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Moslim terroristen in Brazilië nn - 06.12.2010 12:35
Officieel brengen de politici in Brazilië naar buiten dat ze geen last hebben van moslim terroristen maar achter de schermen maken ze zich toch zorgen. Officially, Brazil does not have terrorism inside its borders. In reality, several Islamic groups with known or suspected ties to extremist organizations have branches in Brazil and are suspected of carrying out financing activities Officieel brengen de politici in Brazilië naar buiten dat ze geen last hebben van moslim terroristen maar achter de schermen maken ze zich toch zorgen. Verder blijkt uit de gelekte document op Wikileaks dat de V.S. goede militaire samenwerking met Brazilië heeft maar wel zou willen dat Brazilië zich meer tegen anti-democratische acties van Venezuela en Cuba zou uitspreken. Ook vind de V.S. het jammer dat er geen wetsveranderingen zijn doorgevoerd in Brazilië om meer inzage te krijgen in het financiële verkeer van Brazilië. The primary counterterrorism concern for both Brazilian officials and the U.S. Mission in Brazil is the presence and activities of individuals with links to terrorism-particularly several suspected Sunni extremists and some individuals linked to Hizballah-in Sao Paulo and other areas of southern Brazil. Despite publicly expressed sentiments of high-level officials denying the existence of proven terrorist activity on Brazilian soil, Brazil,s intelligence and law enforcement services are rightly concerned that terrorists could exploit Brazilian territory to support and facilitate terrorist attacks, whether domestically or abroad, and have focused their efforts in the areas of Sao Paulo, where the vast majority of Brazil,s estimated 1.2-1.5 million Muslims live. An anti-terrorism bill that would have established the crime of terrorism and other associated crimes was drafted but shelved before its introduction in Congress and a long-delayed anti-money laundering bill has not been approved by Congress. If passed, the latter bill would facilitate greater law enforcement access to financial and banking records during investigations, criminalize illicit enrichment, allow administrative freezing of assets, and facilitate prosecutions of money laundering cases by amending the legal definition of money laundering and making it an autonomous offense. Officially, Brazil does not have terrorism inside its borders. In reality, several Islamic groups with known or suspected ties to extremist organizations have branches in Brazil and are suspected of carrying out financing activities. the official position of the government is to deny that Brazil has any terrorist activity. http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/10/09BRASILIA1216.html Website: http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/10/09BRASILIA1216.html |
Lees meer over: antimilitarisme vrijheid, repressie & mensenrechten wereldcrisis | aanvullingen | uit dit artikel zijn aanvullingen verplaatst naar de ruispagina | | Militaire uitbreiding Brazilie | nn - 06.12.2010 13:04
Brazilië zoekt naar een excuus om hun militaire apparaat flink uit te breiden en te moderniseren inclusief met een atoomonderzeeër. Al is er geen directe dreiging voor Brazilië zijn olievoorraden wordt dit toch veelvuldig in de media gebruikt om Brazilië klaar te stomen voor militaire uitbreiding. De V.S. vind een militaire uitbreiding van Brazilië prima zodat zij daar ook gebruik van kunnen maken.(A Brazilian military that is more capable and deployable can support U.S. interests by exporting stability in Latin America and be available for peacekeeping elsewhere). the Brazilian military is now making a case for its modernization. Making the case, however, means that the Defense Strategy must observe the conventional wisdom of Brazilian politics. There is no threat, for example, to Brazil,s maritime oil deposits, but Brazilian leaders and media have routinely cited oil discoveries off the coast as an urgent reason for better maritime security. This concern has been merged with Brazil,s twenty year quest to develop a nuclear submarine to give new impetus to research on a small reactor for naval propulsion. COMMENT: There is, however, no information as to what possible threats to oil facilities the Navy may be asked to counter, making it difficult, for example to evaluate the strategy,s assertion that a nuclear submarine would be necessary to meet the goal of protecting such facilities. END COMMENT. There are however, serious questions as to how much of these plans will see follow through, particularly with other supposed strategic priorities, including national service, nuclear submarines and government support to non-competitive defense industries, providing black holes to suck in all available resources. The political preoccupation with imagined threats to sovereignty in the Amazon, however, serves the practical purpose of tasking the military with developing greater capabilities | Wapenhandelaar V.S. | NN - 06.12.2010 13:27
De ambassadeur van de V.S. lobbyt in Brazilië voor Boeing om gevechtsvliegtuigen te verkopen. De V.S. wil dat Brazilie de F18 Super Hornet besteld bij Boeing. Uit dit document blijkt maar weer dat de V.S. niet gebaat is bij landen die hun militaire macht niet wil uitbreiden. Om de militairen in Brazilië aan hun trekken te laten komen hebben ze de uitbreiding van militair materiaal als nationaal belang en eerste prioriteit weten te verkopen aan de Brazilianen. Zelfs als er geen directe militaire bedreiging is voor Brazilië. In dit daglicht zouden de 'moslim bedreigingen' ook wel ingefluisterd kunnen worden door de V.S. met als enige doel om Brazilië zover te krijgen dat ze hun militaire krijgsmacht uitbreiden en hun materieel bij de V.S. kopen. Ambassador Sobel highlighted opportunities for defense industrial cooperation citing Boeing's efforts to find partners for the FX2 program as a model. Responding to a question of how the ambitious plans for military modernization would be resourced, Moura Neto stated that while this was an economic (as opposed to military) question, the advantage of the strategy document (see ref a for discussion) was that it made the question of defense resources a national one. By recognizing Brazil's "strategic vulnerabilities," the strategy had put the question of defense in the forefront of the national debate. Enzo added that this would be a much more positive development for the military as it put them "inside" of national development instead of on the sidelines where they have been since the end of military rule. The warning from Saito, whom post considers a key ally in our FX2 bid, is the clearest indication yet that the obstacles to the F18 sale cited in refs c and d are real and that we still have considerable ground to cover in countering the perception that the USG, and the State Department in particular, cannot be counted on to approve the necessary technology transfer. The service chiefs got the point that the offer of the F18 signified an unprecedented willingness to approve technology for Brazil that would pay dividends in both military and defense industry cooperation in the future The Boeing F18 Super Hornet has had success in establishing itself as a strong candidate to be Brazil's next generation fighter but still faces strong political opposition. To succeed, the USG and Boeing will need a coordinated strategy aimed at highlighting the Super Hornet's advantages, correcting misinformation and building confidence in the USG's support for the purchase. http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/01/09BRASILIA73.html http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/01/09BRASILIA35.html http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/01/09BRASILIA41.html Website: http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/01/09BRASILIA73.html | |
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