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Saoedi-Arabië, Pakistan en Iran steunen Taliban
Wiki - 04.12.2010 01:40
In the current conflict, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia were each supporting their “preferred” Taliban groups. This time, however, Iran’s support was driven by “a war of objectives” not religious sympathies: Iran would even support Sunni Taliban to counter Western influence in Afghanistan, so long as the Taliban factions they supported were not affiliated with Mullah Omar.
Daudzai said that on occasion, young Afghan males are allowed to cross into Iran, where they are recruited and trained before returning to Afghanistan to fight against the GIRoA and Coalition Forces.
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #0436/01 0341358
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031358Z FEB 10 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5365
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000436
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/02/2020
TAGS PREL, IR, AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN’S OUTLOOK ON IRAN: A KARZAI INSIDER’S
VIEW
KABUL 00000436 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: D/Ambassador Ricciardone; Reasons (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: President Karzai’s Chief of Staff and former Ambassador to Iran, Omar Daudzai, offered the Palace’s outlook on Iran’s role in Afghanistan. Daudzai suggested that Karzai could provide “an open door” for the United States to engage Iran, at such time as the U.S. may judge this useful. Daudzai had found in Iran that paradoxically, the Iranian people hate foreigners, except for Americans; but that the Iranian revolution survives on its animosity towards the United States. He said that the Iranians no longer deny their support for the Taliban. While there is room for “indirect” U.S.-Afghan cooperation on Afghanistan, Daudzai cautioned that at best the Iranians would only “tolerate” our presence in Afghanistan. End Summary.
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We Can Help Open the Door to Iran
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¶2. (S) At a meeting within the GIRoA with COS Daudzai, D/Amb. Ricciardone asked for Afghanistan’s outlook on the anti-coalition Jundullah organization (Septel), and Karzai’s and Daudzai’s assessments of Afghanistan’s interests with Iran. Daudzai confirmed February 2, that only he and President Karzai had any substantial political engagement with the Iranian government. Karzai does pay close attention to Iran, Daudzai said, and he suggested that Karzai could help “open a door” for the United States to engage Iran “perhaps after Ahmadinejad leaves the scene,” or at any time the USG may judge useful. He explained that Karzai had maintained excellent relations with Iran and Khatami personally, and that Karzai had obtained the former Iranian president’s support for Daudzai’s appointment as Afghan Ambassador to Tehran. Relations had become more complicated with Ahmadinejad’s election. Daudzai went on to serve about a year and a half in Tehran, from 2004-2005.
¶3. (S) D/Amb. Ricciardone posited that, while President Obama and Secretary Clinton had made clear the United States’ willingness to discuss our differences with the Iranians, Iran evidently is not ready to engage with us. Even though we believe that many Iranians desire more normal relations with the United States, the Iranian government appears out of touch with its people, in particular an increasingly angry middle class.
¶4. (S) Daudzai related that after the first and only time he was “summoned to the MFA” for a complaint on alleged GIRoA support for Jundullah (Septel), and his categorical denial later proved true, he developed excellent relations with Iranian officials. Nonetheless, living in Tehran had been “challenging”. At first, Iranian intelligence shadowed Daudzai’s every move; after he told the Iranians that he was annoyed that he was being followed, the Iranians became more subtle in their approach. He was astonished that while there were no Sunni mosques in Tehran, an estimated 30 to 40 percent of its population was Sunni (combining Iranian and Afghan Sunnis residing there). He established an informal mosque in the basement of the Afghan Embassy, an act that drew much appreciation from the Sunni population.
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Iranian People Dislike Foreigners, Except Americans
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¶5. (S) Reflecting on his time in Tehran, Daudzai said he had reached two main conclusions: 1) “Common” Iranians hate foreigners, except for Americans, whom they “miss”. To illustrate, he said that even his wife’s doctor told her, “Please tell the Americans to bring their soldiers to our country next.” 2) paradoxically, the Iranian revolution lives on its animosity towards the United States. If this animosity ends, then the revolution will end. The national leadership knows this and thus do all they can to sustain “the revolution.” While Daudzai did not foresee that the Iranian revolution would end under Ahmadinejad’s tenure, he predicted that Ahmadinejad’s influence over the remainder of his term would wane. Therefore, he said, it was opportune to now start “preparing the ground” for U.S. relations with Iran under a better leader who would replace Ahmadinejad even though the Supreme Leader really “calls the shots.” Daudzai said that Iran’s “real” Foreign Minister is not Motaki, but rather Ali Akbar Velayati, who reports to the Supreme Leader.
