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Wie bepaald wat er gebeurt en hoe Kakofonix - 12.01.2011 17:12
Over propaganda, voorkennis, boerenbedrog; tijd voor iets geheel anders! Het wordt de hoogste tijd om het parlement af te schaffen en zelf beslissingen te nemen, zoals in een democratie. De regering loopt aan een dubieus lijntje en de 'bevolking' mag om de zoveel jaar een rood kleurpotlood vasthouden voor 150 voltijd en 75 deeltijd parlementariërs. We zijn sinds het Romeinse Rijk niet veel verder gekomen met democratiseren. Tragisch als het zo blijft ( http://wlcentral.org/node/818). "want, we werden wel heel erg vaak gebeld door belangrijke Amerikanen om ons te..." (Nederlandse OS, dinsdag 30 maart 2010, 07:46)
http://nos.nl/audio/147263-ben-de-jong-over-vertrouwelijk-ciadocument.html AUDIO De Amerikaanse inlichtingendienst CIA wil de publieke opinie in Frankrijk en Duitsland bewerken om te voorkomen dat beide landen zich terugtrekken uit Afghanistan. Aanleiding hiervoor is de val van het Nederlandse kabinet. Dit blijkt uit een vertrouwelijk CIA-document dat openbaar is gemaakt door de klokkenluiderssite WikiLeaks. Een gesprek met Ben de Jong, die verbonden is aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam en zich bezighoudt met inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten.
http://nos.nl/video/174629-kamervragen-na-wikileaks.html ------------------------------------------------------------- CIA report into shoring up Afghan war support in Western Europe WikiLeaks release: March 26, 2010 This classified CIA analysis from March, outlines possible PR-strategies to shore up public support in Germany and France for a continued war in Afghanistan. After the Dutch government fell on the issue of dutch troops in Afghanistan last month, the CIA became worried that similar events could happen in the countries that post the third and fourth largest troop contingents to the ISAF-mission. The proposed PR strategies focus on pressure points that have been identified within these countries. For France it is the sympathy of the public for Afghan refugees and women. For Germany it is the fear of the consequences of defeat (drugs, more refugees, terrorism) as well as for Germany’s standing in the NATO. The memo is an recipe for the targeted manipulation of public opinion in two NATO ally countries, written by the CIA. It is classified as Confidential / No Foreign Nationals. http://mirror.wikileaks.info/leak/cia-afghanistan.pdf ------------------------------------------------------------- Trainingsmissie Afghanistan 2011 voor POLITIEPERSONNEL in provincie Kunduz Ingezonden door P Geertsma op za, 01/08/2011 - 12:02 In 2011 wil de Nederlandse overheid weer een nieuwe missie van start laten gaan in Afghanistan. Het vorige kabinet was nog ‘gevallen’ over een langere deelname van Nederlandse militairen in Afghanistan. Met de nieuwe coalitie lijkt de overheid nu toch weer een bijdrage te willen leveren aan de stabiliteit van Afghanistan. (..) In het verleden hebben Nederlandse militairen niet altijd de militaire steun gekregen die ze nodig hadden van hun internationale militaire bondgenoten. In tegenstelling tot de toenmalige bondgenoten zijn de Duitse militairen wel een effectieve partner om op de steunen. Toch blijft het naar mijn mening het beste om zelf voldoende strijdkracht deel te nemen aan een missie om vijandelijke aanvallen snel en effectief af te slaan. Zowel op de grond als vanuit de lucht. http://www.krijgsmacht.nl/artikelen/trainingsmissie-afghanistan-2011-voor-politiepersoneel-provincie-kunduz ------------------------------------------------------------- De Tweede Kamer "behandelde" het kabinetsplan voor een nieuwe missie in Afghanistan. Ditmaal gaat het om een trainingsmissie. Ruim driehonderd politietrainers en begeleiders reizen mogelijk eind dit jaar al af naar Noord-Afghanistan. In Kunduz, onder bescherming van de Duitsers die daar al zitten, moet Nederland politieagenten gaan opleiden. De NAVO wil een fors aantal extra politieagenten opleiden in Afghanistan om zo de veiligheid in het land verder te verbeteren. De coalitie van VVD en CDA heeft zelf geen meerderheid en gedoogpartij PVV is tegen een missie. Geert Wilders liet eerder al weten het een "slecht idee" te vinden en hoopt dat het plan geen steun zal vinden bij de oppositie. PVV-kamerlid Hero Brinkman en oud-Commandant der Strijdkrachten Dick Berlijn zijn in debat over deze mogelijke nieuwe trainingsmissie. Als Commandant der Strijdkrachten was generaal Berlijn de voornaamste militaire gesprekspartner van de minister van Defensie bij onder andere de uitzending van Nederlandse militairen naar Afghanistan. Hij is voorstander van deze missie.
http://pauwenwitteman.vara.nl/Fragment-detail.1548.0.html?&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=19702&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1547&cHash=b7fb400c8824ada0c9d674dbc525630d ------------------------------------------------------------- Dat wordt druk op de Haagse oppositie voor de CIA..... en voor wie nog meer? |
Read more about: antimilitarisme vrijheid, repressie & mensenrechten | supplements | State "views will not reflect" Dutch | De Pooijer - 19.01.2011 09:20
07THEHAGUE2082 2007-12-21 12:12 2011-01-17 00:12 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy The Hague VZCZCXYZ0002 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHTC #2082/01 3551225 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 211225Z DEC 07 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0844 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2743 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0344 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0132 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002082 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, SCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: IT'S OFFICIAL! TWO MORE YEARS IN URUZGAN Classified... " 135376,12/21/2007 12:25,07THEHAGUE2082,"Embassy The Hague",CONFIDENTIAL,,"VZCZCXYZ0002 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHTC #2082/01 3551225 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 211225Z DEC 07 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0844 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2743 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0344 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0132 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY ","C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002082 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, SCA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: IT'S OFFICIAL! TWO MORE YEARS IN URUZGAN Classified By: CDA Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The GONL obtained broad support on December 20 from the Dutch parliament in favor of extending its ISAF mission in Uruzgan province until December 2010. This officially brings to a close months of internal Dutch deliberations on the controversial extension issue, and ensures that the Dutch troops will remain committed to Uruzgan for the next three years despite serious political misgivings and a lack of popular support at home. End summary. ¶2. (C) The Dutch parliament on December 20 officially gave its consent to an additional two-year plus extension of its ISAF mission in Uruzgan from August 2008 until December 2010, voting down by a count of 98 to 42 (with 10 absences) a motion by the Socialist Party to withdraw troops at the end of the current mandate. While parliament does not constitutionally have the authority to approve any Dutch deployment overseas -- and votes represented in parliament by the coalition parties technically gave the GONL a majority -- the GONL nevertheless stressed the political importance of garnering broad support for the mission. (Note: According to Dutch Parliamentary tradition, members planning to be absent from an important vote ""twin"" with a member from the opposing side. Had all members been present, therefore, the vote would have been 103 in favor to 47 against -- slightly more than a two-thirds majority. End note.) ¶3. (C) The GONL obtained this broad support when the opposition Liberal Party (VVD) and Political Calvinist Party (SGP) joined coalition parties the Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA), the Labor Party (PvdA), and Christian Unie (CU). As the largest and most influential opposition party on the right, VVD's support was crucial. Throughout the debate, VVD Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hans van Baalen consistently asked the GONL to justify the new mission in terms of improved structure, financing, new contributions from other partners, sufficient transport and Allied support to extract Dutch troops in case of an emergency, and clarity of the Afghan government's promise to deploy security forces to Uruzgan. ¶4. (C) Despite GONL efforts to satisfy van Baalen's concerns, VVD's support for the new mission was not assured until the parliamentary debate over the extension on December 17. Former Defense Minister and still influential VVD parliamentarian Henk Kamp insisted on upholding the original agreement between NATO and the Netherlands consisting of a two-year deployment to August 2008 -- as indicated by a December 2005 letter from former SACEUR Gen. Jones to Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn. Key demands for VVD's continued support included a clear exit by Dutch troops from Uruzgan by December 2010 and recognition by NATO that it is responsible for finding a successor to the Dutch, as well as the understanding that the GONL will not participate in any other major peacekeeping operation until 2010. Ultimately, van Baalen was satisfied by the GONL's case to remain in Uruzgan -- including especially the promise that new or unforeseen costs associated with the extension would not affect the defense budget -- and pledged his party's unanimous support. Strong Government Case ---------------------- ¶5. (C) During three rounds of parliamentary debate on December 17-18, the GONL confidently pitched the case in favor of extending, answering 577 questions submitted by parliament on the matter. FM Verhagen said he had received a letter from NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer acknowledging that Dutch troops will leave Uruzgan by December 2010. Verhagen reiterated that he informed his counterparts at the NATO foreign ministerial on December 10 the Dutch would withdraw by December 2010. He also made clear that the Netherlands would not participate in any other major operation that might affect the Dutch deployment in Afghanistan. Verhagen stressed the importance of the international community reviewing its collective long-term efforts in Afghanistan, including specifically a ""master strategy"" -- he said this will be discussed at the upcoming NATO summit in Bucharest. ¶6. (C) Defense Minister van Middelkoop argued that the extended mission will not harm Dutch military readiness, and made several reassurances regarding the Australian partnership and the quality of various contributions from France, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. He had hoped for additional partners, but did not foresee any problems working with these contributions, and suggested that the Czech Republic might be willing to extend its parliamentary mandated six-month deployment to a year. Van Middelkoop was confident that the GONL could finance the new mission, including 370 million Euros of additional funding per year. Development Minister Koenders made the case in favor of meaningful reconstruction despite the challenging security situation. He noted that the Uruzgan PRT would be placed under civilian leadership by August 1, 2009. Opposing View ------------- ¶7. (C) The Socialists and Green Left led the charge opposing the extension, arguing that parliament was deliberately misled to support a ""combat"" mission in the guise of reconstruction. Green Left floorleader Halsema argued that the ISAF mission -- in conjunction with OEF -- has enabled a corrupt Karzai government, and has been responsible for unnecessary civilian casualties. Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV) also opposed the mission, but for different reasons. Wilders said he supported the ISAF mission, but felt that the Netherlands had ""done its fair share"" -- time for another Ally to step up and serve in the south. The GONL had hoped to persuade D-66 to join proponents of the extension, but D-66 floorleader Pechtold cited the absence of a clear strategy among NATO, the UN, and the EU as the main reason why he opposes a new mission. ¶8. (C) In all, the Socialist Party (SP), Green Left, PVV, D66 and the Party for the Animals opposed the mission. Opposition actually grew in comparison to the initial mission, due primarily to election gains by the Socialists and Green Left in the last election, and votes lost by VVD to Wilders' PVV off-shoot. Opposition parties sponsored four total motions on the extension: withdrawing Dutch troops by August 2008 (SP), conveying disappointment to NATO over perceived lack of support (SP), publicly releasing the December 2005 letter from former SACEUR Gen. Jones to Gen. Berlijn (D-66), and calling for better compensation for victims of civilian casualties (Green Left) -- all four motions were voted down. Rita Verdonk, who until recently had been a member of VVD, also voted against the extension. Something All Could Agree On ---------------------------- ¶9. (C) Parties all across the political spectrum expressed deep dissatisfaction with NATO and the lack of solidarity in supporting the Dutch extension in Uruzgan. Proponents of the extension were quick to thank the French, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians and Georgians, but questioned why other Allies had not agreed to do more. PvdA spokesperson Martijn van Daam noted disappointment with NATO partners; VVD spokesperson van Baalen called on greater Allies powers -- such as Germany -- to do more. Critics made the perceived lack of NATO solidarity a centerpiece in their opposition to the extension. Wilders based his decision solely on this point; D-66 spokesperson Pechtold described the lack of solidarity as damaging for NATO, and creates a false sense of security for the people of Uruzgan. The Socialists accused NATO of ""not keeping its part of the bargain,"" as evidenced by the Jones-Berlijn letter. Public Opinion -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Despite the broad support in parliament, Dutch public support for the extension remains low. According to the latest opinion polls, 43 percent oppose any extension, approximately 25 percent are in favor, with the remaining almost 33 percent feeling indifferent. ¶11. (C) Dutch media coverage has been mixed, largely ignoring the extension story once it became clear the GONL would obtain a strong parliamentary majority. Most major dailies focused on the latest developments in the Dutch Hell's Angels trial or Dutch soccer team AZ's loss in UEFA Cup play. Dutch daily Trouw (center-left) welcomed the extension, accused Wilders' of political opportunism, and deplored D-66's opposition in light of its long international tradition. The Trouw editorial suggested that stabilizing Afghanistan is a long-term effort, and therefore questioned GONL's decision to ""call it a day"" in 2010. It criticized the GONL for ""operating clumsily,"" while NATO Allies demonstrated ""little solidarity"" with the Netherlands. ¶12. (SBU) Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad (center-left) called for tempered expectations in the next two years, especially as ""not much"" has come from reconstruction efforts thus far. This editorial highlighted the importance of adopting an Afghanistan ""master plan"" at the NATO summit in Bucharest. Dutch daily Telegraaf (center-right; largest circulation in Netherlands) supports the extension, and published holiday wishes from most members of Cabinet on its front page, emphasizing support and respect for Dutch soldiers serving in Afghanistan. ¶13. (SBU) FM Verhagen acknowledged that the wide support in parliament for the extension is not reflected in the Dutch population -- ""at times, (parliament's) views will not reflect the opinion of a majority of the population."" He said he will focus on generating broader Dutch public support for the extension. Comment: Two Years is Two Years? -------------------------------- ¶14. (C) For all the drama (public flubs by van Middelkoop and Berlijn) and delays (GONL assurances that the decision would be complete by what seemed like an endless summer) associated with this extension question, the GONL once again did a masterful job of forcing a difficult decision with low public support through the Dutch parliament on a tight schedule. A key point in gaining the support of many parliamentarians was the promise that Dutch troops will leave Uruzgan by December ¶2010. However, the GONL decision mentions nothing of possible Dutch missions in other Afghan provinces, or a continued Dutch civilian presence in Uruzgan. According to MFA Task Force Uruzgan Coordinator Pieter-Jan Kleiweg on December 21, ""the door purposefully remains open"" -- and a lot can happen in two years time. Schofer | the Dutch two-year commitment to Uruzgan | Broedkip B. & H. Plotter - 19.01.2011 09:37
06THEHAGUE2597 2006-12-13 09:09 2011-01-17 00:12 SECRET Embassy The Hague VZCZCXRO3686 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK DE RUEHTC #2597/01 3470948 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 130948Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7668 INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1696 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002597 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ECON IR RU NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/BALKENENDE: PM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE REF: THE HAGUE 2544 Classified By: A... 89263,12/13/2006 9:48,06THEHAGUE2597,"Embassy The Hague",SECRET,06THEHAGUE2544,"VZCZCXRO3686 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK DE RUEHTC #2597/01 3470948 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 130948Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7668 INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1696 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002597 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ECON IR RU NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/BALKENENDE: PM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE REF: THE HAGUE 2544 Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROLAND E. ARNALL FOR REASONS 1.4(B/D). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During a December 12 meeting with Ambassador Arnall, Dutch Prime Minister Jan Pieter Balkenende expressed satisfaction with his party's strong performance in the November elections, and predicted a centrist-coalition government could be in place by February. According to Balkenende, the Dutch two-year commitment to Uruzgan will not be affected by ongoing coalition negotiations, and will be honored by the next government. Having raised Dutch concerns with Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki on December 7, Balkenende expressed irritation with the Iranian's ""diplomatic speech"" and his ""unacceptable"" comments on the Holocaust. Separately, Balkenende's senior foreign policy advisor confirmed that the Prime Minister is directly engaged in trying to resolve Shell's ongoing dispute with the Russian government over Sakhalin, and claimed the Russians are ""trying to squeeze us like a lemon."" Despite the uncertainty about the next government, Balkenende appeared comfortable with the current situation, optimistic about the future, and confident in his leadership role. END SUMMARY. CENTRIST GOVERNMENT BY FEBRUARY? -------------------------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador Arnall complemented the Prime Minister on his successful election campaign. Balkenende acknowledged that he had -- once again -- defied expectations by leading the Christian Democrats (CDA) to remain the largest party in Parliament, when ""six months ago, everyone expected the next Prime Minister to be Wouter Bos"" (head of the opposition Labor Party, or PvdA). The recent elections had overturned many assumptions about Dutch politics; the CDA, for example, had done better than usual among young voters and in urban areas than in the past. Unfortunately, however, the electorate's unexpected swing to the extreme right -- Geert Wilders' Freedom Party (PVV) and extreme left -- Jan Marijnissen's Socialist Party (SP) -- was now complicating the process of forming a coalition. Balkenende's preferred coalition partner -- the conservative Liberal Party (VVD) -- had run a bad campaign and suffered from internal power struggles, so was no longer in the running. ¶3. (C) Balkenende said he was ""not unhappy"" that attempts to form a coalition with PvdA and SP had collapsed, since there was no realistic chance of CDA and SP governing together. This opened the door to the possibility of a ""centrist"" coalition between CDA, PvdA, and one of the smaller parties -- most likely Christian Union or GreenLeft. Balkenende suggested that such a coalition could be in place by February, although this would depend on how long it took for Wouter Bos to convince his membership to support such a coalition; the process could conceivably drag on past the provincial elections in March. Although he clearly felt that it was up to the PvdA to make most of the concessions necessary to join a coalition government, Balkenende acknowledged that the SP's surprisingly strong showing posed a real dilemma for the PvdA leadership, since they now faced a serious challenger on their left flank. AFGHANISTAN COMMITMENT REMAINS FIRM ----------------------------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador Arnall asked Balkenende how the coalition negotiations might impact the Dutch deployment to Uruzgan. Balkenende responded emphatically that it would be ""impossible"" for a future government to renege on the two-year Dutch commitment to the region. The fact that SP wanted to withdraw Dutch forces sooner, he added, was one reason why the CDA could not join them in a coalition government. PvdA, he said, had the same view as the CDA in this regard, as they had supported the original decision to deploy troops for two years. ¶5. (C) Turning to the Riga summit, Balkenende said that he was generally pleased that NATO had sent a strong signal of support for the Afghan mission. The willingness of some countries, such as Norway and Poland, to increase their contributions was also encouraging. On the other hand, Balkenende expressed concern about Canadian Prime Minister Harper's domestic political situation and its possible impact on the Canadian deployment to the south. He noted that he had also had intense discussions with German Chancellor Merkel, who had made clear that German forces would be available to THE HAGUE 00002597 002 OF 002 support others in extremis. ""STRANGE"" MESSAGE FROM IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER --------------------------------------------- -- ¶6. (C) Balkenende described his short December 7 meeting with visiting Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki as ""strange."" He had raised Iran's destabilizing role in the region, support for terrorism, human rights violations, and nuclear ambitions. On the latter, Balkenende stressed that Iran must comply with its IAEA obligations if it is serious about negotiating a positive outcome to the current situation. Mottaki, according to Balkenende, had responded with non-substantive ""diplomatic speech."" More disturbingly, in their discussion on the Middle East, Mottaki had made comments on the Holocaust which Balkenende found ""irritating,"" ""terrible,"" and ""absolutely unacceptable."" Although the Netherlands has a good economic dialogue with Iran, Balkenende concluded, he had sent a ""very clear"" message about Dutch concerns. SAKHALIN-SHELL: RUSSIANS ""SQUEEZING US LIKE A LEMON"" --------------------------------------------- -------- ¶7. (S) As Ambassador Arnall was leaving Balkenende's office, Karel van Oosterom -- Balkenende's senior foreign policy and defense advisor -- confided that Balkenende was following closely Shell's ongoing dispute with the Russian government over Sakhalin. Van Oosterom dismissed recent press reports claiming the issue was settled, saying their release was just a Russian negotiating tactic. Shell, he stressed, has not agreed to any settlement; on the contrary, the chairman of Shell had visited van Oosterom that day to complain that the Russians had given him ""an offer he couldn't refuse."" Van Oosterom -- who served in China previously -- joked that, while the Chinese could ""threaten with a straight face,"" the Russians ""laugh when they give an ultimatum -- then tell you what they really want."" He reiterated that the Dutch were not impressed with the ""mafia-style"" Russian approach and understood that Russia wanted to ""squeeze Shell like a lemon."" On the other hand, Russia was in a much stronger position now than when the original deal was signed, and knew it. Van Oosterom did not speculate on what next steps might be, but stated that Shell and the Prime Minister were now ""studying"" the Russian proposal. COMMENT: -------- ¶8. (C) Balkenende joked at the start of the conversation that he is currently holding three jobs -- Prime Minister, CDA faction leader in Parliament, and chief CDA negotiator in the coalition talks. If this situation is causing him stress, however, he did not let it show during the meeting. On the contrary, Balkenende was clearly in command of his portfolio and seemed positively invigorated by the challenges before him. He also obviously relishes the prospect of heading the next Dutch government -- which would be his fourth in as many years. Once dismissed as a ""Harry Potter"" clone with no charisma, Balkenende has made a career out of defying expectations -- and appears, once again, to have proven his doubters wrong. ARNALL ----------------------------------------------- 07THEHAGUE1295 2007-07-05 16:04 2011-01-17 00:12 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy The Hague VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHTC #1295/01 1861617 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 051617Z JUL 07 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9745 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2662 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0283 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAFVS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001295 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION REVIEW OFFICIALLY BEGINS Classified By: Am... " 114457,7/5/2007 16:17,07THEHAGUE1295,"Embassy The Hague",SECRET//NOFORN,,"VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHTC #1295/01 1861617 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 051617Z JUL 07 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9745 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2662 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0283 RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAFVS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY ","S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001295 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA, EUR/RPM, EUR/UBI E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL NATO AF NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: EXTENSION REVIEW OFFICIALLY