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Wie bepaald wat er gebeurt en hoe
Kakofonix - 12.01.2011 17:12
Over propaganda, voorkennis, boerenbedrog; tijd voor iets geheel anders!
Het wordt de hoogste tijd om het parlement af te schaffen en zelf beslissingen te nemen, zoals in een democratie. De regering loopt aan een dubieus lijntje en de 'bevolking' mag om de zoveel jaar een rood kleurpotlood vasthouden voor 150 voltijd en 75 deeltijd parlementariërs. We zijn sinds het Romeinse Rijk niet veel verder gekomen met democratiseren. Tragisch als het zo blijft ( http://wlcentral.org/node/818).
"want, we werden wel heel erg vaak gebeld door belangrijke Amerikanen om ons te..."
(Nederlandse OS, dinsdag 30 maart 2010, 07:46)
http://nos.nl/audio/147263-ben-de-jong-over-vertrouwelijk-ciadocument.html
AUDIO De Amerikaanse inlichtingendienst CIA wil de publieke opinie in Frankrijk en Duitsland bewerken om te voorkomen dat beide landen zich terugtrekken uit Afghanistan. Aanleiding hiervoor is de val van het Nederlandse kabinet. Dit blijkt uit een vertrouwelijk CIA-document dat openbaar is gemaakt door de klokkenluiderssite WikiLeaks. Een gesprek met Ben de Jong, die verbonden is aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam en zich bezighoudt met inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten.
http://nos.nl/video/174629-kamervragen-na-wikileaks.html
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CIA report into shoring up Afghan war support in Western Europe
WikiLeaks release: March 26, 2010
This classified CIA analysis from March, outlines possible PR-strategies to shore up public support in Germany and France for a continued war in Afghanistan. After the Dutch government fell on the issue of dutch troops in Afghanistan last month, the CIA became worried that similar events could happen in the countries that post the third and fourth largest troop contingents to the ISAF-mission. The proposed PR strategies focus on pressure points that have been identified within these countries. For France it is the sympathy of the public for Afghan refugees and women. For Germany it is the fear of the consequences of defeat (drugs, more refugees, terrorism) as well as for Germany’s standing in the NATO. The memo is an recipe for the targeted manipulation of public opinion in two NATO ally countries, written by the CIA. It is classified as Confidential / No Foreign Nationals.
http://mirror.wikileaks.info/leak/cia-afghanistan.pdf
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Trainingsmissie Afghanistan 2011 voor POLITIEPERSONNEL in provincie Kunduz
Ingezonden door P Geertsma op za, 01/08/2011 - 12:02
In 2011 wil de Nederlandse overheid weer een nieuwe missie van start laten gaan in Afghanistan. Het vorige kabinet was nog ‘gevallen’ over een langere deelname van Nederlandse militairen in Afghanistan. Met de nieuwe coalitie lijkt de overheid nu toch weer een bijdrage te willen leveren aan de stabiliteit van Afghanistan. (..)
In het verleden hebben Nederlandse militairen niet altijd de militaire steun gekregen die ze nodig hadden van hun internationale militaire bondgenoten. In tegenstelling tot de toenmalige bondgenoten zijn de Duitse militairen wel een effectieve partner om op de steunen. Toch blijft het naar mijn mening het beste om zelf voldoende strijdkracht deel te nemen aan een missie om vijandelijke aanvallen snel en effectief af te slaan. Zowel op de grond als vanuit de lucht.
http://www.krijgsmacht.nl/artikelen/trainingsmissie-afghanistan-2011-voor-politiepersoneel-provincie-kunduz
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De Tweede Kamer "behandelde" het kabinetsplan voor een nieuwe missie in Afghanistan. Ditmaal gaat het om een trainingsmissie. Ruim driehonderd politietrainers en begeleiders reizen mogelijk eind dit jaar al af naar Noord-Afghanistan. In Kunduz, onder bescherming van de Duitsers die daar al zitten, moet Nederland politieagenten gaan opleiden. De NAVO wil een fors aantal extra politieagenten opleiden in Afghanistan om zo de veiligheid in het land verder te verbeteren.
De coalitie van VVD en CDA heeft zelf geen meerderheid en gedoogpartij PVV is tegen een missie. Geert Wilders liet eerder al weten het een "slecht idee" te vinden en hoopt dat het plan geen steun zal vinden bij de oppositie.
PVV-kamerlid Hero Brinkman en oud-Commandant der Strijdkrachten Dick Berlijn zijn in debat over deze mogelijke nieuwe trainingsmissie. Als Commandant der Strijdkrachten was generaal Berlijn de voornaamste militaire gesprekspartner van de minister van Defensie bij onder andere de uitzending van Nederlandse militairen naar Afghanistan. Hij is voorstander van deze missie.
http://pauwenwitteman.vara.nl/Fragment-detail.1548.0.html?&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=19702&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1547&cHash=b7fb400c8824ada0c9d674dbc525630d
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Dat wordt druk op de Haagse oppositie voor de CIA..... en voor wie nog meer?
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| Lees meer over: antimilitarisme vrijheid, repressie & mensenrechten | | aanvullingen | | State "views will not reflect" Dutch | De Pooijer - 19.01.2011 09:20
07THEHAGUE2082 2007-12-21 12:12 2011-01-17 00:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy The Hague
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SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: IT'S OFFICIAL! TWO MORE
YEARS IN URUZGAN
Classified By: CDA Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The GONL obtained broad support on December
20 from the Dutch parliament in favor of extending its ISAF
mission in Uruzgan province until December 2010. This
officially brings to a close months of internal Dutch
deliberations on the controversial extension issue, and
ensures that the Dutch troops will remain committed to
Uruzgan for the next three years despite serious political
misgivings and a lack of popular support at home. End
summary.
¶2. (C) The Dutch parliament on December 20 officially gave
its consent to an additional two-year plus extension of its
ISAF mission in Uruzgan from August 2008 until December 2010,
voting down by a count of 98 to 42 (with 10 absences) a
motion by the Socialist Party to withdraw troops at the end
of the current mandate. While parliament does not
constitutionally have the authority to approve any Dutch
deployment overseas -- and votes represented in parliament by
the coalition parties technically gave the GONL a majority --
the GONL nevertheless stressed the political importance of
garnering broad support for the mission. (Note: According
to Dutch Parliamentary tradition, members planning to be
absent from an important vote ""twin"" with a member from the
opposing side. Had all members been present, therefore, the
vote would have been 103 in favor to 47 against -- slightly
more than a two-thirds majority. End note.)
¶3. (C) The GONL obtained this broad support when the
opposition Liberal Party (VVD) and Political Calvinist Party
(SGP) joined coalition parties the Christian Democratic
Alliance (CDA), the Labor Party (PvdA), and Christian Unie
(CU). As the largest and most influential opposition party
on the right, VVD's support was crucial. Throughout the
debate, VVD Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hans van Baalen
consistently asked the GONL to justify the new mission in
terms of improved structure, financing, new contributions
from other partners, sufficient transport and Allied support
to extract Dutch troops in case of an emergency, and clarity
of the Afghan government's promise to deploy security forces
to Uruzgan.
¶4. (C) Despite GONL efforts to satisfy van Baalen's concerns,
VVD's support for the new mission was not assured until the
parliamentary debate over the extension on December 17.
Former Defense Minister and still influential VVD
parliamentarian Henk Kamp insisted on upholding the original
agreement between NATO and the Netherlands consisting of a
two-year deployment to August 2008 -- as indicated by a
December 2005 letter from former SACEUR Gen. Jones to Dutch
CHOD Gen. Berlijn. Key demands for VVD's continued support
included a clear exit by Dutch troops from Uruzgan by
December 2010 and recognition by NATO that it is responsible
for finding a successor to the Dutch, as well as the
understanding that the GONL will not participate in any other
major peacekeeping operation until 2010. Ultimately, van
Baalen was satisfied by the GONL's case to remain in Uruzgan
-- including especially the promise that new or unforeseen
costs associated with the extension would not affect the
defense budget -- and pledged his party's unanimous support.
Strong Government Case
----------------------
¶5. (C) During three rounds of parliamentary debate on
December 17-18, the GONL confidently pitched the case in
favor of extending, answering 577 questions submitted by
parliament on the matter. FM Verhagen said he had received a
letter from NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer acknowledging that
Dutch troops will leave Uruzgan by December 2010. Verhagen
reiterated that he informed his counterparts at the NATO
foreign ministerial on December 10 the Dutch would withdraw
by December 2010. He also made clear that the Netherlands
would not participate in any other major operation that might
affect the Dutch deployment in Afghanistan. Verhagen
stressed the importance of the international community
reviewing its collective long-term efforts in Afghanistan,
including specifically a ""master strategy"" -- he said this
will be discussed at the upcoming NATO summit in Bucharest.
¶6. (C) Defense Minister van Middelkoop argued that the
extended mission will not harm Dutch military readiness, and
made several reassurances regarding the Australian
partnership and the quality of various contributions from
France, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. He had
hoped for additional partners, but did not foresee any
problems working with these contributions, and suggested that
the Czech Republic might be willing to extend its
parliamentary mandated six-month deployment to a year. Van
Middelkoop was confident that the GONL could finance the new
mission, including 370 million Euros of additional funding
per year. Development Minister Koenders made the case in
favor of meaningful reconstruction despite the challenging
security situation. He noted that the Uruzgan PRT would be
placed under civilian leadership by August 1, 2009.
Opposing View
-------------
¶7. (C) The Socialists and Green Left led the charge opposing
the extension, arguing that parliament was deliberately
misled to support a ""combat"" mission in the guise of
reconstruction. Green Left floorleader Halsema argued that
the ISAF mission -- in conjunction with OEF -- has enabled a
corrupt Karzai government, and has been responsible for
unnecessary civilian casualties. Geert Wilders and his Party
for Freedom (PVV) also opposed the mission, but for different
reasons. Wilders said he supported the ISAF mission, but
felt that the Netherlands had ""done its fair share"" -- time
for another Ally to step up and serve in the south. The GONL
had hoped to persuade D-66 to join proponents of the
extension, but D-66 floorleader Pechtold cited the absence of
a clear strategy among NATO, the UN, and the EU as the main
reason why he opposes a new mission.
¶8. (C) In all, the Socialist Party (SP), Green Left, PVV, D66
and the Party for the Animals opposed the mission.
Opposition actually grew in comparison to the initial
mission, due primarily to election gains by the Socialists
and Green Left in the last election, and votes lost by VVD to
Wilders' PVV off-shoot. Opposition parties sponsored four
total motions on the extension: withdrawing Dutch troops by
August 2008 (SP), conveying disappointment to NATO over
perceived lack of support (SP), publicly releasing the
December 2005 letter from former SACEUR Gen. Jones to Gen.
Berlijn (D-66), and calling for better compensation for
victims of civilian casualties (Green Left) -- all four
motions were voted down. Rita Verdonk, who until recently
had been a member of VVD, also voted against the extension.
Something All Could Agree On
----------------------------
¶9. (C) Parties all across the political spectrum expressed
deep dissatisfaction with NATO and the lack of solidarity in
supporting the Dutch extension in Uruzgan. Proponents of the
extension were quick to thank the French, Czechs, Slovaks,
Hungarians and Georgians, but questioned why other Allies had
not agreed to do more. PvdA spokesperson Martijn van Daam
noted disappointment with NATO partners; VVD spokesperson van
Baalen called on greater Allies powers -- such as Germany --
to do more. Critics made the perceived lack of NATO
solidarity a centerpiece in their opposition to the
extension. Wilders based his decision solely on this point;
D-66 spokesperson Pechtold described the lack of solidarity
as damaging for NATO, and creates a false sense of security
for the people of Uruzgan. The Socialists accused NATO of
""not keeping its part of the bargain,"" as evidenced by the
Jones-Berlijn letter.