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The Two Sides of Iranian Influence in Afghanistan
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¶6. (S) Daudzai said Iran’s influence in Afghanistan, like
KABUL 00000436 002.2 OF 002
Pakistan’s, has been both helpful and hurtful. (Last year, Daudzai had acknowledged that Iran paid limited amounts of money to the Palace only episodically and unpredictably. He contrasted this with sustained U.S. financial support to Afghanistan with far more than the Iranians’ occasional cash payment.) Iran and Pakistan each had supported their own favored Afghan Mujahedin groups against the Soviets, largely along religious affiliations. Likewise, in the current conflict, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia were each supporting their “preferred” Taliban groups. This time, however, Iran’s support was driven by “a war of objectives” not religious sympathies: Iran would even support Sunni Taliban to counter Western influence in Afghanistan, so long as the Taliban factions they supported were not affiliated with Mullah Omar.
¶7. (S) Daudzai said that two years ago when he raised with the Iranians their support for Afghan Taliban, they had flatly denied any involvement. However, over the past half year, the Iranians, including their Ambassador in Kabul, no longer deny this assertion -- now they remain silent, he said. Daudzai attributed the Iranian change in posture to their awareness that the GIRoA has evidence of Iranian support for some Taliban elements.
¶8. (S) Daudzai said that on occasion, young Afghan males are allowed to cross into Iran, where they are recruited and trained before returning to Afghanistan to fight against the GIRoA and Coalition Forces. The Iranians also recruit Afghan university students and graduates. Daudzai said that approximately 7,000 Afghans hold Iranian university degrees, including three of President Karzai’s cabinet picks, who “fortunately” Parliament did not confirm. He claimed that Iran is also offering three-year visas to Afghans who deposit USD 100,000 in an Iranian bank account.
¶9. (S) According to Daudzai, Iran grooms thousands of Afghan religious scholars. After completing their education in Iran, they return to Afghanistan to work in Madrassas, where they continue to receive “support packages” from Iran. The support package included a monthly salary. Daudzai claimed that a man named Ibrahim directed this program from the Supreme Leader’s office. He also asserted that in addition to financing Afghan religious leaders, Iran had provided salary support for some GIRoA deputy ministers and other officials, including “one or two even in the Palace.” Daudzai claimed that some of these officials had been relieved of their duties because “you can’t be an honest Afghan if you receive a (Iran) package.”
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U.S.-Iranian Convergence of Interests is Complicated
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¶10. (S) Daudzai opined that there could be room for indirect, but not direct, cooperation between Iran and the U.S. regarding Afghanistan. Iran at best would “tolerate” the U.S. participation in an area of common interest here, he said. He would reflect further on the subject and would look forward to continuing the conversation. Eikenberry
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| Read more about: antimilitarisme vrijheid, repressie & mensenrechten | | supplements | | Steun Pakistan | NN - 04.12.2010 02:09
Lieberman said. Karzai said he was currently revising the methods and would soon announce a strategy in which sub-commanders might be induced to reintegrate into Afghan society but reconciliation would need Pakistan to end its support for high-level Taliban.
 http://www.wikileaks.nl/cable/2010/01/10KABUL85.html
| | CIA & Saudi Arabia achter Al Qaeda | MM - 04.12.2010 06:48
Oud nieuws; de werkelijkheid is wellicht nog veel ernstiger.
Saudi Arabie is volledig verantwoordelijk voor het in de wereld helpen van het fanatieke Wahabisme.
http://google.com/search?q=wahhabism+saudi+arabia
Former CIA Director James Woolsey told Congress: "Wahhabi extremism today is the soil in which al Qaeda and its sister terrorist organizations are growing."
Het bewind in Saudi Arabie heeft weinig met het moslim geloof te maken en is een zeer nauwe partner voor de USA gov en het voormalige Bush bewind.
Gematigde 'priesters' werden vervangen door fanatieke. Er is melding van een gematigde die vermoord werd en door een CIA medewerker vervangen in Tucson Arizona.
Trek de lijn maar door. Oh, mag ik niet; "complot-theorieen". Tsja, de echte geheimen zijn nog steeds geheim en dit materiaal was laag geklassificeerd.