BEGINS Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The GONL sent a letter to the Dutch Parliament on June 30 noting it will decide this summer whether to extend its ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The decision will follow an exhaustive review of all options, including staying in the mission's current capacity, reducing its contribution or moving to another location, or even withdrawing altogether. Cabinet officials have stressed that ""all options are on the table,"" while public statements by Defense Minister Eimert van Middelkoop in favor of remaining in some capacity may have tipped the hand of the GONL and temporarily unsettled the political process. Dutch officials are cautiously optimistic that the conditions are in place to arrive at a positive extension decision, but stress that sequencing is vital: first the review of options, then consultations with Allies, followed by a decision and subsequent debate with Parliament. End summary. Important First Step -------------------- ¶2. (C) Following its June 29 meeting, the Dutch Cabinet sent a letter to Parliament stating that the GONL will decide this summer whether it will extend its ISAF mission in Afghanistan beyond August 2008, and if so, in what capacity. The letter notes that the Cabinet will investigate the ""options and desirability of continuing to make a contribution"" to ISAF. The review will be conducted in accordance with the set criteria required for parliamentary consent prior to deploying Dutch troops abroad (""toetsingskader""). The letter formally begins the Article 100 process -- more importantly, it means the GONL can formally solicit contributions from other NATO Allies to team with the Dutch in Uruzgan province. ¶3. (S) In a July 2 meeting with Ambassador Arnall, Pieter de Gooijer (MFA Director General for Political Affairs) confirmed that issuing the letter represents an important step toward a possible extension. Although, for political reasons, the GONL remains restricted from expressing support for a particular option, de Gooijer said it ""was fair to say"" that the Cabinet appears to be quietly moving in that direction. He stressed, however, that there is not yet a firm consensus within the Cabinet, and some members are still holding out for significant concessions (e.g., more money for Defense, a significant mission in Africa for Development). De Gooijer noted that the six key ministers (the Prime Minister, two Deputy Prime Ministers, and the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Development and Defense) will meet on July 12 to consider next steps and hopefully steer the process in a positive direction. One Step Beyond --------------- ¶4. (C) Following the June 29 Cabinet meeting, Cabinet ministers emphasized to the press that ""all options were currently on the table,"" and that the GONL would decide whether to extend once the review of options had been fully completed. During one of the press interviews, however, Defense Minister van Middelkoop seemingly tipped the hand of the GONL by noting that ""the political intention is to stay, be it in a more modest form."" He explained that other Allies should take more responsibility, and that some tasks could be phased out to Allies, thereby leading to a trimmed-down Dutch extension. Van Middelkoop acknowledged that ending the mission was an option, but ""the intention is to continue in some form."" ¶5. (C) Van Middelkoop's remarks prompted a firestorm of criticism from both supporters and critics of the current mission. Supporters lamented that van Middelkoop hamstrung the extension review before it started as critics will argue that any such review will be subjective in nature as the GONL attempts to achieve van Middelkoop's stated desire to remain in Uruzgan. Critics worried that van Middelkoop's remarks might send the wrong signal to NATO and Washington, thereby lifting them off the hook by telling them it was not necessary for military planners to initiate contingencies should the Dutch opt not to extend. ¶6. (C) Following van Middelkoop's remarks, Prime Minister Balkenende clarified the GONL ""official position"" -- the Dutch will investigate whether to continue, and if so, ""how and in what way."" But in no sense had the GONL made any decision on an extension. He emphasized that ""matters should be done in the right order,"" and declined to acknowledge any current political intention to extend. Balkenende added that the decision should be made with careful consideration of all arguments -- ""all options remain on the table."" He said the GONL's decision would be made this summer, perhaps as late as September, following a ""very intensive process."" ... And a Step Backwards ------------------------ ¶7. (C) Van Middelkoop began the July 2 parliamentary hearing on Afghanistan by backtracking on his earlier comments. He characterized his remarks as a ""slip of the tongue,"" and emphasized that the GONL would first review all options prior to making any decision to extend. Van Middelkoop reiterated this clarified position on July 3 in a meeting with Ambassador Arnall. He stressed that ""all options were on the table"" and that his suggestion that the Dutch remain in a limited capacity was ""a mistake,"" and not a case of ""being too honest."" Van Middelkoop said his remarks required an apology to Parliament, for which he was ""beaten up for 15 minutes,"" and then the Afghanistan debate continued as it had previously. ¶8. (C) In his meeting with Ambassador Arnall, van Middelkoop commented on the Dutch participation in heavy fighting around Chora in the previous few weeks. He said the Dutch had been ""very lucky"" that the Dutch commander on the ground had made the right tactical decision to stay and fight. Van Middelkoop also praised the Afghan security forces, noting that they had ""fought well."" He said there was still some fighting and instability in the region, which was one of the major reasons why he was visiting Afghanistan on July 5-6. ¶9. (C) Van Middelkoop also commented on prospects of persuading the Dutch Parliament to support an extension. He said part of his challenge with Parliament involves the position of his predecessor and current parliamentary member Henk Kamp, who has adamantly stated that the Dutch deployment in Uruzgan should last for two years, and ""only two years."" In order to overcome Kamp and others, van Middelkoop said the GONL must present sound arguments -- ""the military, political, and financial lines of reasoning all must be convincing."" Ambassador Arnall commented that van Middelkoop has more flexibility on the ground than Kamp, to which the Defense Minister smiled. ¶10. (C) Officially, the GONL does not yet have an opinion on any particular option. But in private, van Middelkoop said the best option to extend in Afghanistan probably involves a more modest contribution with the support of additional partners. He characterized the partnership with Australia as good, but said more help was needed from other Allies in order to convince Parliament. He said the next step was for he and Foreign Minister Verhagen to travel to NATO and make the case for additional assistance. He assessed the political situation on a possible extension as typical ""coalition politics,"" and repeated previously made remarks that ""we are still in the fog"" regarding an extension, ""but we are moving in the right direction."" Parliamentary Hearing --------------------- ¶11. (C) In a three hour parliamentary session o July 2, parliamentarians from both sides of thepolitical spectrum raised concerns regarding the heavy fighting around Chora and subsequent civilian casualties. They initially lambasted van Middelkoop for his comments regarding the political intent to extend, but later seemed to accept his apology. Parliamentarians from the left, including Socialist Harry van Bommel and Green Left Mariko Peters, said van Middelkoop's comments will send NATO and Washington the ""wrong signal,"" especially as NATO is ""responsible"" for finding an Ally to replace the Netherlands -- ""now NATO will think that the Dutch will extend and plans to replace us will not commence,"" said van Bommel. ¶12. (C) No new arguments were raised during the hearing. While all members of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee raised concerns about civilian casualties, all comments made were reasoned and emotionally restrained. Both Verhagen and van Middelkoop noted four on-going investigations (the Dutch military, the UN, ISAF, and Human Rights Watch) following the fighting in Chora, and promised to deliver results of the investigations as soon as they become available. Separately, MFA Task Force Uruzgan Coordinator Pieter Jan Kleiweg de Zwaan told emboffs July 3 that they expect the Dutch military investigation to be completed on or around July 10. Privately Kleiweg was worried that the investigations might contradict one another, further muddling an already confusing situation. ¶13. (C) Other concerns voiced by parliamentarians included the cost of the deployment, poppy eradication, and relations with Pakistan. Both Verhagen and van Middelkoop said it was ""too simplistic"" to classify the Dutch deployment as either a military or reconstruction mission -- both are necessary in order to be successful. Verhagen argued that intense fighting in Chora did not mean that reconstruction in Uruzgan was impossible. Development Minister Koenders began to lay the foundation necessary to make the argument later in the summer and fall that reconstruction was not only possible, but in fact working in Uruzgan. In response to a question from Labor Party (PvdA) spokesperson Angelien Eijsink, van Middelkoop refuted claims made in the Dutch periodical Elsevier that the Dutch military had released a senior Taliban leader. He explained that Afghan authorities had initially made the arrest, and the Dutch offered to hold the individual briefly before returning him to Afghan authorities. Government Strategy ------------------- ¶14. (S) While cautiously optimistic, the working level continues to emphasize PM Balkenende's message that the GONL ""check all the boxes"" during its review prior to making an official extension decision. Kleiweg told emboffs July 2 that the six ministers most responsible for making a decision to extend (Balkenende and Verhagen from the Christian Democratic Alliance, Deputy Minister/Finance Minister Bos and Koenders from the Labor Party, and Deputy Minister/Minister for Youth and Family Affairs Rouvoet and van Middelkoop from the Christian Union) have already met on several occasions, and dynamics among the ministers are ""good."" Kleiweg characterized the ministers as ""moving in the right direction,"" and deflected suggestions that Finance Minister Bos might be problematic. He said ""The Six"" will meet again on July 12 prior to the summer break to discuss various extension options. ¶15. (C) Kleiweg noted that the Dutch have yet to formally solicit contributions from other NATO Allies to any Dutch etension in Uruzgan. He said the GONL first will idntify options and possible tasks that could be flled by others prior to approaching Allies. Kleweg acknowledged that the Dutch are ""picky"" whenit comes to the question of which Allies to apprach -- any potential partner has to ""speak the sae language"" and possess a ""similar outlook"" when i comes to reconstution efforts. He also noteda certain reluctance on the part of the Dutch miitary to incorporate elements from yet another mlitary -- but such hesitancy will need to be overome should the review determine the best chance f an extension involves teaming with another Ally. ¶16. (C) Once tasks and partners are identified,Kleiweg said the USG and SACEUR could be helpful in persuading these Allies to team with the Dutch -- provided the government opts for an extension. When asked about possibly teaming with U.S. forces, Kleiweg said the Dutch ""have no problem"" with U.S. forces under ISAF command. He noted, however, that OEF/ISAF deconfliction continues to be a sensitive issue in the Netherlands, especially as the dividing line between the two becomes more blurry. ¶17. (C) Low public support for both the current mission and any extension continues to be a problem. Kleiweg said the GONL is looking at respected ""international voices"" to enlist to try and influence public opinion. He noted that the GONL had arranged through NATO the visit of several Afghan parliamentarians to the Netherlands. While the trip was a success, Dutch and Afghan media considered the visit ""NATO propaganda,"" Kleiweg said. He noted that the individual with the most power to change Dutch public opinion was Afghan President Karzai, but acknowledged even that might have changed in recent weeks given Karzai's criticism of the Dutch military action in Chora. Kleiweg said Karzai intends to visit the Netherlands in December -- ""hopefully long after the Dutch have made a decision on extending,"" he added. Uruzgan Gov. Monib might be another option, although Kleiweg said GONL relations with Monib are no longer that strong as Monib appears more interested in events in Kabul than in Uruzgan, while Monib's travel ban remains problematic. Other international respected voices might include individuals such as UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon, Kleiweg said. Detention Policy ---------------- ¶18. (C) Kleiweg told emboffs July 3 that the GONL has circulated a draft letter among RC-South contributing nations to the Afghan government requesting greater access for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Council to detainees held in Afghan prisons. The draft letter was an action item derived from the latest RC-South conference held in The Hague in June ¶2007. According to Kleiweg, the GONL, as well as the governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Australia