Public Opinion
--------------
¶10. (SBU) Despite the broad support in parliament, Dutch
public support for the extension remains low. According to
the latest opinion polls, 43 percent oppose any extension,
approximately 25 percent are in favor, with the remaining
almost 33 percent feeling indifferent.
¶11. (C) Dutch media coverage has been mixed, largely ignoring
the extension story once it became clear the GONL would
obtain a strong parliamentary majority. Most major dailies
focused on the latest developments in the Dutch Hell's Angels
trial or Dutch soccer team AZ's loss in UEFA Cup play. Dutch
daily Trouw (center-left) welcomed the extension, accused
Wilders' of political opportunism, and deplored D-66's
opposition in light of its long international tradition. The
Trouw editorial suggested that stabilizing Afghanistan is a
long-term effort, and therefore questioned GONL's decision to
""call it a day"" in 2010. It criticized the GONL for
""operating clumsily,"" while NATO Allies demonstrated ""little
solidarity"" with the Netherlands.
¶12. (SBU) Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad (center-left)
called for tempered expectations in the next two years,
especially as ""not much"" has come from reconstruction efforts
thus far. This editorial highlighted the importance of
adopting an Afghanistan ""master plan"" at the NATO summit in
Bucharest. Dutch daily Telegraaf (center-right; largest
circulation in Netherlands) supports the extension, and
published holiday wishes from most members of Cabinet on its
front page, emphasizing support and respect for Dutch
soldiers serving in Afghanistan.
¶13. (SBU) FM Verhagen acknowledged that the wide support in
parliament for the extension is not reflected in the Dutch
population -- ""at times, (parliament's) views will not
reflect the opinion of a majority of the population."" He
said he will focus on generating broader Dutch public support
for the extension.
Comment: Two Years is Two Years?
--------------------------------
¶14. (C) For all the drama (public flubs by van Middelkoop and
Berlijn) and delays (GONL assurances that the decision would
be complete by what seemed like an endless summer) associated
with this extension question, the GONL once again did a
masterful job of forcing a difficult decision with low public
support through the Dutch parliament on a tight schedule. A
key point in gaining the support of many parliamentarians was
the promise that Dutch troops will leave Uruzgan by December
¶2010. However, the GONL decision mentions nothing of
possible Dutch missions in other Afghan provinces, or a
continued Dutch civilian presence in Uruzgan. According to
MFA Task Force Uruzgan Coordinator Pieter-Jan Kleiweg on
December 21, ""the door purposefully remains open"" -- and a
lot can happen in two years time.
Schofer
| | the Dutch two-year commitment to Uruzgan | Broedkip B. & H. Plotter - 19.01.2011 09:37
06THEHAGUE2597 2006-12-13 09:09 2011-01-17 00:12 SECRET Embassy The Hague
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Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROLAND E. ARNALL FOR REASONS 1.4(B/D).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During a December 12 meeting with Ambassador
Arnall, Dutch Prime Minister Jan Pieter Balkenende expressed
satisfaction with his party's strong performance in the
November elections, and predicted a centrist-coalition
government could be in place by February. According to
Balkenende, the Dutch two-year commitment to Uruzgan will not
be affected by ongoing coalition negotiations, and will be
honored by the next government. Having raised Dutch concerns
with Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki on December 7,
Balkenende expressed irritation with the Iranian's
""diplomatic speech"" and his ""unacceptable"" comments on the
Holocaust. Separately, Balkenende's senior foreign policy
advisor confirmed that the Prime Minister is directly engaged
in trying to resolve Shell's ongoing dispute with the Russian
government over Sakhalin, and claimed the Russians are
""trying to squeeze us like a lemon."" Despite the uncertainty
about the next government, Balkenende appeared comfortable
with the current situation, optimistic about the future, and
confident in his leadership role. END SUMMARY.
CENTRIST GOVERNMENT BY FEBRUARY?
--------------------------------
¶2. (C) Ambassador Arnall complemented the Prime Minister on
his successful election campaign. Balkenende acknowledged
that he had -- once again -- defied expectations by leading
the Christian Democrats (CDA) to remain the largest party in
Parliament, when ""six months ago, everyone expected the next
Prime Minister to be Wouter Bos"" (head of the opposition
Labor Party, or PvdA). The recent elections had overturned
many assumptions about Dutch politics; the CDA, for example,
had done better than usual among young voters and in urban
areas than in the past. Unfortunately, however, the
electorate's unexpected swing to the extreme right -- Geert
Wilders' Freedom Party (PVV) and extreme left -- Jan
Marijnissen's Socialist Party (SP) -- was now complicating
the process of forming a coalition. Balkenende's preferred
coalition partner -- the conservative Liberal Party (VVD) --
had run a bad campaign and suffered from internal power
struggles, so was no longer in the running.
¶3. (C) Balkenende said he was ""not unhappy"" that attempts to
form a coalition with PvdA and SP had collapsed, since there
was no realistic chance of CDA and SP governing together.
This opened the door to the possibility of a ""centrist""
coalition between CDA, PvdA, and one of the smaller parties
-- most likely Christian Union or GreenLeft. Balkenende
suggested that such a coalition could be in place by
February, although this would depend on how long it took for
Wouter Bos to convince his membership to support such a
coalition; the process could conceivably drag on past the
provincial elections in March. Although he clearly felt that
it was up to the PvdA to make most of the concessions
necessary to join a coalition government, Balkenende
acknowledged that the SP's surprisingly strong showing posed
a real dilemma for the PvdA leadership, since they now faced
a serious challenger on their left flank.
AFGHANISTAN COMMITMENT REMAINS FIRM
-----------------------------------
¶4. (C) Ambassador Arnall asked Balkenende how the coalition
negotiations might impact the Dutch deployment to Uruzgan.
Balkenende responded emphatically that it would be
""impossible"" for a future government to renege on the
two-year Dutch commitment to the region. The fact that SP
wanted to withdraw Dutch forces sooner, he added, was one
reason why the CDA could not join them in a coalition
government. PvdA, he said, had the same view as the CDA in
this regard, as they had supported the original decision to
deploy troops for two years.
¶5. (C) Turning to the Riga summit, Balkenende said that he
was generally pleased that NATO had sent a strong signal of
support for the Afghan mission. The willingness of some
countries, such as Norway and Poland, to increase their
contributions was also encouraging. On the other hand,
Balkenende expressed concern about Canadian Prime Minister
Harper's domestic political situation and its possible impact
on the Canadian deployment to the south. He noted that he had
also had intense discussions with German Chancellor Merkel,
who had made clear that German forces would be available to
THE HAGUE 00002597 002 OF 002
support others in extremis.
""STRANGE"" MESSAGE FROM IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
--------------------------------------------- --
¶6. (C) Balkenende described his short December 7 meeting
with visiting Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki as ""strange.""
He had raised Iran's destabilizing role in the region,
support for terrorism, human rights violations, and nuclear
ambitions. On the latter, Balkenende stressed that Iran must
comply with its IAEA obligations if it is serious about
negotiating a positive outcome to the current situation.
Mottaki, according to Balkenende, had responded with
non-substantive ""diplomatic speech."" More disturbingly, in
their discussion on the Middle East, Mottaki had made
comments on the Holocaust which Balkenende found
""irritating,"" ""terrible,"" and ""absolutely unacceptable.""
Although the Netherlands has a good economic dialogue with
Iran, Balkenende concluded, he had sent a ""very clear""
message about Dutch concerns.
SAKHALIN-SHELL: RUSSIANS ""SQUEEZING US LIKE A LEMON""
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶7. (S) As Ambassador Arnall was leaving Balkenende's office,
Karel van Oosterom -- Balkenende's senior foreign policy and
defense advisor -- confided that Balkenende was following
closely Shell's ongoing dispute with the Russian government
over Sakhalin. Van Oosterom dismissed recent press reports
claiming the issue was settled, saying their release was just
a Russian negotiating tactic. Shell, he stressed, has not
agreed to any settlement; on the contrary, the chairman of
Shell had visited van Oosterom that day to complain that the
Russians had given him ""an offer he couldn't refuse."" Van
Oosterom -- who served in China previously -- joked that,
while the Chinese could ""threaten with a straight face,"" the
Russians ""laugh when they give an ultimatum -- then tell you
what they really want."" He reiterated that the Dutch were
not impressed with the ""mafia-style"" Russian approach and
understood that Russia wanted to ""squeeze Shell like a
lemon."" On the other hand, Russia was in a much stronger
position now than when the original deal was signed, and knew
it. Van Oosterom did not speculate on what next steps might
be, but stated that Shell and the Prime Minister were now
""studying"" the Russian proposal.
COMMENT:
--------
¶8. (C) Balkenende joked at the start of the conversation that
he is currently holding three jobs -- Prime Minister, CDA
faction leader in Parliament, and chief CDA negotiator in the
coalition talks. If this situation is causing him stress,
however, he did not let it show during the meeting. On the
contrary, Balkenende was clearly in command of his portfolio
and seemed positively invigorated by the challenges before
him. He also obviously relishes the prospect of heading the
next Dutch government -- which would be his fourth in as many
years. Once dismissed as a ""Harry Potter"" clone with no
charisma, Balkenende has made a career out of defying
expectations -- and appears, once again, to have proven his
doubters wrong.
ARNALL
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SIPDIS
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STATE FOR SCA, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION REVIEW
OFFICIALLY BEGINS
Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The GONL sent a letter to the Dutch
Parliament on June 30 noting it will decide this summer
whether to extend its ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The
decision will follow an exhaustive review of all options,
including staying in the mission's current capacity, reducing
its contribution or moving to another location, or even
withdrawing altogether. Cabinet officials have stressed that
""all options are on the table,"" while public statements by
Defense Minister Eimert van Middelkoop in favor of remaining
in some capacity may have tipped the hand of the GONL and
temporarily unsettled the political process. Dutch officials
are cautiously optimistic that the conditions are in place to
arrive at a positive extension decision, but stress that
sequencing is vital: first the review of options, then
consultations with Allies, followed by a decision and
subsequent debate with Parliament. End summary.
Important First Step
--------------------
¶2. (C) Following its June 29 meeting, the Dutch Cabinet sent
a letter to Parliament stating that the GONL will decide this
summer whether it will extend its ISAF mission in Afghanistan
beyond August 2008, and if so, in what capacity. The letter
notes that the Cabinet will investigate the ""options and
desirability of continuing to make a contribution"" to ISAF.
The review will be conducted in accordance with the set
criteria required for parliamentary consent prior to
deploying Dutch troops abroad (""toetsingskader""). The letter
formally begins the Article 100 process -- more importantly,
it means the GONL can formally solicit contributions from
other NATO Allies to team with the Dutch in Uruzgan province.
¶3. (S) In a July 2 meeting with Ambassador Arnall, Pieter de
Gooijer (MFA Director General for Political Affairs)
confirmed that issuing the letter represents an important
step toward a possible extension. Although, for political
reasons, the GONL remains restricted from expressing support
for a particular option, de Gooijer said it ""was fair to say""
that the Cabinet appears to be quietly moving in that
direction. He stressed, however, that there is not yet a
firm consensus within the Cabinet, and some members are still
holding out for significant concessions (e.g., more money for
Defense, a significant mission in Africa for Development).