Nog wat feitjes dan. Osama Bin Laden ging met een neef Bin laden op verzoek van de CIA naar Afghanistan om het verzet tegen de Russen op te zetten. De Tora Bora is gebouwd door de CIA om bestand te zijn tegen Russisceh luchtaanvallen. De familie Bin Laden zat via een stroman in de Carlyle group, evenals Bush en evenals Tony Blair. Deze investeerden breed in de oorlogsmachine voor 911 en maakten dus vette superwinsten. Voorkennis? Pa Bush ging 2 posities hoger in de CIA nadat Kennedy vermoord was, een carrieresprong die volgens kenners vrijwel onmogelijk is. De vliegschool van een Nederlander in Flordia die de kapers trainde, was eerder gebruikt voor CIA coketransporten. De NLse eigenaar heeft een belastignschuld van 1 miljoen aan de NLse staat uitstaan wegens belastingfraude; toch heeft NL nooit beslag gelegd. Wie zou dat nu geregeld hebben? Het was overigens het Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft die Mo Atta naar de USA haalde, vermoemd na de grondlegger van IG Farben (o.a. Zyclon B; hoe halen ze het in hun hoofd om na WWII een vrijmetselaasr gezelschap naar hem te vernoemen?). Tsja en wie werkte daar ook vlak voor WWII... Prins Bernhard. Ga zo maar door. Er is geen bewijs wie de kapers op de vliegtuigen waren en van een vliegtuig is er eerder bewijs dat dit een drone of raket was die insloeg op het Pentagon. Exact aan de andere kant dan waar Dick Cheney zat en een manouvre die onmogelijk is voor een ongetalenteerde en ongetrainde Al Qaeda flapdrol. Goed; teveel om op te noemen, er is nog zoveel meer. Ja; de luchtverdediging natuurlijk. Er werd alarm gegeven voor een oefening, dus moest iedereen het gebouw uit. daarom waren de straaljagers er niet op tijd. Toen ze opstegen zouden ze ook eerst de andere kant zijn opgestuurd. Allemaal oude kost.
De oorlog tegen Irak was een leugen, zoals achteraf ook bleek. Ondertussen werd David Kelly vermoord die als enigste in staat was die oorlog tegen te houden, daar hij als enigste expert erop hamerde dat er geen weapons of mass destruction in Irak waren. Het is frappant dat dit nauwelijks in de wiki over hem naar voren komt, dus welke wikipedia deskundigen schrijven die wikis?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_David_Kelly
En nog steeds zoeken we Bin Laden en Al Qaeda, de voormalige medewerkers van Bush en CIA...
| | British secret service lessons... | 007 - 04.12.2010 07:46
Als je al die verhalen leest in de wiki en wikis van onderzoeken die daarin genoemd worden... Ze laten gewoon mensen wat beweren en dat wordt dan weer geciteerd. Vervolgens is er een die meent aan te tonen dat het toch een moord is, maar schrijft -nadat zijn vrouwtje is bedreigd en zijn schijf gewist- dat het dan Irakese fans zullen zijn geweest die Kelly vermoord hebben. Was dat de deal om je familie te beschermen voor die enkelingen die door het verdraai-bedrog bos jouw info weten te vinden?
MP says files into Kelly death have been wiped
http://news.scotsman.com/politics/MP-says-files-into-Kelly.2792178.jp
| | Saudi's geld financiert terroristen | Wiki - 05.12.2010 19:14
Friday, 29 May 2009, 11:46
C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000716
EO 12958 DECL: 05/22/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, EFIN, AF, PK, SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI INTERIOR MINISTRY BRIEFS SPECIAL ADVISOR
HOLBROOKE AND TREASURY DAS GLASER ON TERRORISM FINANCE
REF: RIYADH 702
Classified By: CDA DAVID RUNDELL, 1.4 (b),(d)
1. KEY POINTS:
-- (SBU) Special Advisor Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and Treasury DAS Glaser were briefed on Saudi terror finance efforts at a May 16 meeting with Interior Ministry (MOI) officials at the Security Forces Officers Club in Riyadh. Holbrooke also received a briefing on Saudi counterterrorism strategies (reftel). -- (SBU) Saudi Arabia will join the Egmont Group by the end of May 2009. -- (C) Holbrooke pushed for stronger cooperation in pursuing sources of funding for the Taliban, particularly in the Gulf States. -- (C) The Hajj is still a major security loophole for the Saudis, since pilgrims often travel with large amounts of cash and the Saudis cannot refuse them entry into Saudi Arabia. A new Saudi law requires arriving travelers to declare cash over certain amounts. -- (C) The MOI is concerned about funds flowing to Hizballah from the Saudi Shi'a community. -- (C) The political situation in Pakistan affects MOI's intelligence cooperation with Pakistan's ISI.
NEW SAUDI FIU PROMISES BETTER COOPERATION
2. (C) The briefing was delivered by officials from the MOI's new Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). They said the Saudi FIU's mission is to cooperate with all other authorities to combat money laundering and terrorism finance, and outlined the divisions of FIU and their responsibilities to receive, analyze, investigate, and act upon reports of terrorist finance activities in concert with other Saudi financial and law enforcement agencies. The FIU had a budget of $31 million in 2008.