have all approved the draft letter. He inquired if the USG had reviewed the letter and had any comments; emboffs said they would check with Washington. Inter-Governmental Dynamics --------------------------- ¶19. (S//NOFORN) Working level contacts describe the relationship between Verhagen and Koenders as ""contentious but not outright hostile."" Instead of direct confrontation, the two often wage battles through their staffs at the working level, said MFA Security Affairs Chief Robert de Groot. That said, when the two ministers agree, the resulting decision has added weight and is often ""ironclad."" Van Middelkoop is described as ""the third wheel,"" or the ""inexperienced junior partner"" by working level contacts. While substantively knowledgeable, his inexperience in the government is obvious, and he often defers to Verhagen and Koenders. ¶20. (S//NOFORN) According to working level contacts, Koenders has a ""voracious apetite"" for information on Afghanistan -- ""he want to know how many grains of sand are in Uruzgan,"" said Kleiweg. While he has an almost equal statu to Verhagen on Afghanistan behind closed doors,Koenders resents being viewed as subordinate to he other two ministers in public. ""He cannot stad waiting for two hours to speak during a parliaentary hearing, and then be restricted to only tn minutes of speaking time,"" said Task Force Deput Coordinator Dewi van de Weerde. Working level ontacts also describe him as incapable of making decision, which could play into extension consierations. Comment ------- ¶21. (S) Van Middelkoop's comments -- while seemingly positive from our perspective -- temporarily unsettled the political debate on extending. Cabinet members were reportedly incensed by van Middelkoop's blunder, but his public mea culpa seems to have appeased naysayers in Parliament. Despite it, the GONL once again appears to be on the same page in its efforts to create the conditions necessary to arrive at a positive extension decision. There is a process -- an exhaustive review followed by consultations -- that must be followed in order for this to work, and Balkenende is shepherding it through. Finance Minister Bos could still prove problematic, but working level contacts suggest he will be reasonable. As the Dutch are fond of saying, ""do not disturb the brooding hen"" -- which we will no doubt hear often over the course of the summer and into the fall. ARNALL | Ben ik 'Verhagen' in beeld | Hi Larry C. & her Cigar - 19.01.2011 10:24
09THEHAGUE196 2009-03-23 10:10 2011-01-17 00:12 SECRET Embassy The Hague VZCZCXRO6964 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV DE RUEHTC #0196/01 0821038 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 231038Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2688 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000196 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019 TAGS: PREL OVIP PINR MOPS PHUM AF NL SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 31 MEETING WITH DUTCH FM VERHAGEN Classified By: Charge d'Affaire... 198269,3/23/2009 10:38,09THEHAGUE196,"Embassy The Hague",SECRET,,"VZCZCXRO6964 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV DE RUEHTC #0196/01 0821038 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 231038Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2688 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000196 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019 TAGS: PREL OVIP PINR MOPS PHUM AF NL SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 31 MEETING WITH DUTCH FM VERHAGEN Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael F. Gallagher for reasons 1.5(b ,d) Madam Secretary: -------- Overview: -------- ¶1. (S) Your participation in the Afghanistan conference and the March 31 meeting with Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen is well-timed to advance key U.S. priorities, particularly in securing Afghanistan. Verhagen and the whole Dutch government remain among our strongest allies, but Dutch domestic politics threatens to limit progress on our common agenda. On Afghanistan, Verhagen faces an uphill battle to convince parliament and the Dutch people to continue combat missions after 2010. At stake is the deployment of 1,700 Dutch troops in Uruzgan, one of the toughest provinces in Afghanistan. By agreeing to host the Afghanistan conference, Verhagen is taking the first step to extend the Dutch commitment. The Foreign Minister said the Netherlands had been asked to host the conference due to the success of its comprehensive (&3-D8) approach in Uruzgan. ¶2. (C) Verhagen is a skilled politician, having previously served in parliament as party spokesman for the Netherlands, largest political party, the center-right Christian Democrats (CDA). Accordingly, Verhagen is extremely close to Prime Minister Balkenende and is trusted to take the lead on foreign affairs while most of the Dutch government is focused on the economic crisis. The weak governing coalition -- which includes CDA, the center-left Labor Party (PvdA), and the small Christian Union (CU) -- is held together less by a common vision than by fear of electoral losses if the government were to collapse ahead of the next scheduled election in 2011. Despite these divisions, Verhagen and Balkenende have successfully steered the Dutch government toward an active foreign policy that largely aligns with our interests. ¶3. (C) Verhagen plans to use his bilateral meeting with you to start building a close working relationship. He wants the new Administration to see the Netherlands as a reliable partner with the U.S., sharing many of our goals. We recommend you focus discussions on Afghanistan and human rights (including Guantanamo) (paragraphs 5-11), but other possible topics are also discussed below (paragraphs 12-17). ¶4. (SBU) 2009 marks the 400th anniversary of Henry Hudson,s &discovery8 of the Hudson Valley and New Amsterdam in 1609. The Dutch government and the city and state of New York have planned a yearlong celebration (New York 400 ) NY400) honoring our strong bilateral ties and stressing our ""shared DNA"" -- including our values of freedom, democracy, entrepreneurship, diversity, and tolerance. You may wish to comment on our joint history and shared future when you meet Verhagen, especially when you talk to the press. ----------- Afghanistan ----------- ¶5. (C) The Netherlands is a small ally making a big impact in Afghanistan since 2001. They are the fourth largest aid donor in Afghanistan. Ranked by percentage of their military forces deployed, the Netherlands is the second largest military contributor in Afghanistan )- proportionally they are making three to four times the contribution of France or Germany. And Dutch soldiers are deployed to the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan. However, the Dutch are considering dramatically scaling back their combat presence in 2010, perhaps to just a few hundred soldiers, and concentrating more on development assistance. ¶6. (C) Although the public supports its soldiers in the Q6. (C) Although the public supports its soldiers in the field, involvement in Afghanistan is not popular in the Netherlands. Thus far the Dutch have lost 18 soldiers. The 2007 decision to extend the Dutch military deployment was prolonged and politically difficult. Any government decision to stay engaged in Afghanistan past 2010 will be even more difficult to sustain. Among the challenges is a Dutch perception that they have done more than their share. Many political leaders supported the previous deployment decisions with statements that another NATO ally would replace the Dutch at the conclusion of their tour. Dutch opinion leaders are also concerned about the effect of the deployment on military readiness and recruitment. Often cited is the shortfall of 7,000 personnel in a 42,000-member service. The Dutch are also daunted by reports that the ISAF mission is THE HAGUE 00000196 002 OF 004 failing to bring security to the Afghan people, and that development assistance programs are ineffective. The public at large is skeptical that the situation in Afghanistan presents a threat to Europeans. Finally, although casualties have been relatively light by U.S. standards, their emotional impact on a small country with limited recent combat experience cannot be overstated. In April 2008, for example, the country was shocked to learn of the death of First Lieutenant Dennis van Ulm on the same day that his father, General Pieter van Ulm, was sworn in as the new Dutch Chief of Defense. ¶7. (C) Such traumatic events have not swayed Verhagen and PM Balkenende's commitment to the NATO/ISAF mission and the Afghan people. In 2009, just as in 2007, we expect that both Verhagen and Balkenende will be strong and effective allies in winning support from the parliament. The support of the Labor Party, particularly Development Cooperation Minister Koenders, will be essential. The Dutch are expecting a request through NATO for continuing military support, but it is important the request come in the form of consultations among equals rather than through public pressure, which would backfire with the Dutch public and politicians. The Afghanistan Conference this month will do a great deal to show that the Dutch are not only active participants but leading members in the review and strategic planning process. Your meeting with Verhagen will further emphasize this point. Other &selling points8 for the public will be (1) recognition that Afghanistan poses a clearly defined threat to international stability and (2) an improved military strategy that shows that we can and will prevail. Most importantly to the Dutch public, perhaps, will be concrete success stories that we are creating a better life for the Afghan people. Finally, Dutch policy-makers believe in the &3D8 approach and welcome your effort to integrate defense, development, and diplomacy. A previous Dutch commander of Task Force Uruzgan argued that the Dutch 3D approach can &make the Taliban irrelevant8 by winning hearts and minds. ¶8. (C) The Dutch will be interested in the U.S. analysis of Pakistan,s role in solving the Afghanistan quandary. After suspending aid to Pakistan in 2008, the Dutch expect to provide as much as 112 million euro in development aid to Pakistan over the next three years, with the timing of a public announcement yet to be determined. The government will continue to watch political developments there closely out of concern the government may not live up to its democratic commitments. --------------------------- Human Rights and Guantanamo --------------------------- ¶9. (S) Verhagen has made human rights a priority for the Dutch government and his hallmark as Foreign Minister. The Dutch are anxious to work closely with us on human rights issues and welcome the return of the U.S. as an observer to the Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva. The Dutch are serving a second consecutive term on the Council, and while they share our frustration with the results, Verhagen will probably encourage you to seek an HRC seat in 2009 or 2010. In addition, Verhagen may suggest a joint U.S.-Dutch initiative to counter violence against women or to attack child labor. The Dutch are also trying to salvage the Durban review conference on racism, including by circulating an abbreviated draft that removes references to Israel that are offensive to us and the Dutch. Perhaps the best opportunity Qoffensive to us and the Dutch. Perhaps the best opportunity for expanding cooperation is in the area of development assistance. The Netherlands is the world,s sixth largest aid donor, providing over 4 billion euro ($6.1 billion) annually, and Dutch programs are rated as highly effective compared to other nations. ¶10. (S) Verhagen has been critical of Guantanamo, and did not lose an opportunity to raise his concerns about Guantanamo with the previous administration. The Dutch parliament,s debate and fierce criticism of Guantanamo have permeated the Dutch press and public,s perceptions. Closing Guantanamo, therefore, will go a long way toward improving Dutch skepticism of U.S. policies on human and civil rights. Verhagen publicly saluted the President,s decision to close Guantanamo, but he also publicly told Parliament that the Dutch government has no plans to accept detainees. Nonetheless, Verhagen,s personal staff recommended that you raise the issue with him privately, to encourage him to stay open to the idea of supporting an EU proposal to help the United States. A less difficult alternative for the Dutch than accepting detainees would be providing funding to assist with the transfer of detainees to third countries. With an eye to the future, FM Verhagen is funding a two-year study of THE HAGUE 00000196 003 OF 004 the nexus of human rights, humanitarian law, and use of force, thus aiming to resolve the knotty legal issues surrounding Guantanamo. ¶11. (SBU) Finally, Verhagen may ask you about U.S. support for the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Dutch are proud of serving as the &home of international law8 and hosting many international legal institutions such as the International Court of Justice. If you or the President chose to make a major announcement on the ICC, or U.S. commitment to international law and human rights, no setting in Europe would be more appropriate than The Hague, the Netherlands. ------------------------------ Other Issues - Economic Crisis ------------------------------ ¶12. (U) The Dutch financial sector has been hit hard by the global financial crisis, due in part to exposure to U.S. mortgage-backed securities and other toxic assets. The government has responded assertively with several measures to assist banks and their customers, most dramatically by nationalizing the Dutch operations of Fortis Bank and by providing capital to ING and guaranteeing part of its U.S. mortgage portfolio. ¶13. (U) The Dutch real economy is struggling. After 2 percent GDP growth in 2008, the latest official estimate is a 3.5 percent contraction in 2009. Dutch exports are expected to decline by 12 percent this year, a major blow to this trade-dependent economy. The Port of Rotterdam, Europe's largest, has already seen a 15 percent decline in port traffic since October. Several Dutch industry giants have announced layoffs. The current unemployment rate of 3.9 percent is forecast to climb to 5.5 percent in 2009 (still considerably lower than the EU average). The GONL has passed two stimulus packages and is expected to announce a third shortly. ¶14. (U) An invitation to the G-20 summit in London is a major win for the Dutch, who fought hard to be included in the November 2008 Washington G-20 summit. Although not a G-20 member, the Dutch argued successfully that they play a major role in the international financial system (for instance, it is an active member of the Financial Stability Forum). Now, with a second invitation, the Dutch hope to have assured their seat at the table for future G-20 events. At the London summit, we can expect the Dutch to support Germany and other key member states in a call for much broader financial regulation ) but to refrain from supporting new stimulus packages until the results of current stimulus measures can be determined. They will support the G-20,s expansion to include more developing countries. In keeping with their reputation, the Dutch will also stress open markets and free trade. They have called on fellow EU Member States to avoid protectionist measures, and they were highly critical of the proposed ""Buy American"" provisions in the U.S. Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The Dutch have repeatedly expressed their hope to see the economic crisis spur the U.S., China, India, and others to make the concessions necessary to conclude the WTO Doha Round ¶15. (SBU) Prime Minister Balkenende and his cabinet enjoyed widespread public support in late 2008 for their quick intervention in the financial sector. However, domestic and international criticism of the GONL's cautious, incremental approach to the crisis has gathered steam in recent weeks. Balkenende,s cabinet continues to consult closely with parliament, labor, and industry on the way forward. While Finance Minister Wouter Bos, the politically savvy Deputy QFinance Minister Wouter Bos, the politically savvy Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the Labor Party (PvdA), has taken the lead on the Netherlands, international response to the economic crisis, Foreign Minister Verhagen has been less visible on this issue. ----------- Middle East ----------- ¶16. (SBU) Verhagen will welcome your readout on the Middle East; he is eager to play a constructive role. With an eye toward supporting a peace agreement, the Dutch participate in the Gaza maritime interdiction initiative to stop arms smuggling and thereby address Israel,s security concerns. Along with the Danish, the Dutch have proposed resurrecting the EU Gaza-Egypt border monitoring mission. At the same time, the Dutch push for greater access for humanitarian aid in Gaza. The Dutch are substantial donors to Gaza economic development and governance initiatives, providing 72 million THE HAGUE 00000196 004 OF 004 euro in 2008. ¶17. (S) The Dutch strongly support the UN sanctions regime against Iran and quickly follow up on efforts to curtail proliferation activities. The Dutch reported that sanctions are starting to work -- slowly )- although they are not targeting the right people. Nonetheless, the Dutch believe there is substantial interest among Iranian parliamentarians for an exchange with U.S. counterparts. The Dutch are willing to deepen our U.S.-Netherlands cooperation on information-sharing on Iran. On Syria, the Dutch welcome U.S. outreach to Syria and agree that the U.S. and the EU will get more from the Syrians if we keep a united front as we push for a peace agreement with Israel, a secure and stable relationship with Lebanon, and an end to support for militants. GALLAGHER | A Bridge too Far | Petrus - 19.01.2011 10:54
09THEHAGUE514 2009-08-25 14:02 2011-01-17 00:12 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy The Hague VZCZCXYZ0014 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHTC #0514/01 2371459 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 251459Z AUG 09 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3195 INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2831 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0414 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 5254 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2236 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000514 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL AF NATO NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: POST-2010 DEPLOYMENT POSSIBLE BUT NOT IN URUZGAN REF: A. THE HAGUE 0419 ¶B. THE HAGUE 0092... ", 222211,8/25/2009 14:59,09THEHAGUE514,"Embassy The Hague",SECRET//NOFORN,09THEHAGUE419|09THEHAGUE92,"VZCZCXYZ0014 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHTC #0514/01 2371459 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 251459Z AUG 09 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3195 INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2831 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0414 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 5254 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2236 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY ","S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000514 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL AF NATO NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: POST-2010 DEPLOYMENT POSSIBLE BUT NOT IN URUZGAN REF: A. THE HAGUE 0419 ¶B. THE HAGUE 0092 Classified By: Ambassador Fay Hartog Levin for reasons 1.4 (B, D). ¶1. (C) This cable continues reporting on post's efforts to get the Dutch to ""yes"" on a post-2010 deployment in Afghanistan (reftels). ¶2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Labor Party leader Bos told the Ambassador in confidence (STRICTLY PROTECT) the Dutch will likely stay in Afghanistan post-2010 but not in Uruzgan. The cabinet will probably not take that decision until the end of the year. Post recommends next steps in our engagement (para 7). END SUMMARY. ¶3. (S/NF) At the end of her August 24 courtesy call, Ambassador talked one-on-one with Wouter Bos, the Labor Party (PvdA) leader, Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, about Afghanistan. (COMMENT: Senior Dutch officials had identified the Labor Party and Bos, in particular, as the most reluctant member of the three-party governing coalition to agree on staying in Afghanistan beyond the current 2010 mandate. END COMMENT.) Bos told the Ambassador in confidence the issue of staying in Afghanistan was politically unpopular, especially within his own party. ""The Dutch have gone as far as they can go."" Two years ago, when the Dutch decided to extend the mission in Uruzgan, everyone agreed that would be the last time. If we now extend again, Bos said, we will be asked every two years to stay on. It is important to stick to our word and wrap up the mission. This, Bos argued, was the official Labor Party position. ¶4. (S/NF) Bos then said the Government, with Labor Party support, will be able to stay in Afghanistan after its current mandate expires, but not in Uruzgan. The Ambassador pressed Bos that it was more logical for the Dutch to remain in Uruzgan where they had developed important contacts with local tribes and leaders as well as funded numerous projects. Bos admitted this was true, but did not know if staying in Uruzgan would fly with his party. ¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador mentioned the Embassy would be hosting a number of senior USG officials in the near future who would be willing to discuss Afghanistan with Bos (such as USNATO Amb. Daalder and CENTCOM Gen. Petreaus). He said Development Cooperation Minister Koenders was advising him on all issues involving Afghanistan, including how to handle it politically. If Bos is not available to meet with U.S. visitors, he will make sure Koenders is. He also advised the Ambassador the Cabinet would probably not make a final decision on the deployment question until the end of the year, December. ¶6. (S/NF) COMMENT: Queen Beatrix commented to the Ambassador during her credentialing ceremony on August 19 that finding a way forward on Afghanistan ""would be difficult,"" but must be done. It appears the senior leadership of the body politic agrees. We had heard from other Cabinet members, including Foreign Minister Verhagen, that Bos and the Labor Party would likely agree to extending the Dutch mission in Afghanistan past 2010. Bos's statement, however, was the first time any senior Labor Party leader had made that clear. Although appearing to draw a line in the sand about leaving Uruzgan, Qappearing to draw a line in the sand about leaving Uruzgan, Bos did not seem categorical about that issue. In our engagement, we need to continue to stress the Alliance need for the Dutch to remain in Afghanistan and in Uruzgan, in particular; the progress the Dutch have made in Uruzgan and the need to build upon their stability and development efforts there; the increased U.S. contribution in military and civilian personnel and resources in Afghanistan; and the enhanced contributions of NATO and other partners. A word of caution - the Dutch are concerned Jan Mohammed, the former governor and local warlord, might be re-appointed governor of Uruzgan if Pres. Karzai is re-elected. If that were to happen, everyone, including our strongest supporters, says the Dutch will not/not return to Uruzgan under any circumstances. END COMMENT. ¶7. (S/NF) ENGAGEMENT PLAN: (A) The Ambassador continues her courtesy calls, seeing Foreign Minister Verhagen and Defense Minister van Middelkoop August 31. She will raise Afghanistan and extending the Dutch mandate in both meetings. She will also meet with parliamentary leaders in the near future. (B) USNATO Amb. Daalder visits Sept. 3 and will have meetings with senior MoD and MFA officials. He will meet with Verhagen and we have requested a meeting with Minister Koenders. Amb. Daalder will also give a public address talking about NATO in Afghanistan and will conduct several press interviews. (C) Defense Minister van Middelkoop plans to meet with Secretary Gates in Washington September 10. (D) CENTCOM Gen. Petreaus will visit the Netherlands in support of the 65th anniversary of the WWII Market Garden operation (""A Bridge Too Far"") in mid-September. He will deliver three speeches throughout the country, which are expected to get significant media attention. We are working with his staff to identify opportunities for him to meet appropriate ministers and parliamentarians. (E) We recommend SRAP Amb. Holbrooke call Minister Koenders, whom he met in late March in The Hague, to thank him for the Dutch support of the Afghan elections (8 million Euros contribution to UNDP, long and short-term staffers to the EU election observers mission, 30 military personnel), to discuss the recent Friends of Pakistan conference in Istanbul (they pledged 86.7 million Euros in assistance over three years at the Tokyo conference) and to talk about regional developments. Amb. Holbrooke could offer to visit the Netherlands if Koenders thought it would be helpful. (F) Finally, we will re-examine our engagement plan at the end of September in light of Gen. McCrystal's strategic review and the results of these meetings. LEVIN | Tegen beter weten In | Via Tupperambtenaren - 19.01.2011 11:05