De Gooijer noted that the six key ministers (the Prime
Minister, two Deputy Prime Ministers, and the ministers of
Foreign Affairs, Development and Defense) will meet on July
12 to consider next steps and hopefully steer the process in
a positive direction.
One Step Beyond
---------------
¶4. (C) Following the June 29 Cabinet meeting, Cabinet
ministers emphasized to the press that ""all options were
currently on the table,"" and that the GONL would decide
whether to extend once the review of options had been fully
completed. During one of the press interviews, however,
Defense Minister van Middelkoop seemingly tipped the hand of
the GONL by noting that ""the political intention is to stay,
be it in a more modest form."" He explained that other Allies
should take more responsibility, and that some tasks could be
phased out to Allies, thereby leading to a trimmed-down Dutch
extension. Van Middelkoop acknowledged that ending the
mission was an option, but ""the intention is to continue in
some form.""
¶5. (C) Van Middelkoop's remarks prompted a firestorm of
criticism from both supporters and critics of the current
mission. Supporters lamented that van Middelkoop hamstrung
the extension review before it started as critics will argue
that any such review will be subjective in nature as the GONL
attempts to achieve van Middelkoop's stated desire to remain
in Uruzgan. Critics worried that van Middelkoop's remarks
might send the wrong signal to NATO and Washington, thereby
lifting them off the hook by telling them it was not
necessary for military planners to initiate contingencies
should the Dutch opt not to extend.
¶6. (C) Following van Middelkoop's remarks, Prime Minister
Balkenende clarified the GONL ""official position"" -- the
Dutch will investigate whether to continue, and if so, ""how
and in what way."" But in no sense had the GONL made any
decision on an extension. He emphasized that ""matters should
be done in the right order,"" and declined to acknowledge any
current political intention to extend. Balkenende added that
the decision should be made with careful consideration of all
arguments -- ""all options remain on the table."" He said the
GONL's decision would be made this summer, perhaps as late as
September, following a ""very intensive process.""
... And a Step Backwards
------------------------
¶7. (C) Van Middelkoop began the July 2 parliamentary hearing
on Afghanistan by backtracking on his earlier comments. He
characterized his remarks as a ""slip of the tongue,"" and
emphasized that the GONL would first review all options prior
to making any decision to extend. Van Middelkoop reiterated
this clarified position on July 3 in a meeting with
Ambassador Arnall. He stressed that ""all options were on the
table"" and that his suggestion that the Dutch remain in a
limited capacity was ""a mistake,"" and not a case of ""being
too honest."" Van Middelkoop said his remarks required an
apology to Parliament, for which he was ""beaten up for 15
minutes,"" and then the Afghanistan debate continued as it had
previously.
¶8. (C) In his meeting with Ambassador Arnall, van Middelkoop
commented on the Dutch participation in heavy fighting around
Chora in the previous few weeks. He said the Dutch had been
""very lucky"" that the Dutch commander on the ground had made
the right tactical decision to stay and fight. Van
Middelkoop also praised the Afghan security forces, noting
that they had ""fought well."" He said there was still some
fighting and instability in the region, which was one of the
major reasons why he was visiting Afghanistan on July 5-6.
¶9. (C) Van Middelkoop also commented on prospects of
persuading the Dutch Parliament to support an extension. He
said part of his challenge with Parliament involves the
position of his predecessor and current parliamentary member
Henk Kamp, who has adamantly stated that the Dutch deployment
in Uruzgan should last for two years, and ""only two years.""
In order to overcome Kamp and others, van Middelkoop said the
GONL must present sound arguments -- ""the military,
political, and financial lines of reasoning all must be
convincing."" Ambassador Arnall commented that van Middelkoop
has more flexibility on the ground than Kamp, to which the
Defense Minister smiled.
¶10. (C) Officially, the GONL does not yet have an opinion on
any particular option. But in private, van Middelkoop said
the best option to extend in Afghanistan probably involves a
more modest contribution with the support of additional
partners. He characterized the partnership with Australia as
good, but said more help was needed from other Allies in
order to convince Parliament. He said the next step was for
he and Foreign Minister Verhagen to travel to NATO and make
the case for additional assistance. He assessed the
political situation on a possible extension as typical
""coalition politics,"" and repeated previously made remarks
that ""we are still in the fog"" regarding an extension, ""but
we are moving in the right direction.""
Parliamentary Hearing
---------------------
¶11. (C) In a three hour parliamentary session o July 2,
parliamentarians from both sides of thepolitical spectrum
raised concerns regarding the heavy fighting around Chora and
subsequent civilian casualties. They initially lambasted van
Middelkoop for his comments regarding the political intent to
extend, but later seemed to accept his apology.
Parliamentarians from the left, including Socialist Harry van
Bommel and Green Left Mariko Peters, said van Middelkoop's
comments will send NATO and Washington the ""wrong signal,""
especially as NATO is ""responsible"" for finding an Ally to
replace the Netherlands -- ""now NATO will think that the
Dutch will extend and plans to replace us will not commence,""
said van Bommel.
¶12. (C) No new arguments were raised during the hearing.
While all members of the parliamentary foreign affairs
committee raised concerns about civilian casualties, all
comments made were reasoned and emotionally restrained. Both
Verhagen and van Middelkoop noted four on-going
investigations (the Dutch military, the UN, ISAF, and Human
Rights Watch) following the fighting in Chora, and promised
to deliver results of the investigations as soon as they
become available. Separately, MFA Task Force Uruzgan
Coordinator Pieter Jan Kleiweg de Zwaan told emboffs July 3
that they expect the Dutch military investigation to be
completed on or around July 10. Privately Kleiweg was
worried that the investigations might contradict one another,
further muddling an already confusing situation.
¶13. (C) Other concerns voiced by parliamentarians included
the cost of the deployment, poppy eradication, and relations
with Pakistan. Both Verhagen and van Middelkoop said it was
""too simplistic"" to classify the Dutch deployment as either a
military or reconstruction mission -- both are necessary in
order to be successful. Verhagen argued that intense
fighting in Chora did not mean that reconstruction in Uruzgan
was impossible. Development Minister Koenders began to lay
the foundation necessary to make the argument later in the
summer and fall that reconstruction was not only possible,
but in fact working in Uruzgan. In response to a question
from Labor Party (PvdA) spokesperson Angelien Eijsink, van
Middelkoop refuted claims made in the Dutch periodical
Elsevier that the Dutch military had released a senior
Taliban leader. He explained that Afghan authorities had
initially made the arrest, and the Dutch offered to hold the
individual briefly before returning him to Afghan
authorities.
Government Strategy
-------------------
¶14. (S) While cautiously optimistic, the working level
continues to emphasize PM Balkenende's message that the GONL
""check all the boxes"" during its review prior to making an
official extension decision. Kleiweg told emboffs July 2
that the six ministers most responsible for making a decision
to extend (Balkenende and Verhagen from the Christian
Democratic Alliance, Deputy Minister/Finance Minister Bos and
Koenders from the Labor Party, and Deputy Minister/Minister
for Youth and Family Affairs Rouvoet and van Middelkoop from
the Christian Union) have already met on several occasions,
and dynamics among the ministers are ""good."" Kleiweg
characterized the ministers as ""moving in the right
direction,"" and deflected suggestions that Finance Minister
Bos might be problematic. He said ""The Six"" will meet again
on July 12 prior to the summer break to discuss various
extension options.
¶15. (C) Kleiweg noted that the Dutch have yet to formally
solicit contributions from other NATO Allies to any Dutch
etension in Uruzgan. He said the GONL first will idntify
options and possible tasks that could be flled by others
prior to approaching Allies. Kleweg acknowledged that the
Dutch are ""picky"" whenit comes to the question of which
Allies to apprach -- any potential partner has to ""speak the
sae language"" and possess a ""similar outlook"" when i comes
to reconstution efforts. He also noteda certain
reluctance on the part of the Dutch miitary to incorporate
elements from yet another mlitary -- but such hesitancy will
need to be overome should the review determine the best
chance f an extension involves teaming with another Ally.
¶16. (C) Once tasks and partners are identified,Kleiweg said
the USG and SACEUR could be helpful in persuading these
Allies to team with the Dutch -- provided the government opts
for an extension. When asked about possibly teaming with
U.S. forces, Kleiweg said the Dutch ""have no problem"" with
U.S. forces under ISAF command. He noted, however, that
OEF/ISAF deconfliction continues to be a sensitive issue in
the Netherlands, especially as the dividing line between the
two becomes more blurry.
¶17. (C) Low public support for both the current mission and
any extension continues to be a problem. Kleiweg said the
GONL is looking at respected ""international voices"" to enlist
to try and influence public opinion. He noted that the GONL
had arranged through NATO the visit of several Afghan
parliamentarians to the Netherlands. While the trip was a
success, Dutch and Afghan media considered the visit ""NATO
propaganda,"" Kleiweg said. He noted that the individual with
the most power to change Dutch public opinion was Afghan
President Karzai, but acknowledged even that might have
changed in recent weeks given Karzai's criticism of the Dutch
military action in Chora. Kleiweg said Karzai intends to
visit the Netherlands in December -- ""hopefully long after
the Dutch have made a decision on extending,"" he added.
Uruzgan Gov. Monib might be another option, although Kleiweg
said GONL relations with Monib are no longer that strong as
Monib appears more interested in events in Kabul than in
Uruzgan, while Monib's travel ban remains problematic. Other
international respected voices might include individuals such
as UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon, Kleiweg said.
Detention Policy
----------------
¶18. (C) Kleiweg told emboffs July 3 that the GONL has
circulated a draft letter among RC-South contributing nations
to the Afghan government requesting greater access for the
Afghan Independent Human Rights Council to detainees held in
Afghan prisons. The draft letter was an action item derived
from the latest RC-South conference held in The Hague in June
¶2007. According to Kleiweg, the GONL, as well as the
governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and
Australia have all approved the draft letter. He inquired if
the USG had reviewed the letter and had any comments; emboffs
said they would check with Washington.
Inter-Governmental Dynamics
---------------------------
¶19. (S//NOFORN) Working level contacts describe the
relationship between Verhagen and Koenders as ""contentious
but not outright hostile."" Instead of direct confrontation,
the two often wage battles through their staffs at the
working level, said MFA Security Affairs Chief Robert de
Groot. That said, when the two ministers agree, the
resulting decision has added weight and is often ""ironclad.""
Van Middelkoop is described as ""the third wheel,"" or the
""inexperienced junior partner"" by working level contacts.
While substantively knowledgeable, his inexperience in the
government is obvious, and he often defers to Verhagen and
Koenders.
¶20. (S//NOFORN) According to working level contacts, Koenders
has a ""voracious apetite"" for information on Afghanistan --
""he want to know how many grains of sand are in Uruzgan,""
said Kleiweg. While he has an almost equal statu to
Verhagen on Afghanistan behind closed doors,Koenders resents
being viewed as subordinate to he other two ministers in
public. ""He cannot stad waiting for two hours to speak
during a parliaentary hearing, and then be restricted to
only tn minutes of speaking time,"" said Task Force Deput
Coordinator Dewi van de Weerde. Working level ontacts also
describe him as incapable of making decision, which could
play into extension consierations.
Comment
-------
¶21. (S) Van Middelkoop's comments -- while seemingly positive
from our perspective -- temporarily unsettled the political
debate on extending. Cabinet members were reportedly
incensed by van Middelkoop's blunder, but his public mea
culpa seems to have appeased naysayers in Parliament.