3. (C) Holbrooke asked how the U.S. was working with the new FIU. DAS Glaser said FIU cooperation will enable Saudi Arabia to plug into the global terror finance context. The U.S. has tested the Saudi system with three requests and has received a good response. Glaser added that Saudi success in rolling up domestic terror cells has had a positive impact but the need now was to target financial donors and networks that channel the funds to AQ and the Taliban. The daily work of exchanging information with Saudi Arabia was going well.
4. (C) Holbrooke asked whether the relationship could be further improved. The Saudis replied that Saudi Arabia would join the Egmont Group by the end of May 2009. Holbrooke said terrorists exploit the seams between countries such as borders, free trade zones, and international networks such as Hawala systems, and that in this respect drug proceeds were not the primary source of funds for the Taliban; rather private donations from the Gulf were the chief source of Taliban financing. This indicated the need for a new level of cooperation, he said, to address funds flowing from the Gulf to the Taliban, AQ, and South Asian terrorist groups. In particular, the UAE, Pakistan, and the UK must be on board.
5. (C) MOI counterterrorism advisor Major General Khalid al-Humaydan said Saudi Arabia was working to create a "coherent plan" on terrorist finance that included establishing a legal basis for taking action against financiers. The MOI had no problem targeting organizations, he said, but preferred to go after financiers on an individual basis: "the bad apples, not the whole barrel," he said. With the FIU in place, he said, the MOI would be better able to "turn leads into tangible evidence" and follow up with counterpart authorities in other countries. "We used to call Dubai the 'Black Hole'," of terrorist finance, he said. Glaser agreed with the need for a comprehensive strategy. He said he understood the Saudi approach to focus on individuals rather than organizations, but there was another more common model that focused on organizations as part of a broader terrorist network.
HAJJ, HIZBALLAH, AND PAKISTAN
6. (C) MOI Senior Advisor Major General Dr. Sa'ad al-Jabri said the Saudi approach was based on the fact that Saudi Arabia had been in a war and had to act. Saudi authorities had detained over 4,000 individuals, some of whom were suspected of terrorist financing offenses and would act if supplied with information. Hajj was still a big problem for the Saudis, since they could not refuse to let pilgrims enter the country. Some of the non-Saudi terrorism detainees in Saudi Arabia had entered as pilgrims. The Saudi government recently passed a law requiring arriving travelers to declare cash above a certain amount, but Hajj was still "a vacuum in our security," he admitted. Another problem was money going to Hizballah from Saudi Shiites. The Saudis' focus had been on funds from Sunni sources, but they needed to focus on the Shi'a too, Dr. Sa'ad said.
7. (C) Holbrooke noted that Pakistan was also a center for terrorist financing through Islamic charities and asked whether the Saudis were monitoring the large Pakistani community in Saudi Arabia, and whether the Saudis were consulting with the governments of Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh about the issue. Al-Humaydan said the Saudis had detained numerous individuals from these countries and were seeking cooperation to investigate their activities. He added that "we talk to ISI (Pakistan's intelligence agency) and get a good response, but we think ten times before approaching them; things are changing there and we are advised to be careful." Political unrest and new ISI leadership were the principal changes, he said. As a result, he concluded, "We only trust face-to-face transmission of information." The MOI had shared information with ISI on Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia suspected of terror finance, but ISI had not responded.
DON'T FORGET IRAN
8. (C) Holbrooke asked whether the Taliban still found support in Saudi Arabia. Dr. Sa'ad answered that support from Saudi Arabia was less than it had been in earlier years, such as the 1980s, but was still present. Holbrooke asked about Iran, and Dr. Sa'ad replied that in the Saudi view, Iran was a "serious contributor" to terrorism activities in many places, including Yemen, North Africa, and Latin America.
9. (C) Holbrooke concluded by assuring his hosts of the U.S. commitment to cooperation on fighting terrorism and for better relations with the Muslim world.
10. (U) Meeting participants
U.S.
Special Advisor Ambassador Richard Holbrooke Barnett Rubin, Senior Advisor Dan Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury David Rundell, Charge d'Affaires Andrew Roth, Embassy Riyadh Edwin Brown, Embassy Riyadh (notetaker) Jeff Smith, Embassy Riyadh
Saudi Arabia
Major General Sa'ad al-Jabri, Senior Advisor, Ministry of the Interior
Major General Khalid al-Humaydan ("Abu Ali"), Counterterrorism Advisor, Ministry of the Interior
Brigadier General Ahmed al-Issa, U.S. Liaison, Ministry of the Interior
Captain Bandar al-Subaie, Assistant to MG Sa'ad al-Jabri
FIU briefers
11. (U) Amb. Holbrooke cleared this telegram.
RUNDELL
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