VZCZCXRO2469 PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL DE RUEHTC #0543/01 2531435 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 101435Z SEP 09 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3229 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2833 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0416 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 5256 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 000543 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/9/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO NL AF SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DAALDER PRESSES DUTCH TO STAY THE COURSE IN AFGHANISTAN REF: A. THE HAGUE 514 ¶B. THE HAGUE 419 Cl... 224468,9/10/2009 14:35,09THEHAGUE543,"Embassy The Hague",SECRET,09THEHAGUE419|09THEHAGUE514,"VZCZCXRO2469 PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL DE RUEHTC #0543/01 2531435 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 101435Z SEP 09 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3229 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2833 RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0416 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 5256 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 000543 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/9/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO NL AF SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DAALDER PRESSES DUTCH TO STAY THE COURSE IN AFGHANISTAN REF: A. THE HAGUE 514 ¶B. THE HAGUE 419 Classified By: Ambassador Daalder for reasons 1.5(b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, Ambassador Ivo Daalder, argued for the extension of the Netherlands, military deployment and aid to Afghanistan beyond 2010 during high-level meetings, a speech, press interviews, and a reception in The Hague on September 3, ¶2009. This cable covers conversations with Development Minister Koenders (paragraphs 2 - 8), FM Verhagen (paragraphs 9 - 13), and senior foreign policy officials (paragraphs 14 - 24). Dutch officials uniformly responded that selling an extended military deployment to the Dutch parliament will be difficult, but that some Dutch involvement in Afghanistan past 2010 is almost certain. Daalder also exchanged views with the Dutch on the NATO strategic concept (paragraphs 13, 24). Paragraph 25 summarizes Dutch participation and reactions at the speech and reception. END SUMMARY. ----------------------------- Development Minister Koenders ----------------------------- ¶2. (U) September 3, 2009; Dutch Foreign Ministry; The Hague, Netherlands. ¶3. (U) Participants: United States ------------- Ambassador Hartog Levin Ambassador Daalder Jennifer Davis, U.S. Mission to NATO Eric Falls, Embassy The Hague Netherlands ----------- Bert Koenders, Minister for Development Cooperation Ms. Joke Brandt, MFA DG for Development Cooperation Ms. Godie van de Paal, MFA Task Force Uruzgan ¶4. (SBU) Ambassador Daalder emphasized President Obama,s commitment to success in Afghanistan through cooperative effort with Allies. The new U.S. strategy has two key themes, he said. First, it is more narrowly defined to ensure it is tied to our core interests and to ensure it is achievable. Second, the U.S. is boosting support for the strategy through regional cooperation, the &3D8 approach of defense, diplomacy, and development, and through rapid build-up of Afghan security forces. Daalder also emphasized our mission in Afghanistan is a combined effort -- forty percent of the troops in ISAF, as well as forty percent of our casualties, are from our non-U.S. Allies. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Daalder explained that we hope the Dutch will stay in Afghanistan as we value their expertise. He added that we understand that the number of Dutch troops may decline after 2010. Nonetheless, he said we believe there are two key messages that may help convince the Dutch public and parliament to support an extension of the Dutch mission. First, the new U.S. president is extremely popular in Europe and that popularity might result in deeper support for the mission in Afghanistan. Second, the United States depends on cooperation of important Allies like the Netherlands, which has taken a real leadership role in development efforts and relationship-building in Afghanistan. ¶6. (C) Koenders responded with a review of previous Dutch decisions on Afghanistan and an explanation of the current political situation. The first Dutch deployment was a Qpolitical situation. The first Dutch deployment was a &sensitive8 decision for the Labor party four years ago. (Background: Koenders is from the Labor party. The Netherlands, current governing coalition includes the Christian Democrats, the Christian Union, and the Labor party, which is the most skeptical member of the coalition regarding Afghanistan. See reftel A, B. End Background.) &I supported the decision, but it was difficult,8 he said. THE HAGUE 00000543 002 OF 005 The Labor party required a development component to the mission, the &soft approach,8 though he &didn,t think it was soft,8 and he knew troops &would be killed.8 After intensive parliamentary discussions, the party agreed to a two-year deployment, until 2008. The decision to extend the deployment until 2010 was also difficult, with Labor and other parties expressing significant concerns about burden-sharing. The Labor Party was &unhappy8 with the final decision. ¶7. (C) Looking ahead, Koenders said the Dutch would continue development efforts in Uruzgan -- the Dutch leadership is civilian and the Dutch have been successful. However, the government,s credibility is at stake with any military redeployment. The government will decide whether the military will &leave completely8 or &just leave Uruzgan.8 To make the case to the Labor party, the Dutch parliament, and the Dutch people, Koenders said it would be helpful to show greater burden sharing and more collaboration on development aid. President Obama and the new U.S. Afghanistan strategy are also helpful elements, he added. &The picture has changed completely.8 In addition, there should be &no mission creep for ISAF8 and UNAMA needs a larger role. On selling the new strategy, Koenders said the Dutch people would need to see some element of success and a realistic strategy with a final goal that we can achieve. Koenders wondered whether it made sense for the Netherlands to lead on aid coordination, given its &small8 contributions relative to the United States. However, he said it would be worthwhile to follow up on his good discussions with the previous USAID director, particularly on the disorganized effort in Pakistan. ¶8. (C) Daalder said that President Obama agrees we need to establish a realistic exit goal by shifting security to Afghanistan itself and show some real progress on the ground within 12-18 months in order to sustain political support. He added we will work on follow-on meetings about development cooperation. ----------- FM Verhagen ----------- ¶9. (U) September 3, 2009; Dutch Foreign Ministry; The Hague, Netherlands. ¶10. (U) Participants: United States ------------- Ambassador Hartog Levin Ambassador Daalder Jennifer Davis, U.S. Mission to NATO Eric Falls, Embassy The Hague Netherlands ----------- Maxime Verhagen, Foreign Minister Mr. Marcel De Vink, Private Secretary to the Minister Mr. Maarten Boef, Head of MFA Task Force Uruzgan ¶11. (C) Daalder emphasized the importance of the Netherlands, decision on Afghanistan: if the Netherlands pulls out, he said, we will not be able to convince Canada to reverse its withdrawal decision and we could then lose the UK in a &domino effect.8 The USG wants to help the Dutch government support an extension of Dutch troops, although Daalder said &we won,t tell you what to do,8 knowing that public pressure from the U.S. would be self-defeating. Daalder added we understand the Dutch must withdraw as &lead nation8 in Uruzgan, although with the new ISAF command Qnation8 in Uruzgan, although with the new ISAF command structure that is less relevant. He said the United States hopes the Dutch will maintain troops in the &four figure8 level, including enablers, F-16s, and medical units, adding that lower profile deployments might be helpful in making the case to the public. In addition, he said we are making the shift from a direct security role to partnering with the Afghan National Army (ANA). President Obama,s popularity THE HAGUE 00000543 003 OF 005 and our new strategy are also key arguments. ¶12. (C) Verhagen responded, &I am ready to defend a new decision8 on the Netherlands, troop deployment, given the new situation in Afghanistan, the new U.S. president, the new U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, broader participation by Allies, and the Netherlands, involvement at the G20. However, he said, these arguments are not sufficient. Verhagen said the Dutch government won the vote in parliament by setting a 2010 timetable for pull-out, and needed to show reduced corruption in Afghanistan, better coordination of aid, and a greater role for German and French troops. Greater contributions from Allies like France and Germany are key for winning votes from the Liberal party (VVD), he explained. Verhagen emphasized that the United States should &invest in the VVD8 and VVD leaders such as Mark Rutte. The most recent meeting with VVD leaders regarding Uruzgan &was not positive.8 (Background: The VVD, or Liberal party, is in the opposition but nonetheless considered essential in supporting an extension, as Dutch governments need to win support of a broad coalition for military deployments. End background.) ¶13. (S) Daalder concluded with a review of upcoming discussions on NATO,s &strategic concept,8 being headed by former Secretary of State Albright. The group of experts should discuss all issues responsibly, he said; in the past some Allies have hesitated to work on difficult issues. Verhagen welcomed Daalder,s suggestion, noting that a discussion of Article 5 and &out of area8 initiatives would be key. Verhagen said he supports the German proposal to include disarmament efforts as part of the discussion and said he has blocked internal Dutch discussions on the presence of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands because that is a matter for NATO to consider. However, Verhagen said the Netherlands is open to frank NATO discussions and is sending a delegation to Washington to discuss nuclear posture (Note: MOD Policy Director General Lo Casteleijn will lead the delegation on September 9. End note.) Daalder thanked Verhagen and emphasized that Allied agreements on nuclear weapons in Europe would be indispensable to good transatlantic relations and should include the &Quad,8 weapons-basing countries, and Lithuania, amongst others. --------------------------------- Lunch with Senior Dutch Officials --------------------------------- ¶14. (U) September 3, 2009; Societeit de Witte; The Hague, Netherlands. ¶15. (U) Participants: United States ------------- Ambassador Hartog Levin Ambassador Daalder Captain Daniel Braswell, Defense Attache, Embassy The Hague Jennifer Davis, U.S. Mission to NATO Eric Falls, Embassy The Hague Netherlands ----------- Mr. Karel van Oosterom, PM,s National Security Adviser Mr. Pieter de Gooijer, MFA DG for Political Affairs (Political Director) Mr. Lo Casteleijn, MOD DG for Policy Lt. Gen. F. Meulman, Deputy Chief of Defense Mr. Robert de Groot, MFA Deputy Political Director Mr. Henk Swarttow, MFA Director of Security Affairs QMr. Henk Swarttow, MFA Director of Security Affairs Ms. Erica Schouten, MFA Head of NATO Affairs Mr. Maarten Boef, MFA Head of Uruzgan Task Force ¶16. (C) Over lunch, Daalder met with the &Triad8 -- the leading Dutch civilian advisers to the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and Minister of Defense -- to emphasize the importance of Dutch contributions in Afghanistan. Daalder emphasized key points from his discussions with Verhagen and Koenders (paras 4, 5, and 11 above). THE HAGUE 00000543 004 OF 005 ¶17. (C) MFA Political Director De Gooijer said Afghanistan is the &most pressing issue8 for the Triad and added &our job is to help our bosses8 -- six ministers -- make a decision. (Note: The six key ministers are PM Balkenende, Deputy PM and Finance Minister Bos, Deputy PM and Minister of Youth and Family Affairs Rouvoet, Foreign Minister Verhagen, Defense Minister Van Middelkoop, and Development Minister Koenders. End note.) De Gooijer explained that Dutch leaders are heavily influenced by a clear Afghanistan strategy as well as prospects for success, as well as Dutch domestic politics. He said the Dutch appreciated U.S. sensitivity in letting the Dutch make its &own decision.8 In addition, he noted the Dutch were in a different stage of the decision-making process than the United States: &You have rolled out a new strategy, while we are considering a redeployment; you are engaging in a surge, while we are looking to pull back. We need to bridge this concept. The Dutch press will also want to know how these results benefit the Netherlands,8 he said. ¶18. (C) Mr. Van Oosterom, the National Security Adviser equivalent, welcomed President Obama,s remarks on Afghanistan and emphasized that the United States should avoid public pressure on the Dutch. He said while Dutch government officials would like to see a quick decision on a new Dutch deployment, the decision process would be complex. ¶19. (C) MOD Policy Director Casteleijn noted there is tremendous Dutch enthusiasm for President Obama. He encouraged continued emphasis on development aid and a &broad concept8 for the Afghanistan strategy. He suggested avoiding &NATO-ization8 of the Afghanistan mission through greater involvement by the EU, UN, and other international organizations. Waiting 18 months for good results will be risky for the Dutch, he added, given that some Dutch government officials are trying now to extend the deployment for two years. He also noted there is a perception in the Netherlands that the Dutch have done &their fair share.8 He said promoting greater contributions from some Allies who haven,t &punched in their weight class8 would be important to demonstrate. ¶20. (C) Lt. General Meulman said the Dutch military had the capacity to support an extension beyond 2010, although it would be difficult to continue at the same level -- 1,800 troops in Afghanistan -- and it would be difficult to leave some elements like several helicopters for much longer. Meulman also urged better coordination among ISAF, the UN, and the GOA. ¶21. (C) MFA Deputy Political Director De Groot added there is significant mixing of strategies, such as counterinsurgency and development. At the same time, he said we have seen disappointing results in state-building and need an overarching development strategy as well as a new Afghanistan Compact in 2010. ¶22. (C) Daalder noted President Obama,s strong support for metrics to show results on the ground. He added that McChrystal,s forthcoming assessment of troops-to-task in QMcChrystal,s forthcoming assessment of troops-to-task in Afghanistan may provide the Dutch government with a clearer picture of the way forward and improve civilian and military coordination. He said the Netherlands and Canada have been the most thoughtful of the Allies on a comprehensive approach in Afghanistan, so it would be particularly damaging if they leave the coalition. ¶23. (C) (Note: In a private discussion after lunch, De Gooijer encouraged Daalder to ask Secretary Geithner to tell Finance Minister Bos that the Netherlands would not have a seat in G20 discussions but for its contributions in Afghanistan. Bos is head of the Labor party and key to the Dutch cabinet,s decision on Afghanistan (reftel A, B). End Note.) ¶24. (C) On NATO generally, Daalder thanked De Gooijer for the choice of former Dutch Shell CEO Jeroen van der Veer as Vice THE HAGUE 00000543 005 OF 005 Chair of Secretary Albright,s NATO Strategic Concept group of experts. Van der Veer will bring &a breath of fresh air,8 he said, to the discussion. Daalder added the group should address everything, including points of strong disagreement like nuclear weapons, Articles 4, 5, and 10 of the NATO Treaty, and Russia. On NATO-EU cooperation, Daalder said it was likely not productive to castigate Turkey and Greece as the new SYG had recently done. He suggested that to improve cooperation, NATO and the EU should consider regular, informal meetings to focus the &transatlantic8 discussion and that Sweden,s FM Bildt could help in this role. De Gooijer said FM Bildt could certainly help bring Sweden into NATO, and any successor to Solana should commit to addressing NATO-EU cooperation. Daalder flagged Finland,s joining NATO as a future point of contention with Russia. ----------------- Speech, Reception ----------------- ¶25. (C) Ambassador Daalder spoke to a full house at the Societeit De Witte on the afternoon of September 3. More than 150 members of parliament, journalists, diplomats, academics, and students attended. Responding to questions for a half hour, Daalder explained the new U.S. strategy and priorities in Afghanistan. In one question, former Dutch Chief of Defense Berlijn urged the United States to pressure the government of Afghanistan to improve its performance and reduce corruption. The new Dutch representative to NATO, Ambassador Majoor, urged a more integrated approach by NATO to support development and diplomacy. On the evening of September 3, at a well-attended reception hosted by Ambassador Levin, Daalder also engaged a similar audience, including the leading foreign policy or defense spokespersons for the major political parties in parliament. GALLAGHER " | Irrational Commitment & Common Sense | "irrational" views - 19.01.2011 11:17