Despite it, the GONL once again appears to be on the same
page in its efforts to create the conditions necessary to
arrive at a positive extension decision. There is a process
-- an exhaustive review followed by consultations -- that
must be followed in order for this to work, and Balkenende is
shepherding it through. Finance Minister Bos could still
prove problematic, but working level contacts suggest he will
be reasonable. As the Dutch are fond of saying, ""do not
disturb the brooding hen"" -- which we will no doubt hear
often over the course of the summer and into the fall.
ARNALL
| | Ben ik 'Verhagen' in beeld | Hi Larry C. & her Cigar - 19.01.2011 10:24
09THEHAGUE196 2009-03-23 10:10 2011-01-17 00:12 SECRET Embassy The Hague
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2688
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000196
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PREL OVIP PINR MOPS PHUM AF NL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 31 MEETING
WITH DUTCH FM VERHAGEN
Classified By: Charge d'Affaire...
198269,3/23/2009 10:38,09THEHAGUE196,"Embassy The
Hague",SECRET,,"VZCZCXRO6964
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 THE
HAGUE 000196
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PREL OVIP PINR MOPS PHUM AF NL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 31 MEETING
WITH DUTCH FM VERHAGEN
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael F. Gallagher for reasons 1.5(b
,d)
Madam Secretary:
--------
Overview:
--------
¶1. (S) Your participation in the Afghanistan conference and
the March 31 meeting with Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime
Verhagen is well-timed to advance key U.S. priorities,
particularly in securing Afghanistan. Verhagen and the whole
Dutch government remain among our strongest allies, but Dutch
domestic politics threatens to limit progress on our common
agenda. On Afghanistan, Verhagen faces an uphill battle to
convince parliament and the Dutch people to continue combat
missions after 2010. At stake is the deployment of 1,700
Dutch troops in Uruzgan, one of the toughest provinces in
Afghanistan. By agreeing to host the Afghanistan conference,
Verhagen is taking the first step to extend the Dutch
commitment. The Foreign Minister said the Netherlands had
been asked to host the conference due to the success of its
comprehensive (&3-D8) approach in Uruzgan.
¶2. (C) Verhagen is a skilled politician, having previously
served in parliament as party spokesman for the Netherlands,
largest political party, the center-right Christian Democrats
(CDA). Accordingly, Verhagen is extremely close to Prime
Minister Balkenende and is trusted to take the lead on
foreign affairs while most of the Dutch government is focused
on the economic crisis. The weak governing coalition --
which includes CDA, the center-left Labor Party (PvdA), and
the small Christian Union (CU) -- is held together less by a
common vision than by fear of electoral losses if the
government were to collapse ahead of the next scheduled
election in 2011. Despite these divisions, Verhagen and
Balkenende have successfully steered the Dutch government
toward an active foreign policy that largely aligns with our
interests.
¶3. (C) Verhagen plans to use his bilateral meeting with you
to start building a close working relationship. He wants the
new Administration to see the Netherlands as a reliable
partner with the U.S., sharing many of our goals. We
recommend you focus discussions on Afghanistan and human
rights (including Guantanamo) (paragraphs 5-11), but other
possible topics are also discussed below (paragraphs 12-17).
¶4. (SBU) 2009 marks the 400th anniversary of Henry Hudson,s
&discovery8 of the Hudson Valley and New Amsterdam in 1609.
The Dutch government and the city and state of New York have
planned a yearlong celebration (New York 400 ) NY400)
honoring our strong bilateral ties and stressing our ""shared
DNA"" -- including our values of freedom, democracy,
entrepreneurship, diversity, and tolerance. You may wish to
comment on our joint history and shared future when you meet
Verhagen, especially when you talk to the press.
-----------
Afghanistan
-----------
¶5. (C) The Netherlands is a small ally making a big impact in
Afghanistan since 2001. They are the fourth largest aid
donor in Afghanistan. Ranked by percentage of their military
forces deployed, the Netherlands is the second largest
military contributor in Afghanistan )- proportionally they
are making three to four times the contribution of France or
Germany. And Dutch soldiers are deployed to the most
dangerous parts of Afghanistan. However, the Dutch are
considering dramatically scaling back their combat presence
in 2010, perhaps to just a few hundred soldiers, and
concentrating more on development assistance.
¶6. (C) Although the public supports its soldiers in the
Q6. (C) Although the public supports its soldiers in the
field, involvement in Afghanistan is not popular in the
Netherlands. Thus far the Dutch have lost 18 soldiers. The
2007 decision to extend the Dutch military deployment was
prolonged and politically difficult. Any government decision
to stay engaged in Afghanistan past 2010 will be even more
difficult to sustain. Among the challenges is a Dutch
perception that they have done more than their share. Many
political leaders supported the previous deployment decisions
with statements that another NATO ally would replace the
Dutch at the conclusion of their tour. Dutch opinion leaders
are also concerned about the effect of the deployment on
military readiness and recruitment. Often cited is the
shortfall of 7,000 personnel in a 42,000-member service. The
Dutch are also daunted by reports that the ISAF mission is
THE HAGUE 00000196 002 OF 004
failing to bring security to the Afghan people, and that
development assistance programs are ineffective. The public
at large is skeptical that the situation in Afghanistan
presents a threat to Europeans. Finally, although casualties
have been relatively light by U.S. standards, their emotional
impact on a small country with limited recent combat
experience cannot be overstated. In April 2008, for example,
the country was shocked to learn of the death of First
Lieutenant Dennis van Ulm on the same day that his father,
General Pieter van Ulm, was sworn in as the new Dutch Chief
of Defense.
¶7. (C) Such traumatic events have not swayed Verhagen and PM
Balkenende's commitment to the NATO/ISAF mission and the
Afghan people. In 2009, just as in 2007, we expect that both
Verhagen and Balkenende will be strong and effective allies
in winning support from the parliament. The support of the
Labor Party, particularly Development Cooperation Minister
Koenders, will be essential. The Dutch are expecting a
request through NATO for continuing military support, but it
is important the request come in the form of consultations
among equals rather than through public pressure, which would
backfire with the Dutch public and politicians. The
Afghanistan Conference this month will do a great deal to
show that the Dutch are not only active participants but
leading members in the review and strategic planning process.
Your meeting with Verhagen will further emphasize this
point. Other &selling points8 for the public will be (1)
recognition that Afghanistan poses a clearly defined threat
to international stability and (2) an improved military
strategy that shows that we can and will prevail. Most
importantly to the Dutch public, perhaps, will be concrete
success stories that we are creating a better life for the
Afghan people. Finally, Dutch policy-makers believe in the
&3D8 approach and welcome your effort to integrate defense,
development, and diplomacy. A previous Dutch commander of
Task Force Uruzgan argued that the Dutch 3D approach can
&make the Taliban irrelevant8 by winning hearts and minds.
¶8. (C) The Dutch will be interested in the U.S. analysis of
Pakistan,s role in solving the Afghanistan quandary. After
suspending aid to Pakistan in 2008, the Dutch expect to
provide as much as 112 million euro in development aid to
Pakistan over the next three years, with the timing of a
public announcement yet to be determined. The government
will continue to watch political developments there closely
out of concern the government may not live up to its
democratic commitments.
---------------------------
Human Rights and Guantanamo
---------------------------
¶9. (S) Verhagen has made human rights a priority for the
Dutch government and his hallmark as Foreign Minister. The
Dutch are anxious to work closely with us on human rights
issues and welcome the return of the U.S. as an observer to
the Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva. The Dutch are
serving a second consecutive term on the Council, and while
they share our frustration with the results, Verhagen will
probably encourage you to seek an HRC seat in 2009 or 2010.
In addition, Verhagen may suggest a joint U.S.-Dutch
initiative to counter violence against women or to attack
child labor. The Dutch are also trying to salvage the Durban
review conference on racism, including by circulating an
abbreviated draft that removes references to Israel that are
offensive to us and the Dutch. Perhaps the best opportunity
Qoffensive to us and the Dutch. Perhaps the best opportunity
for expanding cooperation is in the area of development
assistance. The Netherlands is the world,s sixth largest
aid donor, providing over 4 billion euro ($6.1 billion)
annually, and Dutch programs are rated as highly effective
compared to other nations.
¶10. (S) Verhagen has been critical of Guantanamo, and did not
lose an opportunity to raise his concerns about Guantanamo
with the previous administration. The Dutch parliament,s
debate and fierce criticism of Guantanamo have permeated the
Dutch press and public,s perceptions. Closing Guantanamo,
therefore, will go a long way toward improving Dutch
skepticism of U.S. policies on human and civil rights.
Verhagen publicly saluted the President,s decision to close
Guantanamo, but he also publicly told Parliament that the
Dutch government has no plans to accept detainees.
Nonetheless, Verhagen,s personal staff recommended that you
raise the issue with him privately, to encourage him to stay
open to the idea of supporting an EU proposal to help the
United States. A less difficult alternative for the Dutch
than accepting detainees would be providing funding to assist
with the transfer of detainees to third countries. With an
eye to the future, FM Verhagen is funding a two-year study of
THE HAGUE 00000196 003 OF 004
the nexus of human rights, humanitarian law, and use of
force, thus aiming to resolve the knotty legal issues
surrounding Guantanamo.
¶11. (SBU) Finally, Verhagen may ask you about U.S. support
for the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Dutch are
proud of serving as the &home of international law8 and
hosting many international legal institutions such as the
International Court of Justice. If you or the President
chose to make a major announcement on the ICC, or U.S.
commitment to international law and human rights, no setting
in Europe would be more appropriate than The Hague, the
Netherlands.
------------------------------
Other Issues - Economic Crisis
------------------------------
¶12. (U) The Dutch financial sector has been hit hard by the
global financial crisis, due in part to exposure to U.S.
mortgage-backed securities and other toxic assets. The
government has responded assertively with several measures to
assist banks and their customers, most dramatically by
nationalizing the Dutch operations of Fortis Bank and by
providing capital to ING and guaranteeing part of its U.S.
mortgage portfolio.
¶13. (U) The Dutch real economy is struggling. After 2
percent GDP growth in 2008, the latest official estimate is a
3.5 percent contraction in 2009. Dutch exports are expected
to decline by 12 percent this year, a major blow to this
trade-dependent economy. The Port of Rotterdam, Europe's
largest, has already seen a 15 percent decline in port
traffic since October. Several Dutch industry giants have
announced layoffs. The current unemployment rate of 3.9
percent is forecast to climb to 5.5 percent in 2009 (still
considerably lower than the EU average). The GONL has passed
two stimulus packages and is expected to announce a third
shortly.
¶14. (U) An invitation to the G-20 summit in London is a major
win for the Dutch, who fought hard to be included in the
November 2008 Washington G-20 summit. Although not a G-20
member, the Dutch argued successfully that they play a major
role in the international financial system (for instance, it
is an active member of the Financial Stability Forum). Now,
with a second invitation, the Dutch hope to have assured
their seat at the table for future G-20 events. At the
London summit, we can expect the Dutch to support Germany and
other key member states in a call for much broader financial
regulation ) but to refrain from supporting new stimulus
packages until the results of current stimulus measures can
be determined. They will support the G-20,s expansion to
include more developing countries. In keeping with their
reputation, the Dutch will also stress open markets and free
trade. They have called on fellow EU Member States to avoid
protectionist measures, and they were highly critical of the
proposed ""Buy American"" provisions in the U.S. Recovery and
Reinvestment Act. The Dutch have repeatedly expressed their
hope to see the economic crisis spur the U.S., China, India,
and others to make the concessions necessary to conclude the
WTO Doha Round
¶15. (SBU) Prime Minister Balkenende and his cabinet enjoyed
widespread public support in late 2008 for their quick
intervention in the financial sector. However, domestic and
international criticism of the GONL's cautious, incremental
approach to the crisis has gathered steam in recent weeks.
