process that started at the beginning of this decade is mixed. On the positive side, the reformlegacy includes a largely empowered and independent press, a more influential and active labor movement, a renewed focus on women's and children's rights (we expect long-awaited comprehensive Anti-TIP legislation to be passed this year), secular opposition politicians and civil society activists eager to increase their engagement in political life, and liberal-minded members of the NDP (many close to presidential son Gamal Mubarak) focused on internal party reforms. However, significant human rights concerns remain, and the GOE has largely rebuffed our attempts to encourage specific reforms since the lead-up to President Obama's June 4 visit to Cairo.
¶7. (C) Since May 2009, we have asked the government to take several steps forward, including:
-- Lift the State of Emergency, and replace it with a counterterrorism law guaranteeing civil liberties.
-- Release detained bloggers.
-- Facilitate monitoring for the 2010 and 2011 elections.
-- Register the U.S. NGOs operating in Egypt: NDI, IRI and IFES.
-- Publicly endorse the quasi-governmental National Council for Human Rights' (NCHR) May 2009 recommendations, which include lifting the State of Emergency, addressing sectarian tensions, abolishing prison sentences for journalists, and passing legislation to combat torture more effectively.
-- Pass uniform places of worship legislation to allow Christians to worship freely, and redress discrimination.
-- Issue ID cards for Bahai'is.
¶8. (C) The issuing of identification documents to some of Egypt's Bahai's in recent months is a positive development, but implementation has been slow and limited to unmarried Bahai's. The GOE has not taken action on the other measures. Copts have called for a uniform law to establish equal rules for building mosques and churches, but the GOE does not appear to support such a draft law due to concerns over sectarian clashes that often erupt, especially in rural areas, in response to church-building. Well-placed NCHR contacts have told us in recent weeks that President Mubarak will likely renew the State of Emergency before it expires in May 2010 in deference to the Interior Ministry, which has argued that it uses vital provisions in only a limited number of counterterrorism cases. However, in recent months the GOE has used the Emergency Law to arrest and detain a large number of MB members, and it continues to hold two bloggers under the Emergency Law.
¶9. (C) The government's November 2009 report for the UN Human Rights Council's February 17 Universal Periodic Review of Egypt makes voluntary pledges to "finalize the text of a balanced counterterrorism law," "review" the legal definition of torture, and consider legal amendments to prevent third parties from filing defamation suits. (Note: The current legal definition of torture is limited to the context of extracting confessions. Current law allows anyone to file defamation cases on behalf of the "public good." End note.)
The report also pledges to "review" the NCHR's recommendation to enact a uniform places of worship law, and to enact legislation on issues such as NGOs, disabilities, and human trafficking. The pledges cover most of the issues raised in the NCHR's May 2009 recommendations, but are largely generalized and non-committal following months of inter-agency negotiations (ref B).
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Freedom of Expression
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¶10. (C) The government generally allows a wide range of criticism in the independent print press, but imposes constraints on mass media outlets. It limits dissent in privately-owned satellite television talk shows, and prevents any critical commentary on GOE-owned television and radio. In recent months, the government and NDP members have brought suits against journalists and writers who have criticized the NDP and the Interior Ministry. Defamation suits, sometimes on political grounds, continue to proliferate, and a journalist was briefly jailed in July for allegedly defaming an MP with ties to the Interior Ministry.
¶11. (SBU) Three bloggers remain in prison (ref E). XXXXXXXXXXXX, who has been jailed since October 2006, was sentenced to four years in prison in February 2007 for insulting Islam and President Mubarak. On December 22, a court rejected XXXXXXXXXXX's most recent appeal. The GOE jailed XXXXXXXXXXX under the Emergency Law in October 2008 following posts deemed offensive to Christianity and Islam. The GOE has also used the Emergency Law to detain activist and blogger XXXXXXXXXXXXX since December 2007 following posts about difficulties faced by Sinai Bedouin. The GOE also intimidates and harasses some bloggers who are critical of its policies.
¶12. (U) Prominent democracy activist XXXXXXXXXXXXXX (XXXXXXXXXXXX) remains in self-imposed exile in the United States following a June 2007 civil suit accusing him of committing "espionage" by urging President Bush to condition aid to Egypt. In May 2009, an appeals court reversed an August 2008 civil ruling against XXXXXXXXXXXXXX for "tarnishing Egypt's image abroad" in a suit filed by an NDP activist, and overturned the two-year prison sentence and fine (ref F). The appeals court also ruled that the five to six pending civil lawsuits against XXXXXXXXXXXXX on similar grounds be referred to the Prosecutor General (attorney-general equivalent) for investigation. The Public Prosecutor referred a separate criminal case against XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX for investigation in January 2009 for allegedly committing "espionage" by asserting in newspaper articles that he had convinced President Bush to withhold aid because of lack of progress on democratic reform.
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Police Brutality
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¶13. (C) While the GOE and its supporters claim that police brutality is unusual, human rights lawyers believe it continues to be a pervasive, daily occurrence in prisons, police stations and Interior Ministry State Security (SSIS) headquarters (ref D). Activists assert that the police and SSIS have adapted to increased media and blogger focus on police brutality by hiding the abuse and pressuring victims not to bring cases. Human rights lawyers believe the GOE should reduce pressure on officers to solve cases immediately, allow suspects to be accompanied by an attorney during questioning in police detention, and amend the laws to increase the penalties for brutality. We expect USG-funded human rights-oriented police training will resume in late January. Draft legislation increasing penalties for police brutality and broadening the definition of torture has languished in the Ministry of Justice.
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Religious Freedom
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¶14. (C) Religious minorities in Egypt generally worship without restriction, and in many cases play leading roles in the country,s business and professional sectors. Despite this, the GoE and Egyptian society's respect for religious freedom is poor. Copts and other Christians complain bitterly about the difficulties they face, particularly outside of major cities, in obtaining required government approval to build and renovate churches. Copts also point to the GoE's failure to aggressively intervene, both during and after sectarian clashes, to protect Christian property and prosecute perpetrators of violence. Copts believe the GoE's encouragement of "reconciliation," in lieu of criminal penalties, encourages further violence, and along with the failure to enact uniform standards for mosque and church construction, stigmatizes Copts as second class citizens.
¶15. (C) While there is no statutory prohibition on religious conversion and Egypt's constitution guarantees freedom of belief, court rulings and bureaucratic hurdles represent a prohibition in practice on conversion from Islam to Christianity. Converts from Islam to Christianity also complain of societal and governmental harassment and a number of converts have been convicted or detained for possessing forged documents stating that they are Christian.
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Labor
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¶16. (C) Egypt,s on-going wave of strikes and labor unrest has continued. Although Egypt's labor law requires that striking workers receive the approval of a GoE-affiliated "general trade union" before striking, a requirement that most strikers ignored, strikes generally proceed with minimal GoE interference. Egypt's independent Real Estate Tax Collectors Union (RETU), founded in 2008, continues to operate, despite a law requiring that all trade unions join the GoE-controlled Egyptian Trade Union Federation. Labor activism focuses on economic issues, and it is unclear whether Egypt's labor movement will take on a more overtly political role.
Tueller
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10CAIRO47.html
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