09THEHAGUE726 2009-12-03 08:08 2011-01-17 00:12 SECRET Embassy The Hague VZCZCXRO6064 PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL DE RUEHTC #0726/01 3370805 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 030805Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3529 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000726 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO AF NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT'S AFGHANISTAN SPEECH; NEXT STEPS REF: A. SECSTATE 122731 ¶B. THE HAGUE 663 Cl... 237780,12/3/2009 8:05,09THEHAGUE726,"Embassy The Hague",SECRET,09SECSTATE122731|09THEHAGUE663,"VZCZCXRO6064 PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL DE RUEHTC #0726/01 3370805 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 030805Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3529 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000726 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO AF NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT'S AFGHANISTAN SPEECH; NEXT STEPS REF: A. SECSTATE 122731 ¶B. THE HAGUE 663 Classified By: Pol Deputy Eric G. Falls for reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Dutch Defense Minister van Middelkoop and the leader of the largest coalition party in parliament told Ambassador they expected the Government to find a way to stay in Afghanistan after 2010, albeit with a significantly reduced presence. Press coverage of the President's address was broad, with Cabinet members avoiding comment on the Dutch deployment decision. The Ambassador will see other key figures in the coming days. The PM's office recommends against high-profile USG visits at this time, and Post concurs. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C/NF) DEFENSE MINISTER: Defense Minister Eimert Van Middelkoop told Ambassador it was important that President Obama used the term ""transition"" as a means of explaining the way forward in Afghanistan, which sent the proper signal to allies and Afghans. (NOTE: Van Middelkoop is a member of the Christian Union. The Dutch governing coalition is made up of the Christian Democrats, Labor, and the Christian Union. END NOTE.) He said the new U.S. strategy was very much in alignment with Dutch operational activity in Uruzgan. Throughout the conversation, van Middelkoop referred to the Cabinet discussion on Afghanistan as ""frustrating"" and alluded to the intransigence of the Labor Party. He indicated they would try to reframe the discussions on transforming the Dutch PRT in Uruzgan as a multi-national PRT, still led by the Dutch and with force protection. Asked about a potential cabinet crisis on the Afghanistan question, Van Middelkoop confirmed that the Labor Party has been very slow to talk about any possibilities in Uruzgan and has not left much room for alternatives. He said the Dutch will not/not leave Afghanistan and will commit other resources to the mission. The only open question really is the continuation of a PRT in Uruzgan. ¶3. (C/NF) CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS FLOORLEADER: Pieter van Geel, leader of the largest party in parliament, the Christian Democrats (CDA), told Ambassador he was ""convinced"" the government coalition would not leave Afghanistan, and would stay ""somehow."" He assured the Ambassador that PM Balkenende and FM Verhagen continue to support the mission, and that PM Balkenende understands that the Dutch military needs a political decision by Christmas for planning purposes. Van Geel agreed that the Netherlands' leadership position in Europe would be harmed if it failed to contribute to the NATO effort. However, Van Geel said some coalition members in parliament cling to ""irrational"" views, such as that the government promised to end its Afghanistan deployment after 2010. Labor confronts the rational pressure from NGOs to stay on and preserve the gains the Dutch had won in Uruzgan, with the irrational commitment to get out of Uruzgan. Van Geel had hoped that the election of President Obama and his new approach in Afghanistan would sway Labor Party members, but he has been disappointed. Unlike the Christian Democrats, the Labor Party does not have a history of making tough political decisions. Within Dutch society, despite satisfaction with the government, there has been a growing a fear of globalization, skepticism of development aid, and a Qfear of globalization, skepticism of development aid, and a tendency to &hide behind the dikes8 rather than fully engage with the outside world. Asked about helpful efforts to engage the Dutch, Van Geel said General Petraeus's full praise for the Dutch efforts during his September visit was a pleasant surprise -- parliamentarians had expected criticism. He noted that opposition parties were important to developing sufficient support for continued deployment, and therefore Mark Rutte of the Liberal Party (VVD) and Alexander Pechtold of D66 would be important contacts for the USG. The CDA had found it helpful to bring former members of Dutch government to parliament, where they offered less political arguments for staying. ¶4. (SBU) PRESS COVERAGE: The president's speech -- including positive reactions from key Dutch cabinet members -- garnered widespread coverage throughout the country on December 2. It was the lead story on the early morning TV and radio news programs. Although too late to make the morning papers, it was covered thoroughly on the websites of the major dailies, including links to a video and the full text of the speech. The headline of the nation's largest daily, ""De Telegraaf,"" read ""Heavy U.S. Pressure on Dutch Government: Stay in Uruzgan."" Various press outlets reported that Secretary Clinton called Foreign Minister Verhagen (a CDA member) last week, asking the Netherlands to ""reconsider"" its planned troop withdrawal. They also reported that Undersecretary of Defense Flournoy called Defense Minister Van Middelkoop with the same request. Although he declined to speculate on the Cabinet's upcoming decision, FM Verhagen commended the president's speech, adding that ""If everyone were to say 'let others take care of this,' Afghanistan would again be a free haven for terrorists in no time. The Netherlands cannot just pass the care for security in Afghanistan to others."" Van Middelkoop similarly praised what he called the President's ""clear and recognizable vision"" for the mission in Afghanistan, including the deadline of July 2011 to begin withdrawing U.S. forces and his call on NATO allies to provide more military troops. Like Verhagen, though, Van Middelkoop stressed that the Dutch government has made no decision about its military contributions after August 1, ¶2010. Labor Party spokesman Martijn van Dam said his party will continue to oppose retaining troops in Uruzgan. ¶5. (S/NF) OTHER REACTIONS: -- National Security Adviser Karel van Oosterom said that negotiations in coalition are moving ""inch by inch"" and are delicate. ""We are beginning to move Labor."" He advised against high-profile U.S. engagement, asserting it would be counterproductive at this time. Dutch NATO PermRep Ambassador Majoor intends to speak soon with Ambassador Daalder. On December 3, the Dutch Chief of Defense, General Van Uhm, will speak with the CJCS Admiral Mullen and SACEUR Admiral Stavridis. -- The Slovak ambassador to the Netherlands had high praise for the Dutch, telling the Dutch MOD political director during a reception that her nations' troops would be eager to expand their work with the Dutch in Uruzgan. -- Dutch Ambassador to the United States Jones-Bos told U.S. Ambassador she was willing to help as needed and that she was ""working"" Transportation Ministers Eurlings (CDA) and State Secretary for European Affairs Timmermans (Labor) to encourage coalition support for a longer-term Uruzgan commitment. ¶6. (S/NF) NEXT STEPS: Post will place an op-ed by Ambassador Daalder, and NATO SYG Rasmussen is also submitting a piece to the Dutch press. Ambassador will see the following key figures in the next few weeks: -- Dec. 4 -- Development Minister Koenders, a key decision-maker in the Labor Party -- Dec. 7 -- FM Verhagen and the head of parliament's defense committee, Anouchka van Miltenberg. -- Dec. 14 -- Opposition party leader Mark Rutte, of the Liberal Party, a possible proponent of the mission. -- Dec. 15 -- Head of parliament's foreign affairs committee, Henk Jan Ormel. ¶7. (S/NF) COMMENT: The PM's office recommends against high-profile USG visits at this time, and Post concurs. Our central goal is to convince the Netherlands to maintain after 2010 a PRT in Uruzgan with a few hundred troops for force protection. We expect them to withdraw nearly 1500 troops in 2010 while continuing their support with F-16s, enablers, and military and police training. The upcoming meeting with Minister Koenders, just after the Dutch cabinet meets on Friday, will be particularly informative. A U.S. QFriday, will be particularly informative. A U.S. announcement on who will take over Task Force Uruzgan will help us engage the Dutch to sustain their efforts in Afghanistan. END COMMENT. LEVIN | Verhagen pull-out Uruzgan (but calls NATO-HQ) | Last Minute Break-down - 19.01.2011 11:31
09THEHAGUE731 2009-12-04 17:05 2011-01-17 00:12 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy The Hague VZCZCXRO8136 PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL DE RUEHTC #0731/01 3381754 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 041754Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3536 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000731 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO AF NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: SWAYING THE DUTCH REF: A. STATE 124188 ¶B. USNATO 563 ¶C. THE HAGUE 726 D... 238255,12/4/2009 17:54,09THEHAGUE731,"Embassy The Hague",SECRET//NOFORN,09STATE124188|09THEHAGUE718|09THEHAGUE726|09USN ATO563,"VZCZCXRO8136 PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL DE RUEHTC #0731/01 3381754 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 041754Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3536 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000731 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO AF NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: SWAYING THE DUTCH REF: A. STATE 124188 ¶B. USNATO 563 ¶C. THE HAGUE 726 ¶D. THE HAGUE 718 Classified By: Pol Deputy Eric G. Falls for reasons 1.4(b,d) ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: All evidence suggests the Dutch will not/not retain a significant number of troops in Uruzgan, and the coalition government could fall over this issue. Pushing the government to collapse on this matter is not in our interest. Accepting Dutch compromise proposals is to our advantage. END SUMMARY. DUTCH LEAVING URUZGAN --------------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Ambassador pressed Development Minister Bert Koenders (Labor Party) to retain a Dutch military contribution in Afghanistan in a meeting December 4. Koenders observed that the pressure after the President,s speech is logical. He gave no insights that have not been in his recent, public statements. Koenders repeated that there will be no Dutch troops in Uruzgan after 2010 and flatly stated the Dutch would also not lead the PRT in Uruzgan. However, he did acknowledge that it is important for the Netherlands to continue to do its part for NATO and said there were ""discussions"" within the cabinet on committing Dutch troops elsewhere in southern Afghanistan. ¶3. (S/NF) D/PM / Finance Minister / Labor Party leader Wouter Bos recently declined a requested meeting with Ambassador Levin to discuss Afghanistan. He referred the Ambassador instead to Koenders, Bos's primary adviser on Afghanistan. In all public statements during