Balkenende,s cabinet continues to consult closely with
parliament, labor, and industry on the way forward. While
Finance Minister Wouter Bos, the politically savvy Deputy
QFinance Minister Wouter Bos, the politically savvy Deputy
Prime Minister and leader of the Labor Party (PvdA), has
taken the lead on the Netherlands, international response to
the economic crisis, Foreign Minister Verhagen has been less
visible on this issue.
-----------
Middle East
-----------
¶16. (SBU) Verhagen will welcome your readout on the Middle
East; he is eager to play a constructive role. With an eye
toward supporting a peace agreement, the Dutch participate in
the Gaza maritime interdiction initiative to stop arms
smuggling and thereby address Israel,s security concerns.
Along with the Danish, the Dutch have proposed resurrecting
the EU Gaza-Egypt border monitoring mission. At the same
time, the Dutch push for greater access for humanitarian aid
in Gaza. The Dutch are substantial donors to Gaza economic
development and governance initiatives, providing 72 million
THE HAGUE 00000196 004 OF 004
euro in 2008.
¶17. (S) The Dutch strongly support the UN sanctions regime
against Iran and quickly follow up on efforts to curtail
proliferation activities. The Dutch reported that sanctions
are starting to work -- slowly )- although they are not
targeting the right people. Nonetheless, the Dutch believe
there is substantial interest among Iranian parliamentarians
for an exchange with U.S. counterparts. The Dutch are
willing to deepen our U.S.-Netherlands cooperation on
information-sharing on Iran. On Syria, the Dutch welcome
U.S. outreach to Syria and agree that the U.S. and the EU
will get more from the Syrians if we keep a united front as
we push for a peace agreement with Israel, a secure and
stable relationship with Lebanon, and an end to support for
militants.
GALLAGHER
| | A Bridge too Far | Petrus - 19.01.2011 10:54
09THEHAGUE514 2009-08-25 14:02 2011-01-17 00:12 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy The Hague
VZCZCXYZ0014
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #0514/01 2371459
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3195
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2831
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0414
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2236
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000514
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF NATO NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: POST-2010 DEPLOYMENT
POSSIBLE BUT NOT IN URUZGAN
REF: A. THE HAGUE 0419
¶B. THE HAGUE 0092...
",
222211,8/25/2009 14:59,09THEHAGUE514,"Embassy The
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OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTC #0514/01 2371459
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
","S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000514
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF NATO NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: POST-2010 DEPLOYMENT
POSSIBLE BUT NOT IN URUZGAN
REF: A. THE HAGUE 0419
¶B. THE HAGUE 0092
Classified By: Ambassador Fay Hartog Levin for reasons 1.4 (B, D).
¶1. (C) This cable continues reporting on post's efforts to
get the Dutch to ""yes"" on a post-2010 deployment in
Afghanistan (reftels).
¶2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Labor Party leader Bos told the Ambassador
in confidence (STRICTLY PROTECT) the Dutch will likely stay
in Afghanistan post-2010 but not in Uruzgan. The cabinet
will probably not take that decision until the end of the
year. Post recommends next steps in our engagement (para 7).
END SUMMARY.
¶3. (S/NF) At the end of her August 24 courtesy call,
Ambassador talked one-on-one with Wouter Bos, the Labor Party
(PvdA) leader, Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister,
about Afghanistan. (COMMENT: Senior Dutch officials had
identified the Labor Party and Bos, in particular, as the
most reluctant member of the three-party governing coalition
to agree on staying in Afghanistan beyond the current 2010
mandate. END COMMENT.) Bos told the Ambassador in
confidence the issue of staying in Afghanistan was
politically unpopular, especially within his own party. ""The
Dutch have gone as far as they can go."" Two years ago, when
the Dutch decided to extend the mission in Uruzgan, everyone
agreed that would be the last time. If we now extend again,
Bos said, we will be asked every two years to stay on. It is
important to stick to our word and wrap up the mission.
This, Bos argued, was the official Labor Party position.
¶4. (S/NF) Bos then said the Government, with Labor Party
support, will be able to stay in Afghanistan after its
current mandate expires, but not in Uruzgan. The Ambassador
pressed Bos that it was more logical for the Dutch to remain
in Uruzgan where they had developed important contacts with
local tribes and leaders as well as funded numerous projects.
Bos admitted this was true, but did not know if staying in
Uruzgan would fly with his party.
¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador mentioned the Embassy would be
hosting a number of senior USG officials in the near future
who would be willing to discuss Afghanistan with Bos (such as
USNATO Amb. Daalder and CENTCOM Gen. Petreaus). He said
Development Cooperation Minister Koenders was advising him on
all issues involving Afghanistan, including how to handle it
politically. If Bos is not available to meet with U.S.
visitors, he will make sure Koenders is. He also advised the
Ambassador the Cabinet would probably not make a final
decision on the deployment question until the end of the
year, December.
¶6. (S/NF) COMMENT: Queen Beatrix commented to the Ambassador
during her credentialing ceremony on August 19 that finding a
way forward on Afghanistan ""would be difficult,"" but must be
done. It appears the senior leadership of the body politic
agrees. We had heard from other Cabinet members, including
Foreign Minister Verhagen, that Bos and the Labor Party would
likely agree to extending the Dutch mission in Afghanistan
past 2010. Bos's statement, however, was the first time any
senior Labor Party leader had made that clear. Although
appearing to draw a line in the sand about leaving Uruzgan,
Qappearing
to draw a line in the sand about leaving Uruzgan,
Bos did not seem categorical about that issue. In our
engagement, we need to continue to stress the Alliance need
for the Dutch to remain in Afghanistan and in Uruzgan, in
particular; the progress the Dutch have made in Uruzgan and
the need to build upon their stability and development
efforts there; the increased U.S. contribution in military
and civilian personnel and resources in Afghanistan; and the
enhanced contributions of NATO and other partners. A word of
caution - the Dutch are concerned Jan Mohammed, the former
governor and local warlord, might be re-appointed governor of
Uruzgan if Pres. Karzai is re-elected. If that were to
happen, everyone, including our strongest supporters, says
the Dutch will not/not return to Uruzgan under any
circumstances. END COMMENT.
¶7. (S/NF) ENGAGEMENT PLAN: (A) The Ambassador continues her
courtesy calls, seeing Foreign Minister Verhagen and Defense
Minister van Middelkoop August 31. She will raise
Afghanistan and extending the Dutch mandate in both meetings.
She will also meet with parliamentary leaders in the near
future.
(B) USNATO Amb. Daalder visits Sept. 3 and will have meetings
with senior MoD and MFA officials. He will meet with
Verhagen and we have requested a meeting with Minister
Koenders. Amb. Daalder will also give a public address
talking about NATO in Afghanistan and will conduct several
press interviews.
(C) Defense Minister van Middelkoop plans to meet with
Secretary Gates in Washington September 10.
(D) CENTCOM Gen. Petreaus will visit the Netherlands in
support of the 65th anniversary of the WWII Market Garden
operation (""A Bridge Too Far"") in mid-September. He will
deliver three speeches throughout the country, which are
expected to get significant media attention. We are working
with his staff to identify opportunities for him to meet
appropriate ministers and parliamentarians.
(E) We recommend SRAP Amb. Holbrooke call Minister Koenders,
whom he met in late March in The Hague, to thank him for the
Dutch support of the Afghan elections (8 million Euros
contribution to UNDP, long and short-term staffers to the EU
election observers mission, 30 military personnel), to
discuss the recent Friends of Pakistan conference in Istanbul
(they pledged 86.7 million Euros in assistance over three
years at the Tokyo conference) and to talk about regional
developments. Amb. Holbrooke could offer to visit the
Netherlands if Koenders thought it would be helpful.
(F) Finally, we will re-examine our engagement plan at the
end of September in light of Gen. McCrystal's strategic
review and the results of these meetings.
LEVIN
| | Tegen beter weten In | Via Tupperambtenaren - 19.01.2011 11:05
VZCZCXRO2469
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DE RUEHTC #0543/01 2531435
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3229
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2833
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0416
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 5256
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 000543
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/9/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO NL AF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DAALDER PRESSES DUTCH TO STAY THE
COURSE IN AFGHANISTAN
REF: A. THE HAGUE 514
¶B. THE HAGUE 419
Cl...
224468,9/10/2009 14:35,09THEHAGUE543,"Embassy The
Hague",SECRET,09THEHAGUE419|09THEHAGUE514,"VZCZCXRO2469
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHTC #0543/01 2531435
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 101435Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3229
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2833
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0416
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 5256
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 THE
HAGUE 000543
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/9/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO NL AF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DAALDER PRESSES DUTCH TO STAY THE
COURSE IN AFGHANISTAN
REF: A. THE HAGUE 514
¶B. THE HAGUE 419
Classified By: Ambassador Daalder for reasons 1.5(b,d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO,
Ambassador Ivo Daalder, argued for the extension of the
Netherlands, military deployment and aid to Afghanistan
beyond 2010 during high-level meetings, a speech, press
interviews, and a reception in The Hague on September 3,
¶2009. This cable covers conversations with Development
Minister Koenders (paragraphs 2 - 8), FM Verhagen (paragraphs
9 - 13), and senior foreign policy officials (paragraphs 14 -
24). Dutch officials uniformly responded that selling an
extended military deployment to the Dutch parliament will be
difficult, but that some Dutch involvement in Afghanistan
past 2010 is almost certain. Daalder also exchanged views
with the Dutch on the NATO strategic concept (paragraphs 13,
24). Paragraph 25 summarizes Dutch participation and
reactions at the speech and reception. END SUMMARY.
-----------------------------
Development Minister Koenders
-----------------------------
¶2. (U) September 3, 2009; Dutch Foreign Ministry; The Hague,
Netherlands.
¶3. (U) Participants:
United States
-------------
Ambassador Hartog Levin
Ambassador Daalder
Jennifer Davis, U.S. Mission to NATO
Eric Falls, Embassy The Hague
Netherlands
-----------
Bert Koenders, Minister for Development Cooperation
Ms. Joke Brandt, MFA DG for Development Cooperation
Ms. Godie van de Paal, MFA Task Force Uruzgan
¶4. (SBU) Ambassador Daalder emphasized President Obama,s
commitment to success in Afghanistan through cooperative
effort with Allies. The new U.S. strategy has two key
themes, he said. First, it is more narrowly defined to
ensure it is tied to our core interests and to ensure it is
achievable. Second, the U.S. is boosting support for the
strategy through regional cooperation, the &3D8 approach of
defense, diplomacy, and development, and through rapid
build-up of Afghan security forces. Daalder also emphasized
our mission in Afghanistan is a combined effort -- forty
percent of the troops in ISAF, as well as forty percent of
our casualties, are from our non-U.S. Allies.
¶5. (C) Ambassador Daalder explained that we hope the Dutch
will stay in Afghanistan as we value their expertise. He
added that we understand that the number of Dutch troops may
decline after 2010. Nonetheless, he said we believe there
are two key messages that may help convince the Dutch public
and parliament to support an extension of the Dutch mission.
First, the new U.S. president is extremely popular in Europe
and that popularity might result in deeper support for the
mission in Afghanistan. Second, the United States depends on
cooperation of important Allies like the Netherlands, which
has taken a real leadership role in development efforts and
relationship-building in Afghanistan.
¶6. (C) Koenders responded with a review of previous Dutch
decisions on Afghanistan and an explanation of the current
political situation. The first Dutch deployment was a
Qpolitical situation. The first Dutch deployment was a
&sensitive8 decision for the Labor party four years ago.
(Background: Koenders is from the Labor party. The
Netherlands, current governing coalition includes the
Christian Democrats, the Christian Union, and the Labor
party, which is the most skeptical member of the coalition
regarding Afghanistan. See reftel A, B. End Background.)
&I supported the decision, but it was difficult,8 he said.
THE HAGUE 00000543 002 OF 005
The Labor party required a development component to the
mission, the &soft approach,8 though he &didn,t think it
was soft,8 and he knew troops &would be killed.8 After
intensive parliamentary discussions, the party agreed to a
two-year deployment, until 2008. The decision to extend the
deployment until 2010 was also difficult, with Labor and
other parties expressing significant concerns about
burden-sharing. The Labor Party was &unhappy8 with the
final decision.
¶7. (C) Looking ahead, Koenders said the Dutch would continue
development efforts in Uruzgan -- the Dutch leadership is
civilian and the Dutch have been successful. However, the
government,s credibility is at stake with any military
redeployment. The government will decide whether the
military will &leave completely8 or &just leave Uruzgan.8
To make the case to the Labor party, the Dutch parliament,
and the Dutch people, Koenders said it would be helpful to
show greater burden sharing and more collaboration on
development aid. President Obama and the new U.S.
Afghanistan strategy are also helpful elements, he added.
&The picture has changed completely.8 In addition, there
should be &no mission creep for ISAF8 and UNAMA needs a
larger role. On selling the new strategy, Koenders said the
Dutch people would need to see some element of success and a
realistic strategy with a final goal that we can achieve.
Koenders wondered whether it made sense for the Netherlands
to lead on aid coordination, given its &small8
contributions relative to the United States. However, he
said it would be worthwhile to follow up on his good
discussions with the previous USAID director, particularly on
the disorganized effort in Pakistan.
¶8. (C) Daalder said that President Obama agrees we need to
establish a realistic exit goal by shifting security to
Afghanistan itself and show some real progress on the ground
within 12-18 months in order to sustain political support.
He added we will work on follow-on meetings about development
cooperation.
-----------
FM Verhagen
-----------
¶9. (U) September 3, 2009; Dutch Foreign Ministry; The Hague,
Netherlands.
¶10. (U) Participants:
United States
-------------
Ambassador Hartog Levin
Ambassador Daalder
Jennifer Davis, U.S. Mission to NATO
Eric Falls, Embassy The Hague
Netherlands
-----------
Maxime Verhagen, Foreign Minister
Mr. Marcel De Vink, Private Secretary to the Minister
Mr. Maarten Boef, Head of MFA Task Force Uruzgan
¶11. (C) Daalder emphasized the importance of the
Netherlands, decision on Afghanistan: if the Netherlands
pulls out, he said, we will not be able to convince Canada to
reverse its withdrawal decision and we could then lose the UK
in a &domino effect.8 The USG wants to help the Dutch
government support an extension of Dutch troops, although
Daalder said &we won,t tell you what to do,8 knowing that
public pressure from the U.S. would be self-defeating.
Daalder added we understand the Dutch must withdraw as &lead
nation8 in Uruzgan, although with the new ISAF command
Qnation8 in Uruzgan, although with the new ISAF command
structure that is less relevant. He said the United States
hopes the Dutch will maintain troops in the &four figure8
level, including enablers, F-16s, and medical units, adding
that lower profile deployments might be helpful in making the
case to the public. In addition, he said we are making the
shift from a direct security role to partnering with the
Afghan National Army (ANA). President Obama,s popularity
THE HAGUE 00000543 003 OF 005
and our new strategy are also key arguments.
¶12. (C) Verhagen responded, &I am ready to defend a new
decision8 on the Netherlands, troop deployment, given the
new situation in Afghanistan, the new U.S. president, the new
U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, broader participation by
Allies, and the Netherlands, involvement at the G20.
However, he said, these arguments are not sufficient.
Verhagen said the Dutch government won the vote in parliament
by setting a 2010 timetable for pull-out, and needed to show
reduced corruption in Afghanistan, better coordination of
aid, and a greater role for German and French troops.
Greater contributions from Allies like France and Germany are
key for winning votes from the Liberal party (VVD), he
explained. Verhagen emphasized that the United States should
&invest in the VVD8 and VVD leaders such as Mark Rutte.
The most recent meeting with VVD leaders regarding Uruzgan
&was not positive.8 (Background: The VVD, or Liberal party,
is in the opposition but nonetheless considered essential in
supporting an extension, as Dutch governments need to win
support of a broad coalition for military deployments. End
background.)
¶13. (S) Daalder concluded with a review of upcoming
discussions on NATO,s &strategic concept,8 being headed by
former Secretary of State Albright. The group of experts
should discuss all issues responsibly, he said; in the past
some Allies have hesitated to work on difficult issues.
Verhagen welcomed Daalder,s suggestion, noting that a
discussion of Article 5 and &out of area8 initiatives would
be key. Verhagen said he supports the German proposal to
include disarmament efforts as part of the discussion and
said he has blocked internal Dutch discussions on the
presence of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands because that
is a matter for NATO to consider. However, Verhagen said the
Netherlands is open to frank NATO discussions and is sending
a delegation to Washington to discuss nuclear posture (Note:
MOD Policy Director General Lo Casteleijn will lead the
delegation on September 9. End note.) Daalder thanked
Verhagen and emphasized that Allied agreements on nuclear
weapons in Europe would be indispensable to good
transatlantic relations and should include the &Quad,8
weapons-basing countries, and Lithuania, amongst others.
---------------------------------
Lunch with Senior Dutch Officials
---------------------------------
¶14. (U) September 3, 2009; Societeit de Witte; The Hague,
Netherlands.
¶15. (U) Participants:
United States
-------------
Ambassador Hartog Levin
Ambassador Daalder
Captain Daniel Braswell, Defense Attache, Embassy The Hague
Jennifer Davis, U.S. Mission to NATO
Eric Falls, Embassy The Hague
Netherlands
-----------
Mr. Karel van Oosterom, PM,s National Security Adviser
Mr. Pieter de Gooijer, MFA DG for Political Affairs
(Political Director)
Mr. Lo Casteleijn, MOD DG for Policy
Lt. Gen. F. Meulman, Deputy Chief of Defense
Mr. Robert de Groot, MFA Deputy Political Director
Mr. Henk Swarttow, MFA Director of Security Affairs
QMr. Henk Swarttow, MFA Director of Security Affairs
Ms. Erica Schouten, MFA Head of NATO Affairs
Mr. Maarten Boef, MFA Head of Uruzgan Task Force
¶16. (C) Over lunch, Daalder met with the &Triad8 -- the
leading Dutch civilian advisers to the Prime Minister,
Foreign Minister, and Minister of Defense -- to emphasize the
importance of Dutch contributions in Afghanistan. Daalder
emphasized key points from his discussions with Verhagen and
Koenders (paras 4, 5, and 11 above).
THE HAGUE 00000543 004 OF 005
¶17. (C) MFA Political Director De Gooijer said Afghanistan is
the &most pressing issue8 for the Triad and added &our job
is to help our bosses8 -- six ministers -- make a decision.
(Note: The six key ministers are PM Balkenende, Deputy PM and
Finance Minister Bos, Deputy PM and Minister of Youth and
Family Affairs Rouvoet, Foreign Minister Verhagen, Defense
Minister Van Middelkoop, and Development Minister Koenders.
End note.) De Gooijer explained that Dutch leaders are
heavily influenced by a clear Afghanistan strategy as well as
prospects for success, as well as Dutch domestic politics.
He said the Dutch appreciated U.S. sensitivity in letting the
Dutch make its &own decision.8 In addition, he noted the
Dutch were in a different stage of the decision-making
process than the United States: &You have rolled out a new
strategy, while we are considering a redeployment; you are
engaging in a surge, while we are looking to pull back.
We need to bridge this concept. The Dutch press will also
want to know how these results benefit the Netherlands,8 he
said.
¶18. (C) Mr. Van Oosterom, the National Security Adviser
equivalent, welcomed President Obama,s remarks on
Afghanistan and emphasized that the United States should
avoid public pressure on the Dutch. He said while Dutch
government officials would like to see a quick decision on a
new Dutch deployment, the decision process would be complex.
¶19. (C) MOD Policy Director Casteleijn noted there is
tremendous Dutch enthusiasm for President Obama. He
encouraged continued emphasis on development aid and a
&broad concept8 for the Afghanistan strategy. He suggested
avoiding &NATO-ization8 of the Afghanistan mission through
greater involvement by the EU, UN, and other international
organizations. Waiting 18 months for good results will be
risky for the Dutch, he added, given that some Dutch
government officials are trying now to extend the deployment
for two years. He also noted there is a perception in the
Netherlands that the Dutch have done &their fair share.8
He said promoting greater contributions from some Allies who
haven,t &punched in their weight class8 would be important
to demonstrate.
¶20. (C) Lt. General Meulman said the Dutch military had the
capacity to support an extension beyond 2010, although it
would be difficult to continue at the same level -- 1,800
troops in Afghanistan -- and it would be difficult to leave
some elements like several helicopters for much longer.
Meulman also urged better coordination among ISAF, the UN,
and the GOA.
¶21. (C) MFA Deputy Political Director De Groot added there is
significant mixing of strategies, such as counterinsurgency
and development. At the same time, he said we have seen
disappointing results in state-building and need an
overarching development strategy as well as a new Afghanistan
Compact in 2010.
¶22. (C) Daalder noted President Obama,s strong support for
metrics to show results on the ground. He added that
McChrystal,s forthcoming assessment of troops-to-task in
QMcChrystal,s forthcoming assessment of troops-to-task in
Afghanistan may provide the Dutch government with a clearer
picture of the way forward and improve civilian and military
coordination. He said the Netherlands and Canada have been
the most thoughtful of the Allies on a comprehensive approach
in Afghanistan, so it would be particularly damaging if they
leave the coalition.
¶23. (C) (Note: In a private discussion after lunch, De
Gooijer encouraged Daalder to ask Secretary Geithner to tell
Finance Minister Bos that the Netherlands would not have a
seat in G20 discussions but for its contributions in
Afghanistan. Bos is head of the Labor party and key to the
Dutch cabinet,s decision on Afghanistan (reftel A, B). End
Note.)
¶24. (C) On NATO generally, Daalder thanked De Gooijer for the
choice of former Dutch Shell CEO Jeroen van der Veer as Vice
THE HAGUE 00000543 005 OF 005
Chair of Secretary Albright,s NATO Strategic Concept group
of experts. Van der Veer will bring &a breath of fresh
air,8 he said, to the discussion. Daalder added the group
should address everything, including points of strong
disagreement like nuclear weapons, Articles 4, 5, and 10 of
the NATO Treaty, and Russia. On NATO-EU cooperation, Daalder
said it was likely not productive to castigate Turkey and
Greece as the new SYG had recently done. He suggested that
to improve cooperation, NATO and the EU should consider
regular, informal meetings to focus the &transatlantic8
discussion and that Sweden,s FM Bildt could help in this
role. De Gooijer said FM Bildt could certainly help bring
Sweden into NATO, and any successor to Solana should commit
to addressing NATO-EU cooperation. Daalder flagged
Finland,s joining NATO as a future point of contention with
Russia.