the past several months, and repeated publicly as recently as two days ago, just after President Obama's speech, Bos has consistently stated the Dutch will leave Uruzgan in 2010. ¶4. (S/NF) Even Ministers that support continued involvement in Afghanistan at the most aggressive level have been clear about this basic point. FM Verhagen stated ""the U.S. knows that we will hand over the lead in Uruzgan"" in 2010. ¶5. (S/NF) Comment: The Labor Party has left no room for their own maneuvering on pulling everyone out of Uruzgan except for a few (12) development personnel. We expect the Labor Party could well bring down the government rather than extend the Uruzgan mission. The Labor Party's ""bread and butter"" is the economy, but the party is looking for an out to rally their rank and file. The Labor Party's poll numbers have been low for months, suggesting a steep loss of seats in a near-term election. Accompanying this poor performance has been criticism of Bos's leadership and his willingness to flip flop. We expect that rather than reverse course again and support a robust Uruzgan mission, Bos would opt to pull out of the coalition and campaign on Afghanistan. End Comment. GOVERNMENT COLLAPSE NOT IN OUR INTEREST --------------------------------------- ¶6. (S/NF) A collapse of the government hurts our chances for Dutch contributions and would delay any prospective Dutch contributions. ¶7. (S/NF) A collapse hurts our chances for significant Dutch military contributions. If Labor pulls the plug on the governing coalition at this time, it would likely make Afghanistan one of the central campaign issues. Dutch public support for the mission continues at a low level (33% as of October 30), suggesting that advocates for a deployment will lose seats in parliament. On the other hand, Geert Wilders' Qlose seats in parliament. On the other hand, Geert Wilders' far-right, isolationist Freedom Party stands to gain significant seats in parliament. In turn, a new governing coalition will likely be forced to include more parties to reach a majority. It's likely the coalition could shift to the left and include parties who are likely to oppose deployment after the elections' ""referendum on Afghanistan."" ¶8. (S/NF) A collapse of the government will delay additional Dutch contributions. New elections and the formation of a new government will take 5-10 months, possibly longer due to Wilders' popularity and the corresponding difficulty in forming a new government. Until the new government is formed, the caretaker government would not be able to approve a new military mission. Considering that Dutch troops are scheduled to depart this summer, as well as the planning required for an extension, withdrawal from Uruzgan will proceed as scheduled and a new deployment could easily be delayed until 2011. ACCEPTING DUTCH PROPOSALS IS TO OUR ADVANTAGE --------------------------------------------- ¶9. (S/NF) The new Dutch proposal -- maintaining a civilian PRT with protection by another ally, plus troops elsewhere in southern Afghanistan -- is better than waiting for a new coalition government that might not give us anything more, and could well give us less. Embassy counsels patience, deference and openness with Dutch government's efforts to sustain their Afghanistan deployment. PM Balkenende's consistent support for the Afghanistan mission and his success in leading his party to four consecutive wins in national elections give us confidence. We recommend deferring to the advice of Balkenende's National Security Adviser on not publicly pressuring the Dutch on Afghanistan. LEVIN | Looking Forward to a New Coalition | No Labour involved - 19.01.2011 11:43
09THEHAGUE759 2009-12-21 16:04 2011-01-17 00:12 SECRET Embassy The Hague VZCZCXRO2084 OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL DE RUEHTC #0759/01 3551628 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 211628Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3596 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0435 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000759 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO AF NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: CABINET DELIBERATING - LABOR PARTY LINES DRAWN REF: THE HAGUE 726 Classified By: Charge... 241007,12/21/2009 16:28,09THEHAGUE759,"Embassy The Hague",SECRET,09THEHAGUE726,"VZCZCXRO2084 OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL DE RUEHTC #0759/01 3551628 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 211628Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3596 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0435 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000759 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO AF NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/AFGHANISTAN: CABINET DELIBERATING - LABOR PARTY LINES DRAWN REF: THE HAGUE 726 Classified By: Charge Andrew C. Mann for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Dutch cabinet deliberations on Afghanistan are stalled going into the holiday break, with no clear indication when the impasse will be broken. Dutch post-2010 commitments to Afghanistan are being held hostage to the Labor Party's (PvdA) uncompromising stance. Ambassador's engagement with key leaders reveals few new assessments: Dutch will likely stay in Afghanistan focusing on training, enablers and development - outside of Uruzgan. END SUMMARY CABINET MEETINGS SIGNAL NEW LOW IN DELIBERATIONS --------------------------------------------- --- ¶2. (S) A sextet of ministers devoted their ""mini"" cabinet meetings to Afghanistan December 09 and 15. The sextet consists of Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende (Christian Democrats (CDA)), Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen (CDA), Finance Minister/Deputy Prime Minister Wouter Bos (Labor Party (PvdA)), Defense Minister Eimert van Middelkoop (Christian Unie (CU)), Development Cooperation Minister Bert Koenders (PvdA), and Youth and Families Minister/Deputy Prime Minister Andre Rouvoet (CU). ¶3. (S) The cabinet has not released any public information following the meetings. Verhagen's private secretary told the Embassy Balkenende, for the first time in a cabinet meeting, made a ""heartfelt pitch"" for staying in Uruzgan on December 9. The private secretary was not optimistic, however, about the future of the Uruzgan mission because the PvdA's political ""stranglehold"" was still in place. The cabinet reviewed three options: a substantially reduced Uruzgan presence, a training mission outside Uruzgan, and a PRT outside Uruzgan. Chief of Defense Staff apparently provided broad outlines of these scenarios at the December 15 meeting. DUTCH KEY LEADER ASSESSMENTS ---------------------------- ¶4. (S) PvdA - Bos has completely shunned the diplomatic corps, relegating Afghanistan discussions to Koenders who has categorically said the Dutch will not be in Uruzgan after 2010 except for development efforts. The Australian Ambassador met with PvdA Foreign Affairs spokesperson Martijn van Dam who was even more unyielding on the Uruzgan departure. He stated that if Dutch security was needed in Uruzgan for development efforts after 2010, then the Dutch would simply stop those efforts as well. The PvdA defense spokesperson opined that it would not be of any benefit for U.S. leaders to engage either Bos or van Dam as they were not ""open-minded"" on Afghanistan. The PvdA is a party in disarray; their December 12 party congress was very mixed. Although there was no formal party statement made on Afghanistan, Labor's position remained clear - it was standing firm on withdrawal of all troops from Uruzgan in ¶2010. Bos has stated he wants a Cabinet decision around January 8, before the Davids Commission issues it report about the political support the Dutch Government gave the U.S. decision to attack Iraq in 2003. Press commentary after the party congress heavily criticized Labor for failing to recognize: (1) any positive developments in Uruzgan over the past two years; (2) the importance for the Dutch to support the new NATO strategy and mission; and (3) the lives lost Qthe new NATO strategy and mission; and (3) the lives lost needlessly and effort wasted if the Dutch withdrew from Uruzgan. ¶5. (S) CDA - Verhagen told the Ambassador December 11 he thought the cabinet planned to have a decision prior to the late January London Conference on Afghanistan. Verhagen did not provide any new insight on what a final cabinet decision will entail. He and CDA parliamentary floor leader Pieter van Geel told the Ambassador the CDA MPs were not enthusiastic about continuing in Uruzgan past 2010, but would support any decision by the cabinet. Verhagen was not optimistic about what the cabinet would ultimately decide but he remained committed to serious Dutch involvement in Afghanistan. ¶6. (S) CU - Van Middelkoop told the Ambassador that discussions within the cabinet had been ""frustrating."" The THE HAGUE 00000759 002 OF 003 military leadership do not want to leave Afghanistan and are clearly concerned about being the ""odd man out"" within NATO as many other countries are stepping up their commitments. Van Middelkoop appears to support a serious commitment but does not see a way around the impasse caused by the intransigence of the PvdA. ¶7. (S) Opposition parties - Anouchka van Miltenburg (Liberal Party - VVD), Chair of the Defense Committee, told the Ambassador that the debate has everything to do with local politics and almost nothing to do with statesmanship. She said the PvdA will clearly put the government into a crisis over the decision if pressed by CDA. She sees no way to avoid that other than to compromise on a mission of some nature outside of Uruzgan. VVD party leader Mark Rutte told the Ambassador December 14 his party would support staying in Uruzgan. He speculated that if the cabinet went to a crisis over the issue the end result may be a coalition of VVD, CDA, D-66 and CU resulting in more serious support of NATO-led operations. Alexander Pechtold, D66 party leader, told Ambassador December 16 his party would support retention of a PRT and force protection in Uruzgan. He suggested a cabinet crisis was not in any of the coalition partner's interest. Pechtold believes the cabinet decision will be delayed as long as possible to distance a decision from the recent public comments to give them room to maneuver. In a meeting with POL/ECON Counselor, Mariko Peters, the GreenLeft party spokesperson for defense and foreign affairs (and former DCM at the Dutch Embassy in Kabul), said her party would support continued Dutch involvement in Afghanistan if it focused on community policing, even if Dutch police trainers needed Dutch troops to provide force protection to do their job. Geert Wilders of the Freedom Party (PVV) told the Ambassador December 10 the Labor Party had painted itself into a corner with no way out. It was in a lose-lose situation. It would probably agree to stay in Afghanistan someplace other than Uruzgan, but that would not placate its followers. Wilders supports the NATO mission in Afghanistan and praised the President's new strategy, but his party wants all Dutch troops to be withdrawn, ""it is time for others to step up and assume their responsibilities. The Dutch have done enough."" JOINT EFFORTS ------------- ¶8. (S) The results of the Ambassador's meetings with the party leaders are the same as those undertaken by the British, Australian and Danish Ambassadors. Comparing notes reinforced the overwhelming support of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister for a continued Uruzgan deployment, but frustration as arguments fall on deaf ears in the PvdA. The PvdA shows no realization of the impact a lack of significant commitment by the Dutch will have on their international stature. They also fail to grasp the overall costs and loss of credibility from leaving a successful PRT and establishing a completely new mission in a new location as Labor has proposed as an alternative. The British embassy has forwarded a suggestion that Foreign Secretary David Miliband, a Labor leader, contact Bos on a party-to-party basis to discuss Afghanistan. The Danish Ambassador believes that as Qdiscuss Afghanistan. The Danish Ambassador believes that as a small country with the same issues as the Dutch she can argue a different angle that may be helpful in urging the Dutch forward. COMMENT ------- ¶9. (S) Karel van Oosterom, the Prime Minister's Foreign Affairs and Defense Advisor (NSA equivalent), told visiting EUR/WE Office Director Maureen Cormack the cabinet was faced with finding consensus between the PvdA's absolute refusal to countenance an additional military mission in Uruzgan and the CDA's insistence that the Netherlands make a significant contribution to NATO's mission in Afghanistan. He recognized it was in no one's interest to bring the cabinet to crisis because of the important work the cabinet still needed to do. While mindful of Bos's Jan. 8 date, Verhagen's eye on the London Conference and Parliament's desire for a decision by March 1, van Oosterom said the Prime Minister will take whatever time is necessary to achieve the best result. PvdA Minister Koenders told the Australian Ambassador that Labor, with Bos's blessing, could support continued development THE HAGUE 00000759 003 OF 003 efforts through the PRT in Uruzgan (leaving 12 or so civilian development officers behind in Tarin Kowt with force protection provided by some other country), enablers, a force of as many as 500 soldiers deployed elsewhere in Afghanistan, and an increased financial contribution for development and training efforts. Given Labor's refusal to consider other options, that may be the best we can hope for. END COMMENT. MANN | |
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