-----------------
Speech, Reception
-----------------
¶25. (C) Ambassador Daalder spoke to a full house at the
Societeit De Witte on the afternoon of September 3. More
than 150 members of parliament, journalists, diplomats,
academics, and students attended. Responding to questions
for a half hour, Daalder explained the new U.S. strategy and
priorities in Afghanistan. In one question, former Dutch
Chief of Defense Berlijn urged the United States to pressure
the government of Afghanistan to improve its performance and
reduce corruption. The new Dutch representative to NATO,
Ambassador Majoor, urged a more integrated approach by NATO
to support development and diplomacy. On the evening of
September 3, at a well-attended reception hosted by
Ambassador Levin, Daalder also engaged a similar audience,
including the leading foreign policy or defense spokespersons
for the major political parties in parliament.
GALLAGHER
"
| | Irrational Commitment & Common Sense | "irrational" views - 19.01.2011 11:17
09THEHAGUE726 2009-12-03 08:08 2011-01-17 00:12 SECRET Embassy The Hague
VZCZCXRO6064
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3529
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000726
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT'S AFGHANISTAN
SPEECH; NEXT STEPS
REF: A. SECSTATE 122731
¶B. THE HAGUE 663
Cl...
237780,12/3/2009 8:05,09THEHAGUE726,"Embassy The
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000726
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT'S AFGHANISTAN
SPEECH; NEXT STEPS
REF: A. SECSTATE 122731
¶B. THE HAGUE 663
Classified By: Pol Deputy Eric G. Falls for reasons 1.4(b,d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Dutch Defense Minister van Middelkoop and
the leader of the largest coalition party in parliament told
Ambassador they expected the Government to find a way to stay
in Afghanistan after 2010, albeit with a significantly
reduced presence. Press coverage of the President's address
was broad, with Cabinet members avoiding comment on the Dutch
deployment decision. The Ambassador will see other key
figures in the coming days. The PM's office recommends
against high-profile USG visits at this time, and Post
concurs. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C/NF) DEFENSE MINISTER: Defense Minister Eimert Van
Middelkoop told Ambassador it was important that President
Obama used the term ""transition"" as a means of explaining the
way forward in Afghanistan, which sent the proper signal to
allies and Afghans. (NOTE: Van Middelkoop is a member of the
Christian Union. The Dutch governing coalition is made up of
the Christian Democrats, Labor, and the Christian Union. END
NOTE.) He said the new U.S. strategy was very much in
alignment with Dutch operational activity in Uruzgan.
Throughout the conversation, van Middelkoop referred to the
Cabinet discussion on Afghanistan as ""frustrating"" and
alluded to the intransigence of the Labor Party. He
indicated they would try to reframe the discussions on
transforming the Dutch PRT in Uruzgan as a multi-national
PRT, still led by the Dutch and with force protection. Asked
about a potential cabinet crisis on the Afghanistan question,
Van Middelkoop confirmed that the Labor Party has been very
slow to talk about any possibilities in Uruzgan and has not
left much room for alternatives. He said the Dutch will
not/not leave Afghanistan and will commit other resources to
the mission. The only open question really is the
continuation of a PRT in Uruzgan.
¶3. (C/NF) CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS FLOORLEADER: Pieter van Geel,
leader of the largest party in parliament, the Christian
Democrats (CDA), told Ambassador he was ""convinced"" the
government coalition would not leave Afghanistan, and would
stay ""somehow."" He assured the Ambassador that PM Balkenende
and FM Verhagen continue to support the mission, and that PM
Balkenende understands that the Dutch military needs a
political decision by Christmas for planning purposes. Van
Geel agreed that the Netherlands' leadership position in
Europe would be harmed if it failed to contribute to the NATO
effort. However, Van Geel said some coalition members in
parliament cling to ""irrational"" views, such as that the
government promised to end its Afghanistan deployment after
2010. Labor confronts the rational pressure from NGOs to
stay on and preserve the gains the Dutch had won in Uruzgan,
with the irrational commitment to get out of Uruzgan. Van
Geel had hoped that the election of President Obama and his
new approach in Afghanistan would sway Labor Party members,
but he has been disappointed. Unlike the Christian
Democrats, the Labor Party does not have a history of making
tough political decisions. Within Dutch society, despite
satisfaction with the government, there has been a growing a
fear of globalization, skepticism of development aid, and a
Qfear of globalization, skepticism of development aid, and a
tendency to &hide behind the dikes8 rather than fully
engage with the outside world. Asked about helpful efforts
to engage the Dutch, Van Geel said General Petraeus's full
praise for the Dutch efforts during his September visit was a
pleasant surprise -- parliamentarians had expected criticism.
He noted that opposition parties were important to
developing sufficient support for continued deployment, and
therefore Mark Rutte of the Liberal Party (VVD) and Alexander
Pechtold of D66 would be important contacts for the USG. The
CDA had found it helpful to bring former members of Dutch
government to parliament, where they offered less political
arguments for staying.
¶4. (SBU) PRESS COVERAGE: The president's speech -- including
positive reactions from key Dutch cabinet members -- garnered
widespread coverage throughout the country on December 2. It
was the lead story on the early morning TV and radio news
programs. Although too late to make the morning papers, it
was covered thoroughly on the websites of the major dailies,
including links to a video and the full text of the speech.
The headline of the nation's largest daily, ""De Telegraaf,""
read ""Heavy U.S. Pressure on Dutch Government: Stay in
Uruzgan."" Various press outlets reported that Secretary
Clinton called Foreign Minister Verhagen (a CDA member) last
week, asking the Netherlands to ""reconsider"" its planned
troop withdrawal. They also reported that Undersecretary of
Defense Flournoy called Defense Minister Van Middelkoop with
the same request. Although he declined to speculate on the
Cabinet's upcoming decision, FM Verhagen commended the
president's speech, adding that ""If everyone were to say 'let
others take care of this,' Afghanistan would again be a free
haven for terrorists in no time. The Netherlands cannot just
pass the care for security in Afghanistan to others."" Van
Middelkoop similarly praised what he called the President's
""clear and recognizable vision"" for the mission in
Afghanistan, including the deadline of July 2011 to begin
withdrawing U.S. forces and his call on NATO allies to
provide more military troops. Like Verhagen, though, Van
Middelkoop stressed that the Dutch government has made no
decision about its military contributions after August 1,
¶2010. Labor Party spokesman Martijn van Dam said his party
will continue to oppose retaining troops in Uruzgan.
¶5. (S/NF) OTHER REACTIONS:
-- National Security Adviser Karel van Oosterom said that
negotiations in coalition are moving ""inch by inch"" and are
delicate. ""We are beginning to move Labor."" He advised
against high-profile U.S. engagement, asserting it would be
counterproductive at this time. Dutch NATO PermRep
Ambassador Majoor intends to speak soon with Ambassador
Daalder. On December 3, the Dutch Chief of Defense, General
Van Uhm, will speak with the CJCS Admiral Mullen and SACEUR
Admiral Stavridis.
-- The Slovak ambassador to the Netherlands had high praise
for the Dutch, telling the Dutch MOD political director
during a reception that her nations' troops would be eager to
expand their work with the Dutch in Uruzgan.
-- Dutch Ambassador to the United States Jones-Bos told U.S.
Ambassador she was willing to help as needed and that she was
""working"" Transportation Ministers Eurlings (CDA) and State
Secretary for European Affairs Timmermans (Labor) to
encourage coalition support for a longer-term Uruzgan
commitment.
¶6. (S/NF) NEXT STEPS: Post will place an op-ed by Ambassador
Daalder, and NATO SYG Rasmussen is also submitting a piece to
the Dutch press. Ambassador will see the following key
figures in the next few weeks:
-- Dec. 4 -- Development Minister Koenders, a key
decision-maker in the Labor Party
-- Dec. 7 -- FM Verhagen and the head of parliament's defense
committee, Anouchka van Miltenberg.
-- Dec. 14 -- Opposition party leader Mark Rutte, of the
Liberal Party, a possible proponent of the mission.
-- Dec. 15 -- Head of parliament's foreign affairs committee,
Henk Jan Ormel.
¶7. (S/NF) COMMENT: The PM's office recommends against
high-profile USG visits at this time, and Post concurs. Our
central goal is to convince the Netherlands to maintain after
2010 a PRT in Uruzgan with a few hundred troops for force
protection. We expect them to withdraw nearly 1500 troops in
2010 while continuing their support with F-16s, enablers, and
military and police training. The upcoming meeting with
Minister Koenders, just after the Dutch cabinet meets on
Friday, will be particularly informative. A U.S.
QFriday, will be particularly informative. A U.S.
announcement on who will take over Task Force Uruzgan will
help us engage the Dutch to sustain their efforts in
Afghanistan. END COMMENT.
LEVIN
| | Verhagen pull-out Uruzgan (but calls NATO-HQ) | Last Minute Break-down - 19.01.2011 11:31
09THEHAGUE731 2009-12-04 17:05 2011-01-17 00:12 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy The Hague
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000731
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: SWAYING THE DUTCH
REF: A. STATE 124188
¶B. USNATO 563
¶C. THE HAGUE 726
D...
238255,12/4/2009 17:54,09THEHAGUE731,"Embassy The
Hague",SECRET//NOFORN,09STATE124188|09THEHAGUE718|09THEHAGUE726|09USN
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RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02
THE HAGUE 000731
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: SWAYING THE DUTCH
REF: A. STATE 124188
¶B. USNATO 563
¶C. THE HAGUE 726
¶D. THE HAGUE 718
Classified By: Pol Deputy Eric G. Falls for reasons 1.4(b,d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: All evidence suggests the Dutch will
not/not retain a significant number of troops in Uruzgan, and
the coalition government could fall over this issue. Pushing
the government to collapse on this matter is not in our
interest. Accepting Dutch compromise proposals is to our
advantage. END SUMMARY.
DUTCH LEAVING URUZGAN
---------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Ambassador pressed Development Minister Bert
Koenders (Labor Party) to retain a Dutch military
contribution in Afghanistan in a meeting December 4. Koenders
observed that the pressure after the President,s speech is
logical. He gave no insights that have not been in his
recent, public statements. Koenders repeated that there will
be no Dutch troops in Uruzgan after 2010 and flatly stated
the Dutch would also not lead the PRT in Uruzgan. However,
he did acknowledge that it is important for the Netherlands
to continue to do its part for NATO and said there were
""discussions"" within the cabinet on committing Dutch troops
elsewhere in southern Afghanistan.
¶3. (S/NF) D/PM / Finance Minister / Labor Party leader Wouter
Bos recently declined a requested meeting with Ambassador
Levin to discuss Afghanistan. He referred the Ambassador
instead to Koenders, Bos's primary adviser on Afghanistan.
In all public statements during the past several months, and
repeated publicly as recently as two days ago, just after
President Obama's speech, Bos has consistently stated the
Dutch will leave Uruzgan in 2010.
¶4. (S/NF) Even Ministers that support continued involvement
in Afghanistan at the most aggressive level have been clear
about this basic point. FM Verhagen stated ""the U.S. knows
that we will hand over the lead in Uruzgan"" in 2010.
¶5. (S/NF) Comment: The Labor Party has left no room for their
own maneuvering on pulling everyone out of Uruzgan except for
a few (12) development personnel. We expect the Labor Party
could well bring down the government rather than extend the
Uruzgan mission. The Labor Party's ""bread and butter"" is the
economy, but the party is looking for an out to rally their
rank and file. The Labor Party's poll numbers have been low
for months, suggesting a steep loss of seats in a near-term
election. Accompanying this poor performance has been
criticism of Bos's leadership and his willingness to flip
flop. We expect that rather than reverse course again and
support a robust Uruzgan mission, Bos would opt to pull out
of the coalition and campaign on Afghanistan. End Comment.
GOVERNMENT COLLAPSE NOT IN OUR INTEREST
---------------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) A collapse of the government hurts our chances for
Dutch contributions and would delay any prospective Dutch
contributions.
¶7. (S/NF) A collapse hurts our chances for significant Dutch
military contributions. If Labor pulls the plug on the
governing coalition at this time, it would likely make
Afghanistan one of the central campaign issues. Dutch public
support for the mission continues at a low level (33% as of
October 30), suggesting that advocates for a deployment will
lose seats in parliament. On the other hand, Geert Wilders'
Qlose seats in parliament. On the other hand, Geert Wilders'
far-right, isolationist Freedom Party stands to gain
significant seats in parliament. In turn, a new governing
coalition will likely be forced to include more parties to
reach a majority. It's likely the coalition could shift to
the left and include parties who are likely to oppose
deployment after the elections' ""referendum on Afghanistan.""
¶8. (S/NF) A collapse of the government will delay additional
Dutch contributions. New elections and the formation of a
new government will take 5-10 months, possibly longer due to
Wilders' popularity and the corresponding difficulty in
forming a new government. Until the new government is
formed, the caretaker government would not be able to approve
a new military mission. Considering that Dutch troops are
scheduled to depart this summer, as well as the planning
required for an extension, withdrawal from Uruzgan will
proceed as scheduled and a new deployment could easily be
delayed until 2011.
ACCEPTING DUTCH PROPOSALS IS TO OUR ADVANTAGE
---------------------------------------------
¶9. (S/NF) The new Dutch proposal -- maintaining a civilian
PRT with protection by another ally, plus troops elsewhere in
southern Afghanistan -- is better than waiting for a new
coalition government that might not give us anything more,
and could well give us less. Embassy counsels patience,
deference and openness with Dutch government's efforts to
sustain their Afghanistan deployment. PM Balkenende's
consistent support for the Afghanistan mission and his
success in leading his party to four consecutive wins in
national elections give us confidence. We recommend
deferring to the advice of Balkenende's National Security
Adviser on not publicly pressuring the Dutch on Afghanistan.
LEVIN
| | Looking Forward to a New Coalition | No Labour involved - 19.01.2011 11:43
09THEHAGUE759 2009-12-21 16:04 2011-01-17 00:12 SECRET Embassy The Hague
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000759
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: CABINET DELIBERATING -
LABOR PARTY LINES DRAWN
REF: THE HAGUE 726
Classified By: Charge...
241007,12/21/2009 16:28,09THEHAGUE759,"Embassy The
Hague",SECRET,09THEHAGUE726,"VZCZCXRO2084
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OF 03 THE HAGUE 000759
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO AF NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: CABINET DELIBERATING -
LABOR PARTY LINES DRAWN
REF: THE HAGUE 726
Classified By: Charge Andrew C. Mann for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Dutch cabinet deliberations on Afghanistan
are stalled going into the holiday break, with no clear
indication when the impasse will be broken. Dutch post-2010
commitments to Afghanistan are being held hostage to the
Labor Party's (PvdA) uncompromising stance. Ambassador's
engagement with key leaders reveals few new assessments:
Dutch will likely stay in Afghanistan focusing on training,
enablers and development - outside of Uruzgan.
END SUMMARY
CABINET MEETINGS SIGNAL NEW LOW IN DELIBERATIONS
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶2. (S) A sextet of ministers devoted their ""mini"" cabinet
meetings to Afghanistan December 09 and 15. The sextet
consists of Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende (Christian
Democrats (CDA)), Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen (CDA),
Finance Minister/Deputy Prime Minister Wouter Bos (Labor
Party (PvdA)), Defense Minister Eimert van Middelkoop
(Christian Unie (CU)), Development Cooperation Minister Bert
Koenders (PvdA), and Youth and Families Minister/Deputy Prime
Minister Andre Rouvoet (CU).
¶3. (S) The cabinet has not released any public information
following the meetings. Verhagen's private secretary told
the Embassy Balkenende, for the first time in a cabinet
meeting, made a ""heartfelt pitch"" for staying in Uruzgan on
December 9. The private secretary was not optimistic,
however, about the future of the Uruzgan mission because the
PvdA's political ""stranglehold"" was still in place. The
cabinet reviewed three options: a substantially reduced
Uruzgan presence, a training mission outside Uruzgan, and a
PRT outside Uruzgan. Chief of Defense Staff apparently
provided broad outlines of these scenarios at the December 15
meeting.
DUTCH KEY LEADER ASSESSMENTS
----------------------------
¶4. (S) PvdA - Bos has completely shunned the diplomatic
corps, relegating Afghanistan discussions to Koenders who has
categorically said the Dutch will not be in Uruzgan after
2010 except for development efforts. The Australian
Ambassador met with PvdA Foreign Affairs spokesperson Martijn
van Dam who was even more unyielding on the Uruzgan
departure. He stated that if Dutch security was needed in
Uruzgan for development efforts after 2010, then the Dutch
would simply stop those efforts as well. The PvdA defense
spokesperson opined that it would not be of any benefit for
U.S. leaders to engage either Bos or van Dam as they were not
""open-minded"" on Afghanistan. The PvdA is a party in
disarray; their December 12 party congress was very mixed.
Although there was no formal party statement made on
Afghanistan, Labor's position remained clear - it was
standing firm on withdrawal of all troops from Uruzgan in
¶2010. Bos has stated he wants a Cabinet decision around
January 8, before the Davids Commission issues it report
about the political support the Dutch Government gave the
U.S. decision to attack Iraq in 2003. Press commentary after
the party congress heavily criticized Labor for failing to
recognize: (1) any positive developments in Uruzgan over the
past two years; (2) the importance for the Dutch to support
the new NATO strategy and mission; and (3) the lives lost
Qthe new NATO strategy and mission; and (3) the lives lost
needlessly and effort wasted if the Dutch withdrew from
Uruzgan.
¶5. (S) CDA - Verhagen told the Ambassador December 11 he
thought the cabinet planned to have a decision prior to the
late January London Conference on Afghanistan. Verhagen did
not provide any new insight on what a final cabinet decision
will entail. He and CDA parliamentary floor leader Pieter
van Geel told the Ambassador the CDA MPs were not
enthusiastic about continuing in Uruzgan past 2010, but would
support any decision by the cabinet. Verhagen was not
optimistic about what the cabinet would ultimately decide but
he remained committed to serious Dutch involvement in
Afghanistan.
¶6. (S) CU - Van Middelkoop told the Ambassador that
discussions within the cabinet had been ""frustrating."" The
THE HAGUE 00000759 002 OF 003
military leadership do not want to leave Afghanistan and are
clearly concerned about being the ""odd man out"" within NATO
as many other countries are stepping up their commitments.
Van Middelkoop appears to support a serious commitment but
does not see a way around the impasse caused by the
intransigence of the PvdA.
¶7. (S) Opposition parties - Anouchka van Miltenburg (Liberal
Party - VVD), Chair of the Defense Committee, told the
Ambassador that the debate has everything to do with local
politics and almost nothing to do with statesmanship. She
said the PvdA will clearly put the government into a crisis
over the decision if pressed by CDA. She sees no way to
avoid that other than to compromise on a mission of some
nature outside of Uruzgan. VVD party leader Mark Rutte told
the Ambassador December 14 his party would support staying in
Uruzgan. He speculated that if the cabinet went to a crisis
over the issue the end result may be a coalition of VVD, CDA,
D-66 and CU resulting in more serious support of NATO-led
operations. Alexander Pechtold, D66 party leader, told
Ambassador December 16 his party would support retention of a
PRT and force protection in Uruzgan. He suggested a cabinet
crisis was not in any of the coalition partner's interest.
Pechtold believes the cabinet decision will be delayed as
long as possible to distance a decision from the recent
public comments to give them room to maneuver. In a meeting
with POL/ECON Counselor, Mariko Peters, the GreenLeft party
spokesperson for defense and foreign affairs (and former DCM
at the Dutch Embassy in Kabul), said her party would support
continued Dutch involvement in Afghanistan if it focused on
community policing, even if Dutch police trainers needed
Dutch troops to provide force protection to do their job.
Geert Wilders of the Freedom Party (PVV) told the Ambassador
December 10 the Labor Party had painted itself into a corner
with no way out. It was in a lose-lose situation. It would
probably agree to stay in Afghanistan someplace other than
Uruzgan, but that would not placate its followers. Wilders
supports the NATO mission in Afghanistan and praised the
President's new strategy, but his party wants all Dutch
troops to be withdrawn, ""it is time for others to step up and
assume their responsibilities. The Dutch have done enough.""
JOINT EFFORTS
-------------
¶8. (S) The results of the Ambassador's meetings with the
party leaders are the same as those undertaken by the
British, Australian and Danish Ambassadors. Comparing notes
reinforced the overwhelming support of the Prime Minister and
the Foreign Minister for a continued Uruzgan deployment, but
frustration as arguments fall on deaf ears in the PvdA. The
PvdA shows no realization of the impact a lack of significant
commitment by the Dutch will have on their international
stature. They also fail to grasp the overall costs and loss
of credibility from leaving a successful PRT and establishing
a completely new mission in a new location as Labor has
proposed as an alternative. The British embassy has
forwarded a suggestion that Foreign Secretary David Miliband,
a Labor leader, contact Bos on a party-to-party basis to
discuss Afghanistan. The Danish Ambassador believes that as
Qdiscuss Afghanistan. The Danish Ambassador believes that as
a small country with the same issues as the Dutch she can
argue a different angle that may be helpful in urging the
Dutch forward.
COMMENT
-------
¶9. (S) Karel van Oosterom, the Prime Minister's Foreign
Affairs and Defense Advisor (NSA equivalent), told visiting
EUR/WE Office Director Maureen Cormack the cabinet was faced
with finding consensus between the PvdA's absolute refusal to
countenance an additional military mission in Uruzgan and the
CDA's insistence that the Netherlands make a significant
contribution to NATO's mission in Afghanistan. He recognized
it was in no one's interest to bring the cabinet to crisis
because of the important work the cabinet still needed to do.
While mindful of Bos's Jan. 8 date, Verhagen's eye on the
London Conference and Parliament's desire for a decision by
March 1, van Oosterom said the Prime Minister will take
whatever time is necessary to achieve the best result. PvdA
Minister Koenders told the Australian Ambassador that Labor,
with Bos's blessing, could support continued development
THE HAGUE 00000759 003 OF 003
efforts through the PRT in Uruzgan (leaving 12 or so civilian
development officers behind in Tarin Kowt with force
protection provided by some other country), enablers, a force
of as many as 500 soldiers deployed elsewhere in Afghanistan,
and an increased financial contribution for development and
training efforts. Given Labor's refusal to consider other
options, that may be the best we can hope for.
END COMMENT.
MANN
| |
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